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ABSTRACT
The main goal of this dissertation is to develop an overarching defense of Kant’s
idea of the highest good, against the criticisms pointed out in the English-speaking world,
within the framework of the so-called “Beck-Silber controversy.”
As it is known, since the second half of the last century, when the “Beck-Silber
controversy” started, Kant’s idea of the highest good has been subject to a massive attack.
These attacks motivated, in turn, the emergence of a counterforce of defenders, a group
that I attempt to join through this work. Particularly, I have identified six criticisms
against Kant’s idea of the highest good, which I have labeled as the problems of
heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment. Thanks
to this, we know what a complete defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good requires.
Now, once with all these criticisms identified, I develop a response to each of them. In
that way, I show how Kant’s idea of the highest good does not undermines the principle
of autonomy; how the highest good has not only a place, but a privileged one in his moral
philosophy; how it is possible to promote a world in which happiness is distributed in
accordance to virtue; how the problem of injustice is both ungrounded and overestimated;
how the highest good is actually relevant for morality; and finally, that Kant did not
abandoned his idea of the highest good at the end of his life. In this way, I hope having
saved the highest good as part of Kant’s ethics.
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INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this dissertation is to develop an overarching defense of Kant’s
idea of the highest good (that ideal world in which virtue is crowned with happiness)
against the criticisms pointed out in the English-speaking world, within the framework of
the so-called “Beck-Silber controversy.”
As it is known, since the second half of the last century, when the “Beck-Silber
controversy” started, Kant’s idea of the highest good has been subject to a massive attack.
These attacks motivated, in turn, the emergence of a counterforce of defenders, a group
that I attempt to join through this work. Now, considering the large amount of secondary
literature produced in relation to this topic, and in relation to Kant’s philosophy in
general, one may ask whether there is something else to say about it. Has not the topic
been already exhausted? This I deny, mainly for three reasons.
First, because many of the commentaries found in the secondary literature, instead
of clarifying Kant’s idea of the highest good, distort it to the extreme in which one
wonders whether there is some of Kant’s philosophy left. Kant’s idea of the highest good,
therefore, is always at risk of being buried under these misleading interpretations. Some
of the interpretations, for sure, are instead illuminating, working as a good way of access
to Kant’s idea of the highest good, and to those I am thankful. Nonetheless, if it is still
possible to develop a fresh close reading of Kant’s idea of the highest good, as I will try
in Chapter I, then the risk of burying it is, at least, diminished.
1
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Second, because even though the discussion around this topic is still unified under
the umbrella of the “Beck-Silber controversy,” and although Mathew Caswell has, in
addition, helpfully divided the interpreters in four groups (the “critics,” the “revisionists,”
the “secularizers,” and the “maximalists”) , it is still possible to put more order over the
discussion, concretely by identifying and labeling all the criticisms posited against Kant’s
idea of the highest good, something that is lacking and that makes it harder, if not
impossible, to elaborate not only a defense, but an overarching defense of it. As a matter
of fact, in many instances the defenders seem to jump from one criticism to another,
without clarifying if the problems at stake are reducible to the supposed irrelevance of the
highest good for ethical purposes, or if each criticism deserves a separate response, as is
finally the case. This lack of systematization of the criticisms has misled many to say that
by responding to the problem of irrelevance the highest good is saved, which is not true.
And this is precisely what I am offering in Chapter II: a systematization of the criticisms,
a precondition for the referred to overarching defense. Particularly, I have identified six
criticisms against Kant’s idea of the highest good, which I have labeled as the problems
of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment.
Thanks to this, we know what a complete defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good
requires.
Third, because although some of the criticisms have been already contested in a
successful way by the defenders (that is, for instance, the case of the problems of
heteronomy and abandonment), it is still possible to develop new responses to some of
them, something that I undertake in Chapter III.
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This dissertation, therefore, is divided in three Chapters: the first devoted to a
fresh close reading of those sections of Kant’s oeuvre in which he talks about the highest
good; the second to the identification and labeling of the criticisms found in the
secondary literature in the English-speaking world (together with a historical and critical
analysis of the defenses found in the same literature); and the third, to an overarching
defense of the concept under discussion, a defense that the reader will hopefully find
original, accurate, and complete.
Now, this justifies the project undertaken here from the point of view of a
historical and critical study of Kant’s idea of the highest good. But there is another reason
that explains the importance of talking about Kant’s idea of the highest good at the
beginning of the 21st century, namely the crisis of orientation that is characteristic of our
times; in other words, the lack of an answer to the “whither” question, the question of
where are we orienting our lives and our world.
Among others, two facts characterize our world, the so-called ‘postmodern’
world. On one hand, the collapse of the ideal that was characteristic of the
Enlightenment, the ideal represented in the faith in progress and in the role of reason in
the construction of objective grounds for understanding the universe and for unfolding a
universal ethics. On the other hand, the replacement of such an ideal with a way of living
that is clearly the sign of decadence: base consumerism. But how this has happened?
Not only the violence that came with the world wars, the holocaust, and the
atomic bombs, but also the globalization that came with technology are responsible for
killing both the faith in progress and the search for a unique theoretical system that will
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explain the metaphysical structure of the universe and even more our role in it (for
instance, in the style of Hegel). Television has allowed us to witness, in real time, both
gross violence (like the fall of the Twin Towers, or the bombarding of Iraq in 2003) and
the existence of so many ways of living foreign to the Western style, that it is impossible
to hold the ideal that inspired the European citizen of the 18th century, to hold his naïveté.
We are too late for naïveté. Instead, we find ourselves living in the ruins of Modernity,
without having been able to find a new ideal towards which to orient our lives. We are
not, to be sure, the beneficiaries of Modernity, but its survivors, and we do not know (yet)
how to rebuild a new world, a new spirituality to fill the void that, like a black hole,
swallows our existence.
This existential void is our tragedy, one that is seriously aggravated by the way
that the “priests” of the new millennia, the corporations and their CEO’s, have been
allowed to take control not only of the material world, but even worst, of our spirituality.
The businessmen appear as the new educators, and wherever they go, whether by
television, internet, radio, signboards, etc., they impose the idea that our ultimate desire
for meaning can be filled with that which in turn feeds them: namely, consumerism.
Having killed metaphysics and religion as trustworthy paths to truth, beauty, and
goodness, the new salvation is to be found in base hedonism. We are, more than two
thousand years after Plato, still prisoners of the cave, perhaps more prisoners than ever.
The object has become the end, and the individual the object. We have become slaves of
objects. Is there a worse way of denigration?
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So instead of leading us to a meaningful life and to a better world, this hedonistic
culture is disintegrating us into as many parts as inclinations we have, and destroying the
world through its overexploitation. The mercantilist ideal, hence, is not only empty, a
mere appearance without substance, but destructive; it is, literally, killing us without
corresponding at all to what we ultimately need, call this the Good, eudaimonia, God,
beatitas, das höchste Gut, happiness, or felicidad.
But this corrupted ideal has not destroyed, and will never erase, our deepest
hunger for meaning. We are still, perhaps more than ever, starving for a new ideal. How
to rebuild one? There is, evidently, no manual for it. Nonetheless, we can always look
back to what the heroes of thought and spirituality have said about this. We can always
take hand of such heritage, learn from it; not in a dogmatic way, for sure, but as one that
contains outstanding examples of how an ideal should look. Kant’s idea of the highest
good can serve, therefore, as a model. His ideal of a moral world in which people are
virtuous and deservedly happy is, without doubts, a good example of what kind of world
we should be constructing, and hence where to orient our lives. Let’s, therefore, study it,
learn from it, be nurtured and inspired by it, and perhaps the new ideal, the one that
hopefully is already approaching us, crossing the spiritual world from the same fountains
of the future, will make its appearance.

CHAPTER I
THE HIGHEST GOOD THROUGH KANT’S OEUVRE
As it is known, the highest good receives special treatment in the Critique of
Practical Reason (1788), particularly in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason.”
Nonetheless, the highest good is a topic that Kant develops in many other works. The
three main accounts are found in the Second Critique, together with the Critique of Pure
Reason (1781/1787) and the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1794). Sporadic
references are also found in other works such as the Lectures on Ethics, the Critique of
Judgment (1790) and Theory and Practice (1793). From this it follows that, in order to
have a complete account of Kant’s conception of the highest good, it is necessary to go
beyond the Second Critique, and to include in our analysis what Kant has said about it in
these other works.
With this in mind (and these materials at hand), this chapter has four goals: first,
to present a narrative (non-critical) account of each description of the highest good
(including not only its definition, but also the setting of its possibility, the context in
which the concept emerges, etc.); second, to outline the logic that lies behind each
description (to display its engineering); third, to identify how Kant envisioned the highest
good (i.e. to find his “idea” of the highest good, his definition of it); and fourth, to find
out if the several descriptions differ or if they, instead, share the same essential
components.
6
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So before reviewing the vast discussion that this concept has generated in the
English-speaking world, and before entering into a historical and critical analysis of this
debate, I would like to present the highest good as Kant did in his works. In other words,
I will try to give a transparent account of what is said about the highest good in these
texts. In general terms, this will constitute the soil from which we will be able, later in
this work, to judge how faithful and accurate have been the interpretations and criticisms
of Kant’s idea of the highest good given in the secondary literature, and make our own
defense of the concept against the “critics.”
In relation to its structure, the chapter contains five sections. I will start with the
highest good as it is developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. Then I will do the same
with the Second Critique. In a third section, I will present the highest good according to
the Religion. Next I will compile the minor references found in his other works. Finally, I
would defend that Kant held one idea of the highest good, and that each account shares
the fundamental elements that are found in the others.
Now, before I begin the first section, I would like to give a warning by
highlighting that the narrative accounts that follow, and the corresponding outlining of
each account, are not critical. In that sense, the reader will not find a critique of those
parts in which it seems that Kant goes too fast, or when a superficial reading would
suggest that Kant is not proving his point. On the contrary, the descriptive nature of the
accounts that follow are closer to a (implicit, although in some parts explicit) defense
than to a critique, since they attempt to clarify what Kant says in relation to the highest
good in his works. Hence, like a conservative musician, my intention here is to loyally
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follow the “philosophical scores/sheets” that are found in these particular sections of
Kant’s books, i.e. to display their “truth” and “beauty.” The purely explicit defense will
come later, concretely in chapter III, and will be directed against the problems pointed
out by the “critics.” These said let’s start with the highest good as found in the First
Critique.
The Highest Good in the Critique of Pure Reason
The idea of the highest good in the Critique of Pure Reason is developed in the
second chapter of the “Transcendental Doctrine of Method,” particularly from
A804/B832 to A819/B847 (“On the Canon of Pure Reason,” second section). The sole
title of this section, which is “On the idea of the highest good (des höchsten Guts), as a
determining ground of the ultimate end of pure reason,” gives us a first glimpse of Kant’s
conception of the highest good. In fact, the highest good here is defined as the
determining ground of the final end of reason, which curiously happens to be the same
highest good; so the highest good is for Kant both a rightful determining ground of the
will, and an end, the most important end of pure reason.
The first paragraph starts with a brief reminder of what Kant claims to have
shown so far: the limits of reason in its speculative use; in other words, the human
impossibility of answering with scientific certainty the most fundamental questions (the
existence and nature of God, for instance, or of the human soul and immortality). Those
are ideas that exceed the limits of reason in its speculative use, and hence are
unknowable. Nevertheless, Kant does not want to stop his philosophical project here, and
invites us to try another experiment, to work out three new questions, namely: a. whether
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there is pure practical reason; b. whether pure practical reason can lead us to (and to some
extent grant) those ultimate ideas; and c. whether, hence, from its practical interest,
reason can attain what in relation to its speculative use it denied to us. The rest of the
section is devoted to answering these questions.
Kant begins his “experiment” with that widely known paragraph according to
which “all interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the
following three questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I
hope?” (CPR A804/B832). So reason is not only interested (or even primarily) in the
epistemological question. There are two other questions that are also fundamental, which
belong mainly to the ethical and religious domains (although these are, of course, not
completely independent from the epistemological one). Now, as Kant explains, the first
question is merely speculative and has been the main topic of his Critique of Pure
Reason. The second question, in turn, is purely practical, and it belongs to pure reason yet
in a moral sense. Finally, the third question, the question of hope, is described by him as
both practical and theoretical.
The question of hope is expanded in the following terms: “If I do what I should,
what may I then hope?” (CPR A805/B833). This extension gives us a hint of how it is
true that the question of hope is both practical and theoretical. In his own words, here
the practical leads like a clue to a reply to the theoretical and, in its highest form,
the speculative question. For all hope concerns happiness, and with respect to the
practical and the moral law it is the very same as what knowledge and the natural
law is with regard to theoretical cognition of things. The former finally comes
down to the inference that something is (which determines the ultimate final end)
because something ought to happen; the latter, that something is (which acts as
the supreme cause) because something does happen (CPR A805/B833).
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In simple terms, and anticipating a little bit what comes next, Kant is saying that
since there is a duty to promote the highest good, then the latter must be possible, and we
may then reasonably hope to partake of it in a future life. That is how, to some extent, the
question of hope is both practical and theoretical.
On What Should I Do?
From A806/B834 to A808/836 Kant answers the moral question, i.e. he presents
his moral theory in a nutshell, as it will be developed later (mainly) in the Groundwork
for the Metaphysics of Morals and in Critique of Practical Reason. This will, at the same
time, help us to answer the question of hope, because of the dual nature (theoretical and
practical) of this question.
Kant starts by defining happiness as the ‘extensive,’ ‘intensive,’ and ‘protensive’
(with regard to duration) satisfactions of all our inclinations. He then advances his well
known distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, although he does
not use these terms here. The former he identifies as rules of prudence (which are merely
pragmatic) and the latter as moral laws (which are properly moral). By the first we know
what to do in order to enjoy happiness; by the second what to do in order to become
worthy of happiness. Rules of prudence, according to him, are grounded in experience,
whereas the moral laws “can rest on mere ideas of pure reason and be cognized a priori”
(CPR A806/B835). Kant expressly declares that he believes in the existence of pure
moral laws which determine a priori the will, i.e. without regard to happiness. He bases
his belief in two facts: a. the proofs of the most enlightened moralists (although he does
not mention who these moralists are; only Leibniz is mentioned some paragraphs later);
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and b. the moral judgment of every human being, “if he will distinctly think such a law”
(CPR A807/B835). He will later give better grounds for this belief in the Groundwork
and in the Second Critique. From here he concludes that
pure reason contains – not in its speculative use, to be sure, but yet in a certain
practical use, namely the moral use – principles of the possibility of experience,
namely of those actions in conformity with moral precepts which could be
encountered in the history of humankind. For since they command that these
actions ought to happen, they must also be able to happen (…) (CPR A807/B835).
In simple terms, what he is saying here is that, since the moral laws command us
to become worthy of happiness, by putting order over our inclinations guided by the light
of reason, this must be possible (an argument that resembles the one mentioned before in
relation to the highest good, at CPR A805/B833). In other words, here we find Kant
establishing the famous principle according to which “ought implies can.”
What Kant does next is to introduce the concept of a moral world (eine
moralische Welt), which is defined as the world as it would be “if it were in conformity
with all moral laws” (CPR A808/B836). This moral world is qualified in five ways by
him: a. as possible by appealing to our rational nature (and hence to our freedom); b. as a
moral duty, as established by the moral laws; c. as an intelligible world; d. as a practical
idea that can and should impact the sensible world “in order to make it agree as far as
possible with this idea” (A808/B836); and e. as an object of pure reason in its practical
use and a corpus mysticum of the rational beings, one that has objective reality “as
pertaining to the sensible world (…) insofar as their free choice under moral laws has
thoroughgoing systematic unity in itself as well as with the freedom of everyone else”
(CPR A808/B836).
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Kant finishes this sub-section by asserting what was his goal so far: to answer the
second question, the moral question. Our moral duty is defined by him in the following
way: “Do that through which you will become worthy to be happy” (CPR A808/B836).
Now, Kant has not defined what the moral laws command. For instance, when he says
that we ought to become worthy of happiness, he is not telling us the way to do it. This
question is not answered with the idea of a moral world, since this is defined in relation to
the moral laws, which he has not presented. Of course we know that he will do that in
later works, but in strict relation to the First Critique, this is a void that must be
highlighted. In any case, we know that there is a moral world that is both a duty and an
end, and that by promoting such a world we become worthy of happiness.
On What May I Hope?
So far we are supposed to know what our duty is: to become worthy of happiness
by promoting the moral world (although we do not know what the moral laws that will
shape the moral world command). Now it is the turn of the question of hope to be
answered, and that is what Kant aims to show in this sub-section.
The question of hope -as he reiterates at this point- also “concerns the practical
interest” (CPR A808/B836). In that sense, it is wrong to think that, for Kant, the moral
question is limited to the question of duties. Now, the question of hope is established by
him in the following form: do the principles of pure reason that prescribe the moral law
according to which I ought to become worthy of happiness also connect this hope for
happiness with it? The answer according to Kant is yes, but how is this true?
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He starts defending his thesis by saying that just as the moral laws are necessary
according to pure practical reason, the personal hope for a world in which virtue will be
rewarded with happiness must also be thought as reasonable, according to “reason in its
theoretical use (theoretischen Gebrauch)” (CPR A809/B837). Hence, in the idea of pure
reason, “the system of morality is (…) inseparably connected with the system of
happiness” (CPR A809/B837). This, of course, does not mean that the moral action is
that which is done for the sake of happiness (that would be utilitarianism or, more
broadly speaking, consequentialism), or that the moral action necessarily produces
happiness in this world (as the Stoics would defend by equating happiness with
contentment, which is the satisfaction of being virtuous, as he explains later in the Second
Critique). Instead, Kant is only trying to set the foundations of a reasonable hope for the
virtuous (since we cannot do without the question of hope, and hence of the final end of
all our actions, as he stated at the beginning of the Canon, and as he will make more
explicit later in the Religion), by pointing to some sort of distributive divinely-based
justice, as we will see immediately.
At this point Kant returns to the idea of the moral world (that world in which
everybody would act for the sake of the moral laws), and argues that in such a world
a system of happiness proportionately combined with morality can also be
thought as necessary, since freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral
laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness, and rational beings, under
the guidance of such principles, would themselves be the authors of their own
enduring welfare and at the same time that of others (CPR A809/B837).
But why is this true? We could say, for instance, that because in such a world
people will respect (and hence not harm) each other, a fact that by itself contributes to
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happiness; also, because to reward virtue is a duty that follows from the moral law
(something that will be unfolded extensively in Chapter III). Now, the realization of such
a world will only happen if everybody follows the moral law, Kant says; in that sense, it
is something that escapes our individual efforts (in other words, is beyond our individual
power). Nonetheless, we are still bound by the moral law to promote such a world.
Hence, Kant asks: how such a connection between virtue and happiness can still be
thought as possible for the individual that acts virtuously? This connection, he asserts,
cannot be grounded merely in nature, but still may be hoped for if it is grounded on what
he calls a “highest reason” (CPR A810/B838). And this is the moment in which the idea
of the highest good is introduced. In his own words,
I call the idea of such an intelligence, in which the morally most perfect will,
combined with the highest blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world,
insofar as it stands in exact relation with morality (as the worthiness to be happy),
the ideal of the highest good (das Ideal des höchsten Guts). Thus only in the ideal
of the highest original good (des höchsten unsprünglichen Guts) can pure reason
find the ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the
highest derived good (des höchsten abgeleiteten Guts), namely of an intelligible,
i.e., moral world (moralischen Welt) (CPR A810/B838).
This paragraph is fundamental for the following reasons. First, as it has been
mentioned, in it the highest good is presented for the first time in the book (at least under
the express title). Second, since in it we find that, for Kant, there is not only one highest
good, but two: the original (unsprünglichen), which is God, and the derived
(abgeleiteten), which is the moral world, a world in which virtue is rewarded with
proportioned happiness. Third, since in it is established that the postulate of God is
required for the highest (derived) good to be possible, at least in its total completion.
Now, along with God, Kant adds that a future life is also required as a presupposition to
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make complete sense of the idea of the highest good, because the sensible world by itself
does not offer to us the desired connection between virtue and happiness. That is how, for
Kant, “God and a future life are two presuppositions that are not to be separated from the
obligation that pure reason imposes on us in accordance with principles of that very same
reason” (CPR A811/B839).
As we can see, God and immortality, two ideas that could not be granted to be
objects of knowledge by pure reason in its speculative use, suddenly reappear on the
stage as reasonable and even unavoidable presuppositions, thanks to the same pure reason
but in its practical use. That is how Kant answers at a stroke the three questions presented
at the beginning of the section, namely whether there is pure practical reason, whether the
latter can lead us to those supreme ideas such as the ideas of God and immortality, and
hence whether pure practical reason can grant to some extent what pure reason in its
speculative use denied to us. The answer in all cases is, as we can see, affirmative.1
Kant then elaborates on how it is true that both God and immortality are two
necessary presuppositions. In his view, as rational beings we are compelled either to
assume the existence of God and of a future life in the moral world (a world in which
happiness will be distributed in accordance to virtue), or “to regard the moral laws as
empty figments of the brain, since without that presupposition their necessary success,
which the same reason connects with them, would have to disappear” (CPR A811/B839).
As we can see, without those presuppositions not only hope is endangered: even the
moral laws are at risk, insofar as they would become pointless if the highest good were
1

This is just another example of how it is not true that Kant abolished metaphysics, as it is usually repeated
in the Academia: his sole intention was to refound it, to lead metaphysics to the so-called “secure path of
science.”
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impossible. Moral laws are commands, and as commands they carry promises and
threats, Kant asserts. Now, in order to carry these things they (the moral laws) must “lie
in a necessary being,” namely God, the guarantor of such a “purposive unity” (CPR
A811/B839).
In his next move, Kant introduces the concept of “maxims,” which he defines as
practical laws “insofar as they are at the same time subjective grounds of actions”
(A812/B840). With this definition in hand, he then asserts as necessary that our life
should be subordinated to moral maxims. But, he adds, this would not be possible if
reason did not connect the moral law with an efficient cause that could grant the highest
good, i.e. the moral world. From here he concludes that
without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the
majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration
but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they would not fulfill the
whole end that is natural for every rational being and determined a priori and
necessarily through the very same pure reason (CPR A813/B841).
In simple terms, this passage means that, if the highest good were impossible, the
moral agent will lose a moral incentive. This becomes clear if we think of the highest
good as a project on which we are engaged. Now, as in any project, if we knew from the
outset that the project is impossible, clearly we will lose the required motivation for
working on the project, namely the motivation of knowing that our efforts are effective,
i.e. that the moral law is possible and not a mere chimera.
With a position that he will keep and repeat in the Second Critique, Kant then
asserts that neither happiness nor virtue constitute the complete good for reason. Only
deserved happiness constitutes the complete good. To prove this he brings up the
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example of the “impartial judge,” who will certainly distribute happiness in accordance to
virtue if it were in his power. Now why this is the case? Because for Kant “in the
practical idea both elements are essentially combined” (CPR A813/B814), but in such a
way that virtue shapes happiness, never vice versa. And that is how Kant arrives at his
final definition of the highest good as it is developed in the First Critique: “Thus
happiness in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings, through which they are
worthy of it, alone constitutes the highest good of a world (das höchste Gut einer Welt)
(…)” (CPR A814/B842), an intelligible one that we are called to approach, but that can
only be fully brought about by God. And this is how Kant answers the third question,
namely the question of hope: in simple terms, if there is a duty to promote the highest
good, then we have a moral need to assume that the highest good is possible, which in
turn lays the ground for a hope for it, i.e. for the hope that the moral world will eventually
happen, and that we will receive happiness as a reward for virtue.
Concluding Remarks
Kant finishes this sub-section by underlining, among other things, how pure
reason in its practical use is able to lead us to the idea of God, the highest (original) good,
something impossible from its speculative use. In that way, he has answered the three
questions pointed at the beginning, namely that there is pure practical reason; that this
can lead us to the supreme ideas of God, immortality, etc.; and that pure reason in its
practical use is able, at the very end, to reach higher peaks than pure speculative reason,
and hence is more successful in relation to our ultimate expectations as human beings
(without saying, it is important to clarify, that there are two reasons in conflict: it is one
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reason analyzed from different perspectives, namely in relation to its theoretical and its
practical uses).
The Highest Good in the First Critique (in a Nutshell)
As a way of summarizing and grasping the quintessence of Kant’s argument in
relation to the highest good in the First Critique, we can say that this is unfolded as
follows:
1. Reason’s ultimate interest is to answer three fundamental questions: What can I
know? What should I to do? And what may I hope (if I do my duty)?
2. What can I know? Only things as they appear to us (not the things in themselves).
3. What should I do? Become worthy of happiness by promoting the highest good,
i.e. a world governed by pure moral laws.
4. In the idea of a moral world happiness and virtue are necessary connected, insofar
as people will not harm each other and, furthermore, since people will reward
each other’s virtue and their own with happiness. The latter is true since the
rewarding of virtue is also a duty.
5. The highest good is beyond our power, but is still a duty for us individually (a
duty to promote). Hence, how could we think of it as possible? By postulating the
existence of God and of a future life.
6. But why is this step (that of recurring to the postulates) necessary? Because, if the
highest good were impossible, the moral laws would be pointless, and the moral
agent would lose an incentive, the incentive of knowing that his moral efforts are
not pointless. Morality, hence, will stand in quicksand without the highest good.
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7. That is how we must assume that the highest good is possible: not because we
need happiness, but because it is a duty for us to promote it. But this has a
collateral effect: we can reasonably hope that the highest good will come to
reality, and hence that we will be rewarded for our virtue. So what may I hope (if
I am virtuous)? I can hope for the highest good, which therefore appears not only
as a duty, but simultaneously as an object of hope.
The Highest Good in the Critique of Practical Reason
The Highest Good in the Preface
The concept of the highest good in the Critique of Practical Reason is first
mentioned by Kant in the preface. After having explained why his book does not
constitute a critique of pure practical reason, but rather a critique of practical reason, he
asserts that, together with the existence of the former, transcendental freedom is
established (a concept that, in his opinion, is the keystone of the whole system of pure
reason). In fact, for Kant freedom is proved by what he qualifies as a fact of reason,
namely the moral law. And not only freedom: the concepts of God and immortality also
get certainty through practical reason, although in a different degree. That is how pure
practical reason happens to be more successful than pure reason in its speculative use,
since by means of it we get certainty of concepts that remained uncertain to us by the
latter, as we have already seen in the analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason.
Among those concepts, namely freedom, God and immortality, Kant asserts that
the first (freedom) is “the only one the possibility of which we know a priori” (CPrR 5:4),
since it is the condition of the moral law. That the latter assertion does not contradict
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what Kant said before, namely that the moral law proves freedom, is explained by him in
a footnote, in which he clarifies that freedom is the ratio essendi of the moral law, while
the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom; so each is the condition of the other in
a different way.
Now, while freedom is considered the condition of the moral law (to the extent
that without freedom it would be impossible for there to be a moral law of selflegislation), the concepts of God and immortality are not. They are, instead, “conditions
of the necessary object of a will determined by this law, that is, of the mere practical use
of our pure reason; (…) they are (…) conditions of applying the morally determined will
to its object given to it a priori (the highest good (das höchste Gut))” (CPrR 5:4). That is
how we get to the idea of the highest good, which is preliminarily presented here by him
as both a necessary object of the will determined by the moral law and an object given a
priori by reason.
So the moral law, which is a fact of reason, proves freedom. Freedom, in turn, is
the condition of the moral law. Now, a will determined by the moral law (a free will) has
an object which is determined a priori: the highest good. But just as freedom was the
condition of the moral law, the concepts of God and immortality are the necessary
conditions for the highest good. Hence, although there is not any theoretical insight into
these supreme concepts, morality leads us to them and compels us to assume their
existence (and, even more, they take objective reality as practical knowledge). In other
words, for Kant it would be unreasonable not to assume the existence of God and
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immortality, which are the conditions of that object which “one ought to set unfailingly
as the aim of one’s conduct” (CPrR 5:5).
The Highest Good in the Analytic
The highest good is mentioned at least twice in the “Analytic of Pure Practical
Reason.” Concretely in Chapter I of the Analytic (“On the Principles of Pure Practical
Reason”), Kant tells us how “the moral law in fact transfers us, in idea, into a nature in
which pure reason, if it were accompanied with suitable physical power, would produce
the highest good (das höchste Gut) (…)” (CPrR 5:43). Two basic ideas are captured here;
in the first place, that the concept of the highest good follows from the moral law; and
second, that the highest good seems to be ultimately possible (in its totality) under the
existence of pure reason and suitable physical power (one that exceeds ours, as has been
anticipated in the First Critique and as will be repeated in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical
Reason”).
The concept of the highest good is also mentioned in Chapter II of the Analytic
(“On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason”), this time in relation to the
ancients, who in Kant’s opinion erred by placing the highest good as the keystone of
morality, i.e. as the proper determining ground of the will, without having identified the
moral law first as its unconditioned condition. This, in his opinion, leads to heteronomy,
and that is precisely what he tries to surpass by arguing that it is the moral law that
determines what is good, and not vice versa. He does not deny, we already know, the
importance of the concept of the highest good for morality, but this is a concept that must
come later. In his words, the highest good is
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an object which can much later – when the moral law has first been established by
itself and justified as the immediate determining ground of the will – be
represented as object to the will, now determined a priori in its form; and this we
will undertake in the Dialectic of pure practical reason (CPrR 5:64).
It is precisely in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason” where Kant presents his
most developed account of the highest good, and that is the topic of the next sub-section.
The Highest Good in the Dialectic
Preliminary Remarks
Just as pure speculative reason seeks the unconditioned for the theoretically
conditioned, so pure reason in its practical use does. The kind of problems that this
generates in the former case, and how they are resolved, was the main topic of the First
Critique. Now Kant wants to approach the same phenomenon at the level of morality.
Pure practical reason, he asserts, also has its dialectic, since “it seeks the unconditioned
totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the highest good (des
höchsten Guts)” (CPrR 5:108). As we can see, and as he clarifies, this search for the
unconditioned condition is not satisfied by the moral law, which works as the
determining ground of the will. Instead, the attention is turned at this level to what he
calls the object of pure practical reason, i.e. the highest good.
But before he enters into the Dialectic, Kant makes a fundamental preliminary
remark: he clarifies how the highest good can be considered the determining ground of
the will without bringing heteronomy into morality. First he reminds us of what he has
already explained in the Analytic, namely that the moral law is the sole proper
determining ground of the will. The moral law determines what is good, and not vice
versa. No empirical object can determine the will without bringing heteronomy with it.
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That is why the highest good, as object of a pure practical reason, cannot be considered
the determining ground of the will. In other words, it cannot take the place of the moral
law. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which we could say that the highest good is the
determining ground of the will. This is possible, Kant says, since the moral law is part of
the highest good; moreover, is its supreme condition. In his own words,
it is, however, evident that if the moral law is already included as supreme
condition in the concept of the highest good, the highest good (das höchste Gut) is
then not merely object: the concept of it and the representation of its existence as
possible by our practical reason are at the same time the determining ground of
the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included and thought in
this concept, and no other object, in fact determines the will in accordance with
the principle of autonomy (CPrR 5:109).
That is how the highest good happens to be both the determining ground of the
will and the object of pure practical reason.
The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason
Kant starts chapter II of the Dialectic by clarifying the distinction between the
complete good and the supreme good, considering that both could be identified as the
highest good and hence lead to confusion. The supreme good is virtue, since it is the
“condition which is itself unconditioned;” but virtue cannot be considered the complete
good “as the object of the faculty of desire of rational finite beings” (CPrR 5:110).
Instead, the complete good must also include happiness as one of its components. In
order to prove this he refers us, as he did in the First Critique, to the idea of an “impartial
judge,” who will necessarily agree in this respect. Explaining this a little more, any
impartial reason with enough power to proportion virtue in accordance to happiness will
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find it improper not to do it. This is how he arrives at his first substantial definition of the
highest good (in the Second Critique, at any rate):
virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a
person (des höchsten Guts in einer Person), and happiness distributed in exact
proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)
constitutes the highest good of a possible world (das höchste Gut einer möglichen
Welt) (CPrR 5:110).
As it is established, the highest good is composed by both virtue and happiness,
with virtue as its supreme component. Happiness, it is important to clarify, is also good,
but not unconditionally good, i.e. not good in itself. The highest good could also be
considered both in relation to a person and to a world, and these views are not opposed.
In fact, in this case we are seeing the same phenomenon from two perspectives: from the
perspective of the individual that is a member of that ideal world, and from the
perspective of the ideal world as a whole, all its members included.
So far we have a basic definition of the highest good. The next question that needs
to be solved is how the highest good is practically possible. In Kant’s words, “two
determinations necessarily combined in one concept must be connected as ground and
consequent, and so connected that this unity is considered either as analytic (logical
connection) or as synthetic (real connection) (…)” (CPrR 5:111). In the ancient world,
the Stoics and the Epicureans considered that the unity was analytic, i.e. that the pursuit
of happiness and of virtue were identical. They only differed at the moment of deciding
which element was more fundamental (the ground of the other). For the Epicureans,
happiness was fundamental, and hence they argued that to strive for happiness is to be

25
virtuous; for the Stoics, on the other hand, virtue was fundamental, so they propose that
to be virtuous leads to happiness. As Kant explains in relation to this,
the Stoics maintained that virtue is the whole highest good, and happiness only
the consciousness of this possession as belonging to the state of the subject. The
Epicureans maintained that happiness is the whole highest good, and virtue only
the form of the maxim for seeking to obtain it, namely, the rational use of means
to it (CPrR 5:112).
Nevertheless, they were mistaken, according to Kant, insofar as they looked for
unity in two heterogeneous forces. Virtue and happiness are in fact so heterogeneous that
they often collide in a person’s ordinary life. That is why the moral law requires from us
to put limits on our inclinations when the satisfaction of them implies treating the others
or ourselves as mere means, and not as ends. The virtuous action makes us worthy of
happiness, but many times requires that we renounce happiness. It could even require
from us that we sacrifice our lives. Now, if this is true, the answer to the question “how is
the highest good practically possible?” (CPrR 5:112) remains hidden.
The analytic union of happiness and virtue, as has been shown, is not possible;
hence, that union must be a synthetic one. This we know a priori, not from experience.
We know both that the highest good is practically necessary and that the union of its
components must be synthetic. Therefore, Kant concludes, “the deduction of this concept
must be transcendental. It is a priori (morally) necessary to produce the highest good
(das höchste Gut) through the freedom of the will: the cognition of its possibility must
therefore rest solely on a priori grounds of cognition” (CPrR 5:113).
So far Kant has shown us the following: a. the highest good is the complete good,
understood as happiness in proportion to virtue both for a person and for a possible world
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(virtue being the supreme good); b. a synthetic union of happiness and virtue is required;
and c. the deduction of the conditions of the possibility of the highest good must be
transcendental. He then presents the antinomy corresponding to this dialectic at numeral
1 of Chapter II of the Dialectic.
The Antinomy of Practical Reason
The fact that the combination of the elements that shape the highest good must be
a synthetic one leaves us with two possibilities: either the desire for happiness is the basis
of morality, or virtue causes happiness. The first possibility Kant qualifies as absolutely
impossible, since our inclinations are the basis of heteronomy, the opposite of morality.
The second possibility is also impossible since virtue does not necessarily produce
happiness (happiness being the consequence of rules of prudence, not of the moral law).
Now, if the highest good happens to be impossible, Kant argues, the moral law must be
regarded as false:
since the promotion of the highest good (des höchsten Guts), which contains this
connection in its concept, is an a priori necessary object of our will and
inseparably bound up with the moral law, the impossibility of the first must also
prove the falsity of the second. If, therefore, the highest good (das höchste Gut) is
impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which
commands us to promote it, must be fantastic and directed to empty imaginary
ends and must therefore in itself be false (CPrR 5:114).
This point clearly resembles that found in the First Critique (CPR A811/839), as
we have seen before. What is at stake here, once again, is nothing less than the success of
the categorical imperative, that “fact of reason” that proved freedom, freedom that in turn
was qualified by Kant at the beginning of the Second Critique as the “keystone of the
whole structure of a system of pure reason” (CPrR 5:4). Therefore, it is not only the
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moral law that is at risk: the whole system is endangered. This explains the urgency of a
proper solution of the antinomy, i.e. of this apparent conflict of practical reason with
itself.
In relation to this, it is important to clarify that the moral law is still a fact of
reason, which does not depend on anything else, as Kant has shown in the Analytic.
Nonetheless, in its fullness, as completing its aims it requires the possibility of its highest
end. This is what Kant means when he says that, without the highest good, the validity of
the moral law is endangered.
Critical Solution of the Antinomy
The solution is found at numeral II of Chapter II of the Dialectic. According to
Kant, to say that virtue is the cause of happiness is only conditionally false for humans,
since we also partake of the intelligible world, i.e. since we are not merely members of
the sensible world. That we also partake of the intelligible world is shown first by the fact
that we can reasonably think of ourselves as noumena in the world of understanding (as it
was shown in the First Critique), but mainly thanks to the moral law, which is a “purely
intellectual determining ground of my causality (in the sensible world)” (CPrR 5:115).
Hence, as he states,
it is not impossible that morality of disposition should have a connection, and
indeed a necessary connection, as cause with happiness as effect in the sensible
world, if not immediately, yet mediately (by means of an intelligible author of
nature), a connection which, in a nature that is merely an object of the senses, can
never occur except contingently and cannot suffice for the highest good (CPrR
5:115).
From this it follows that the highest good, i.e. the synthetic union of virtue and
happiness, in which the former produces the latter, is practically possible. And that is
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how the validity of the moral law is reasserted, this time in relation to its ultimate goal.
Here we also see that the connection between the two elements is not an immediate one,
but mediated. The latter makes sense since, as it was shown in the Analytic, and as it has
been mentioned before, virtue does not necessarily grant happiness in our ordinary lives.
The connection, then, will be thrown by Kant to a future life, and granted by the original
highest good, namely God, as we will see later.
Now, in this same section Kant brings the concept of “contentment with oneself”
(Selbstzufriedenheit) to the scene, seemingly as an example of how virtue (freedom) can
be the immediate source of some enjoyment, which is, nevertheless, neither compared
with happiness, nor with holiness. Contentment is the (negative) satisfaction with one’s
existence that accompanies the self-awareness of being virtuous. Now, despite the fact
that the feeling of contentment is the result of being autonomous, i.e. of putting the moral
law above our inclinations, this cannot be an example (and hence a proof) of virtue as
source of happiness, because happiness is the satisfaction of our inclinations. In other
words, it is a positive feeling, whereas contentment is qualified as a negative one, in the
sense that it is the result of freedom and not of the satisfaction of an inclination. They
(contentment and happiness) have different sources and hence different natures. But Kant
also wants to clarify how contentment is not yet beatitude (Seligkeit), which requires
complete independence from the inclinations. Nonetheless, according to Kant,
contentment is closer to beatitude than to happiness, since both beatitude and
contentment have the same origin: independence from needs, self-sufficiency.
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At the closing of this sub-section, Kant claims to have solved the antinomy of
pure practical reason by showing that the highest good can be thought as possible. Now
he wants to “set forth the grounds of that possibility” (CPrR 5:119), both in relation to
what is in our hands, namely virtue, and what is in greater measure beyond our power,
namely happiness as a reward for that virtue.
The Postulates of Freedom, God, and Immortality
As a preamble of his account of how the postulates of God, immortality, and
freedom are practically necessary, Kant clarifies how pure reason in its practical use has
primacy over pure speculative reason (Chapter II, numeral III). He does that for an
important reason. Kant wants to make clear that he is not contradicting himself or
denying the conclusions arrived in the First Critique, namely that the ideas of God,
immortality, and freedom surpass our cognitive capacity, and hence are unknowable from
the speculative point of view. This is still true, but if the same pure reason in its practical
use regards those ideas as necessary (as Kant has already shown at the end of the First
Critique, and will argue again), we cannot simply discard them. What is required here is
to establish which of them prevails: either pure speculative reason or pure practical
reason (which is, at the very end, the same reason analyzed from two different
perspectives, in relation to its uses). Otherwise, a conflict would arise: pure reason in two
of its different uses will be fighting against itself. Kant’s solution goes as follows:
one cannot require pure practical reason to be subordinated to speculative reason
and so reverse the order, since all interest is ultimately practical and even that of
speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone
(CPrR 5:121).
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This conclusion is fundamental, not only because in this way Kant is saving the
coherence of his whole philosophical system (there is no contradiction in postulating the
ideas of God, immortality, and freedom as practically necessary), but mainly because he
is asserting that ethical interests prevail over epistemological ones.
Once he has made this point clear, Kant starts his defense of the postulates,
starting with that of immortality (Chapter II, numeral IV). The practical necessity of the
postulate of the immortality of the soul is defended in the following way. As we know,
the supreme condition for the highest good is virtue, but virtue in what degree? For Kant
a “complete conformity of the will with the moral law” (CPrR 5:122) is required; in other
words, holiness. Holiness is what the moral law requires from us, but this generates a
problem, since human beings, as rational but finite beings, are not capable of holiness at
any time of their lives. On the contrary, holiness can only be thought as possible in an
endless progress, which in turn is only possible in beings that are immortal souls.
Therefore, Kant asserts, “the highest good (das höchste Gut) is practically possible only
on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected
with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason” (CPrR 5:122).
Now, this idea of holiness as a state attainable only through an endless progress is
useful for Kant not only because it –to some extent- grants an idea that was not possible
to secure from the speculative perspective (namely, the immortality of the soul), but also
for religious purposes. Without this postulate (and hence without this moral vocation) one
could either become indulgent with respect to the moral law, or else get the false illusion
that it is possible to attain holiness in this life. “In both cases” –Kant asserts- “constant
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effort to observe precisely and fully a strict and inflexible command of reason, which is
yet not ideal but true, is only hindered”; and he continues: “for a rational but finite being
only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible” (CPrR
5:123).
All this in turn leads to the idea of hope. In other words, this justification of the
postulate of immortality of the soul makes it reasonable for finite rational beings like us
to hope for that immortality, thanks to which we will be able to approach holiness, which
in turn is commanded by the moral law and is contained in the highest good as its
supreme condition. In Kant’s words, humans “may hope for a further uninterrupted
continuance of this (moral) progress” (CPrR 5:123)2.
The postulate of the immortality of the soul, as we can see, follows from the
moral law and grants what is in greater degree within our power in relation to the highest
good, namely virtue. Now it is necessary to understand how the second element of the
highest good, i.e. happiness in proportion to virtue, could be possible. And here the
postulate of God appears on the scene (Chapter II, numeral V).
Once again the moral law leads us to an idea or postulate that could grant the
highest good, this time in relation to its subordinated component and from the standpoint
of an impartial reason. This postulate is no other than God. The argumentation starts with
a definition of happiness: “Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the
whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will (…)” (CPrR
2

The fact that he asserts that immortality is also an object of hope could be thought as problematic, insofar
as immortality seems to have a stronger status as a necessary postulate, and hence as an idea over which we
have practical knowledge. Now, to say that immortality is an object of hope does not necessarily contradict
that it is also a necessary postulate of reason. Nonetheless, it is important to have in mind that immortality
is not only an object of hope, but first and primarily a postulate.
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5:124). But the moral law, as it was established in the Analytic, commands from another
dimension, i.e. the noumenal world. Therefore, there is no obvious way to conceive virtue
as a necessary sufficient cause of happiness in the natural world. In relation to this, Kant
denies that humans are able to bring about that connection completely: in his words, a
rational being that belongs to the sensible world “cannot by his will be a cause of this
nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it
harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles” (CPrR 5:124). Nevertheless, the
highest good must be possible, since we are obliged to promote it (and we know that, for
Kant, ought implies can (CPrR 5:30)). Hence, there must be a way thanks to which the
highest good could be conceived as possible. Kant finds that the only plausible possibility
is to refer to the concept of an author of nature, i.e. God, considered as “a cause of all
nature, distinct from nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely of the
exact correspondence of happiness with morality” (CPrR 5:125). And that is how “the
postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world (der besten Welt))
is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good (eines höchsten
ursprünglichen Guts), namely of the existence of God” (CPrR 5:125).
At this point we can ask if there is an obligation to believe in God. For Kant this
is not the case. For him it is morally necessary to assume his existence, but this necessity
is a subjective one (it is a need, not a duty). God is not the ground of morality, but rather
the principle of autonomy is the ground. So the postulate of God is neither a duty nor the
foundation of ethics. From the standpoint of speculative philosophy it is just a hypothesis,
but thanks to the highest good it is elevated to the condition of a “pure rational belief.” So
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just as it was reasonable to postulate the immortality of the soul, now it is reasonable to
postulate the existence of God. And this is how the possibility of the reality of the highest
good is completed, as Kant asserts at 5:126.
This previous explanation also allows Kant to explain why the Stoics and the
Epicureans failed in their attempt to explain the possibility of the highest good. The
Epicureans failed from the beginning, since they chose the wrong principle as the ground
for morality, namely happiness. The Stoics, on the other hand, were right in the principle
(virtue), but committed two mistakes. First, they thought that perfect virtue was possible
in this life, and second, they took contentment as equivalent to happiness (that is to say,
they left happiness out of the highest good). Christianity, on the contrary, is seen by him
as a doctrine which is closer to his ethics.
Kant also highlights how the moral law, through the idea of the highest good,
leads to religion. He even says that the moral law must be considered a divine command,
“because only from a will that is morally perfect (…) and at the same time all-powerful,
and so through harmony with this will, can we hope to attain the highest good (das
höchste Gut), which the moral law makes it our duty to take as the object of our
endeavors” (CPrR 5:129). This does not imply heteronomy, Kant reasserts, since the
highest good (which includes happiness as one of its components, and which leads to the
postulates of immortality and God), as an object of a morally determined will, follows
from the moral law. The moral law is still the keystone of the moral system, the piece that
holds the whole edifice together. That is why he insists that morals is not a doctrine of
how to become happy, but of how to become worthy of happiness. Nevertheless, there is
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a sense in which it can be said that morals can be defined as a doctrine of happiness. As
he explains with this respect,
when morals (which merely imposes duties and does not provide rules for selfish
wishes) has been set forth completely, then –after the moral wish, based on a law,
to promote the highest good (das höchste Gut) (to bring the kingdom of God to
us) has been awakened, which could not previously have arisen in any selfish
soul, and for the sake of this wish the step to religion has been taken- then for the
first time can this ethical doctrine also be called a doctrine of happiness, because
it is only with religion that the hope of happiness first arises (CPrR 5:130).
From this it also follows, according to Kant, that the final end in God’s creation of
the universe is the realization of the highest good, i.e. happiness as a reward for virtue
(not as a result of mere beneficence). In fact, if the final end were happiness as a result of
mere beneficence, then God could be the object of love, but not of respect and adoration.
His plan, then, consists in the gradual sanctification of human beings, together with the
final “crowning (of) such a beautiful order with corresponding happiness” (CPrR 5:131).
And from this it also follows that “in the order of ends the human being (and with him
every rational being) is an end in itself” (CPrR 5:131).
Now, what about the postulate of freedom? Kant does not dedicate much time to
it in the Dialectic, perhaps because it received all the attention in the Analytic, and
because it is not only a necessary presupposition for the possibility of the highest good
but, as has been said, because it is the keystone of the whole system. Without freedom,
nothing is left. Hence, before we start to talk about the highest good, the postulate of
freedom must have been established. Kant indeed establishes its possibility through that
fact of reason which he calls the moral law. So it would be pointless to repeat what he
said in the Analytic about it. Nonetheless, he has some things to say about the postulate

35
of freedom, concretely in Chapter II, numeral VI. At 5:132, Kant asserts that the postulate
of freedom follows “from the necessary presupposition of independence from the
sensible world and of the capacity to determinate one’s will by the law of an intelligible
world, that is, the law of freedom”. Immediately, at 5:133, Kant also reaffirms that the
reality of the postulate of freedom “lays down through the moral law and with it the law
of an intelligible world as well.”
Now, as should be noticed, and as Kant highlights, pure practical reason gets
further than speculative reason. At the speculative level, the concepts of God,
immortality, and freedom led to problems of paralogisms, antinomy, and ideal. The main
victory at that level perhaps was that those ideas could not be denied as chimeras by the
unbeliever, since he was as unable to demonstrate their non existence as the believer was.
Their existence, at the practical level, on the contrary, has gained objective reality,
although this does not imply a cognitive extension from the speculative standpoint, “for
we thereby cognize neither the nature of our souls, nor the intelligible world, nor the
supreme being as to what they are in themselves” (CPrR 5:133). Kant dedicates a great
part of the rest of the Dialectic (namely, Chapter II, numeral VII) to explaining how it is
possible to think of an extension of pure reason from the practical perspective without
expanding its cognition for speculative purposes.
Numeral VIII of Chapter II serves to make some final clarifications. The ideas of
God, immortality, and freedom are only hypotheses from the speculative perspective,
which are the consequence of a need of pure reason to attain the unconditioned condition
in the cognitive sphere (i.e. from a natural need to answer the most fundamental human
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questions, e.g. the question of the first cause of the universe). From the practical
perspective, on the other hand, there is also a need, but this follows from a duty, namely
that of promoting the highest good, duty that in turn is based on the moral law, which is a
fact of reason. Now, if it is a duty to promote the highest good, then it must be possible,
and hence we have to figure out the conditions of that possibility, which happen to be the
same ideas of God, immortality, and freedom. Insofar as the duty is based on a fact of
reason, it does not need further support, Kant says. In other words, the duty to promote
the highest good is objective, and we are compelled to obey it as rational beings, without
additional conditions. Nonetheless,
the subjective effect of this law, namely the disposition conformed with it and
also made necessary by it to promote the practically possible highest good (das
höchste Gut), nevertheless presupposes at least that the latter is possible; in the
contrary case it would be practically impossible to strive for the object of a
concept that would be, at bottom, empty and without an object (CPrR 5:143).
The need of pure speculative reason led us to the ideas of God, immortality, and
freedom as hypotheses. These hypotheses are rational opinions that help us to satiate our
unlimited hunger for knowledge, but without a scientific certainty. The need of pure
practical reason also led us to those same ideas, but as postulates, i.e. as necessary
assumptions for the possibility of the highest good, whose promotion is commanded by
the moral law. Hence, the postulates are not, as in the speculative realm, the consequence
of curiosity and hence of a choice, but are instead necessary according to the moral law.
The postulates, hence, do not appear “for the sake of a discretionary speculative purpose
but of a practically necessary end of a pure rational will, which does not here choose;
instead, it obeys (…)” (CPrR 5:143).
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In the second part of numeral VIII, Kant insists in remarking that there is not a
duty to believe in the possibility of the highest good. For Kant, “(…) speculative reason
must concede it without being asked” (CPrR 5:144), but from this doesn’t follow a
command on believing. Speculative reason must concede it, in his opinion, since “no one
can want to maintain” that the distributive justice that is promised in the highest good “is
impossible in itself” (CPrR 5:144). Now, to deny the supreme condition of the highest
good, namely virtue, is senseless since it implies to deny the moral law, but the case of
the second element, i.e. happiness in proportion to virtue, is different. In the latter case
there is no need of a command for its possibility, since speculative reason does not deny
it, but
the way in which we are to think such a harmony of the laws of nature with those
of freedom has in it something with respect to which we have a choice, since
theoretical reason decides nothing with apodictic certainty about it, and with
respect to this there can be a moral interest which turns the scale (CPrR 5:145).
Reason finds it impossible to conceive of a necessary connection between virtue
and happiness in the world, but this impossibility is only subjective. In other words,
although we cannot conceive such a connection, we still cannot prove by scientific
methods that there is not such a connection. So how are we justified to recur to the
postulate of God as the condition for such connection? In Kant’s opinion, this resort to
God is the consequence of a “subjective condition of reason” (CPrR 5:145), namely that
this is the only way in which our reason can conceive of a perfect connection between
virtue and happiness. The manner in which this connection is possible, therefore, rests on
a choice, “in which a free interest of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a
wise author of the world” (CPrR 5:146). Kant closes this sub-section by saying that, if we
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consider both that the promotion of the highest good and the assumption of its possibility
are objectively necessary, and that the way in which we conceive of its possibility
(namely, through God) lies in our choice, hence “the principle that determines our
judgment about it, though it is subjective as a need, is yet, as the means of promoting
what is objectively (practically) necessary, the ground of a maxim of assent for moral
purposes, that is, a pure practical rational belief” (CPrR 5:146). In consequence, the
postulate of God is not a command but a pure practical rational belief, a belief that can
vacillate but never be denied as impossible.
The Highest Good in the Dialectic of the Second Critique (in a Nutshell)
As we did in relation to the highest good in the First Critique, now we outline the
way Kant unfolds the highest good in the Dialectic of the Second Critique:
1. Reason in its practical use (as in its theoretical use) seeks the unconditioned for
the practically conditioned, under the name of the highest good.
2. The highest good is both the whole object of a pure practical reason and the
determining ground of the will.
3. The highest good is the determining ground of the will only insofar as it contains
the moral law as its supreme element.
4. Virtue is the supreme good, but only the highest good is the complete good, since
it also includes happiness. To this even an impartial reason will agree.
5. The highest good for a person and for a world is happiness in proportion to virtue
(the later being the condition for the former).
6. The union of both elements must be a synthetic one.
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7. Since the sensible world fails to clearly support this synthetic union, the deduction
of the possibility of the highest good must be transcendental.
8. Antinomy: The synthetic connection of virtue and happiness cannot be grounded
merely in nature. Now, if the highest good were impossible, the moral law would
be directed to imaginary ends and hence be regarded as false (since the latter
commands the promotion of the former).
9. Solution of the antinomy: that virtue produces happiness is only conditionally
false. If we consider ourselves as part of the noumenal world, as the moral law
suggests and proves, then it is not impossible to think of virtue as the cause of
happiness in the sensible world through the postulate of God.
10. From the solution of the antinomy, the highest good can be thought as possible.
But what else is required for its possibility?
11. Immortality of the soul is required, since the highest good requires holiness,
something that can only be attained in an endless progress.
12. God is also required, since it is not in our hands to bring the highest good into
complete existence, especially in relation to proportionate happiness.
13. To believe in God is not a duty, but something subjectively necessary for moral
purposes. It is, also, a rational belief.
14. The moral law, in this way, leads to the idea of the highest good and to religion.
15. The highest good is, for Kant, “God’s final end in creating the world” (CPrR
5:130).
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The Highest Good in the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
The Highest Good in the Preface to the First Edition
The highest good is re-approached by Kant in the Religion within the Limits of
Reason Alone, and the first reference is found in the preface to the first edition. Kant
starts his book by restating what he has said before in relation to the purity of morality,
his ethics of intentions, namely that “on its own behalf morality in no way needs religion”
(REL 6:4). This is because ethics is founded, according to Kant, on pure practical reason.
We can know what our duties are without reference to any subjective end. Otherwise,
instead of autonomy, heteronomy would reign. Nonetheless, Kant continues, it could be
the case that morality has a necessary reference to a special sort of end, an end that does
not ground morality but that follows from it as its consequence.
Kant is convinced that the latter is true. Reason, he thinks, cannot be indifferent to
the results of our morally right actions. Kant is not, we know, a consequentialist (least of
all a utilitarian); nevertheless, we do need to answer the question of, as Kant puts it,
“What is then the result of this right conduct of ours?” (REL 6:5). It is not enough, he
says, to know how to act: the “whither” aspect of morality is also fundamental. In other
words, for Kant we cannot do without answering the question of where we are orienting
our lives, what object we are aimed at realizing. He insists that the right action is done
merely out of duty, in direct relation to the moral law, and not with reference to any
object. Nonetheless, once the categorical imperative guides us in our ordinary lives, we
could legitimately ask (and our reason compels us to ask) what the effect is of such
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disposition of the will (what kind of object/end are we promoting while doing the right
thing).
The end or final goal is for Kant the highest good, which is defined as
the idea of an object that unites within itself the formal condition of all such ends
as we ought to have (duty) with everything which is conditional upon ends we
have and which conforms to duty (happiness proportioned to its observance), that
is, the idea of a highest good in the world (die Idee eines höchsten Gutes in der
Welt), for whose possibility we must assume a higher, moral, most holy, and
omnipotent being who alone can unite the two elements of this good (REL 6:5).
So once again we find that the highest good is envisioned as a moral world in
which happiness will be proportioned in accordance to virtue, through the grace of God.
Kant also speaks here about the highest good as the final end of all things, an idea that is
fashioned by morality itself, without increasing by it “the number of morality’s virtues,”
but providing these virtues “a special point of reference for the unification of all ends”
(REL 6:5).
In order to prove how the idea of the highest good follows from morality as
necessary, Kant once again considers the example of the “impartial judge” (as he did in
the First and Second Critiques, as we have seen). The example goes as follows. Human
beings can hardly avoid asking themselves what kind of world they would create if they
had the power. If the person is morally well disposed, Kant thinks, he would certainly
depict a world in which happiness will be proportioned in accordance to virtue. He would
–as a morally well disposed person who, because of that, is compelled to judge with
impartiality– even will this world, according to Kant, even at the risk of renouncing a part
of his happiness, “since the moral law wills that the highest good (das höchste Gut)
possible through us be actualized” (REL 6:5). In this way, Kant asserts, “the human being
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evidences the need, effected in him by morality, of adding to the thought of his duties an
ultimate end as well, as their consequence” (REL 6:6).
This is how he also arrives at the crucial assertion that “morality (…) inevitably
leads to religion” (REL 6:6), and through religion to the idea of God as a moral lawgiver
and as guarantor of the highest good.
The final reference made to the highest good in the preface is found in the
footnote that immediately follows from the assertion that morality leads to religion. There
Kant asserts that the proposition of God as guarantor of the highest good is a synthetic a
priori proposition, and asks how it can be justified. In this way, he also wants to reinforce
the idea that morality leads to religion. He starts his argumentation by making a
distinction between an end and a law. The first is the object of inclinations, whereas the
second, the object of respect. An objective end is in turn defined as an end that follows
from reason alone (and in that sense it is distinguished from an ordinary end). An
ultimate end, on the other hand, is “the end that contains the inescapable, and at the same
time sufficient, condition of all other ends” (REL 6:6). Happiness is the “subjective
ultimate end of rational beings belonging to the world” (REL 6:6). We desire happiness
by nature, and hence it is senseless to sustain that we have a duty to pursue our own
happiness. On the other hand, we have a duty to promote the highest good, which is an
objective end (an end not determined subjectively, but objectively by the moral law). The
latter is, according to Kant, a synthetic practical proposition a priori, “since it is a
proposition that exceeds the concept of the duties in this world, and adds a consequence
(an effect) of these duties that is not contained in the moral law and cannot, therefore, be
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evolved out of them analytically” (REL 6:7). The latter is true since the moral law
commands without regard to ends. Once again, we do not need anything else than the
moral law in order to know what our moral duties are. Nonetheless, we cannot escape
asking about the effects of our actions. We cannot do without an end, in which we look
for something we “can love, even though it is being proposed to them through reason
alone” (REL 6:8). And that is how the moral law “extends itself on its behalf to include
the moral ultimate end of reason among its determining grounds” (REL 6:8). This is the
same as to say that the duty to promote the highest good is a synthetic proposition a priori
“introduced by the moral law itself, and yet through it practical reason reaches beyond
the law” (REL 6:8). This proposition is possible since the moral law is taken here with
reference to beings that cannot do without ends. Now, since we are not capable of fully
bringing about the highest good, the existence of God is assumed. In this way, morality
leads to religion.
The Highest Good in Part Three of the Religion
Preamble
The concept of the highest good in the Religion is revisited in its third part,
entitled “The victory of the good principle over the evil principle, and the foundation of a
kingdom of God on earth” (REL 6:93). At this point in the book, Kant has already
explained both the existence and nature of an evil principle in human nature, and the
struggle between this and the good principle (the principle of autonomy, or the
categorical imperative). He starts this section of the book by saying that the most that a
well-disposed person can get from this battle against the evil principle is freedom: “that
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he be free (…), this is the highest price that he can win” (REL 6:93). Nevertheless, this
does not imply that the evil principle could be eliminated. The moral battle is a
permanent one, one for which we have to be always ready. Our freedom is always in
peril. Kant also thinks that we are in this fight due to our own fault. Hence, in order to
find a way, the best way, to fight the evil principle, it is necessary to understand the
causes of this undesirable (from the perspective of the good) moral war. In relation to
this, Kant appears to have a very optimistic view of humanity: we have an “originally
good predisposition” (REL 6:93); it is life in community which constitutes the source of
the evil principle. In that sense, he is very close to Rousseau. In his own words, “envy,
addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail
his nature (…) as he is among human beings” (REL 6:93). While in isolation, on the
contrary, we are in peace. Now, this rather negative view of life in community is
moderated and superseded immediately, when he explains the way in which we could
overcome the principle of evil. In fact, according to Kant, it is only in community that the
good can overcome evil. Without what he calls an ethical community, the individual will
always be in peril of falling prey to the evil principle. In his own words,
the dominion of the good principle is not otherwise attainable, so far as human
beings can work toward it, than through the setting up and the diffusion of a
society in accordance with, and for the sake of, the laws of virtue –a society
which reason makes it a task and a duty of the entire human race to establish in its
full scope (REL 6:94).
This ethico-comunal constitution/entity (ein ethisches gemeines Wesen), also
known as the ethical community, which will later be identified with the highest (derived)
good, and which is also called an ethical state, a kingdom of virtue, and an ethico-civil
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society, cannot exist without a political community, Kant asserts, but it is different to the
extent that its unifying principle is virtue, i.e. the good principle (instead of merely
‘public juridical laws’). To this Kant also adds that the idea of such an ethical community
is objective insofar as it is grounded on pure practical reason, through the duty that we
have to promote it.
The Ethical State of Nature
Next Kant wants to describe what he understands as an ethical state of nature
(which is in turn necessary in order to conceive how to get to an ethico-civil state). He
starts with a distinction between: a. a juridico-civil (political) state; b. a juridical state of
nature; c. an ethico-civil state; and d. an ethical state of nature. In that way, just as a. and
b. are opposed, so c. and d. are.
Kant makes it clear that both in the juridical and the ethical state of nature the
“individual prescribes the law to himself” (REL 6:95) (without the involvement of third
parties); in that way, he is his own judge. He also emphasizes that to be in a juridico-civil
state does not imply that its members are in an ethico-civil state. They (the members of
the political state) could perfectly well be in an ethical state of nature, and it is desirable,
according to Kant, that they have that choice. The political state, hence, cannot command
its citizens to create or be part of an ethico-civil state. As he emphatically states in this
regard, “woe to the legislator who would want to bring about through coercion a polity
directed to ethical ends!” (REL 6:96). Of course, it is the ideal that the members of a
political state be also part of an ethical community, which would stand “over and above
the political one” (REL 6:96), but this cannot be commanded by law. Finally, Kant
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clarifies that only a community united by the good principle in which all human beings
are part can be properly called an ethical community. This is because ethics is universal.
Any smaller community united by virtue can be recognized as one that strives for the
ethical community, but is not as such one.
The Ethical Community as a Duty
It was already established at 6:95, that to join the ethical state was a duty. From
6:97 to 6:98 Kant returns to that idea. In his opinion, both the juridical and the ethical
state of nature are moments of war. In the first case, we find human beings fighting
against each other; in the second case, on the other hand, we find the good principle
fighting against the evil one. The problem of the ethical state of nature (in distinction
with the ethico-civic state) is that there humans have not yet adopted the good as their
unifying principle. It is only when humans adopt the good principle as their supreme law
that the ethical community emerges, and it is only in this state, as it has been said, that the
evil principle can be superseded. Now, just as it is a duty to leave the political state of
nature, it is also a duty, according to Kant, to leave the ethical state of nature, and hence
to promote the ethical community. From here two crucial additions follow: first, the
special (sui generis) nature of this duty; and second, the identification of the ethical
community as the highest good. In his own words:
here we have a duty sui generis, not of human beings toward human beings but of
the human race towards itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively –
in the idea of reason- destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the
highest good (des höchsten Guts) as a good common to all (REL 6:97).
So the highest good is now presented as equivalent to the ethical community, and
the duty to promote it as differing from all other moral duties both “in kind and in
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principle” (REL 6:98). Basically, it is different from all other duties insofar as the ethical
community cannot be brought about by the effort of one morally well-oriented individual,
but rather through the effort of all humans towards such a common goal, a goal that even
then we cannot know if it is in our hands to attain. He completes this new approach to the
highest good by saying -as he said in the First and in the Second Critiques- that its
realization cannot be thought as possible unless we presuppose the existence of God, i.e.
“of a higher moral being through whose universal organization the forces of single
individuals, insufficient on their own, are united for a common effect” (REL 6:98).
The Ethical Community and God as its Legislator
In a juridico-civil (political) state, the citizens take the role of the lawgiver (a
concept that for Kant seems to include that of a judge), and its laws are directed to
promote what Kant calls the legality of actions. The case of an ethico-civil state is
different. With regard to the goal of the moral laws, they are not oriented towards the
legality of actions, but towards the morality of them. On the other hand, in relation to its
lawgiver, this role cannot be assigned, as in the political state, to the members of the
community. Another kind of legislator is needed here, namely a divine one. The postulate
of God as legislator is required because the morality of actions (which is determined by
the moral intention) cannot be seen, since they are internal. Hence, we will never be able
to judge the morality of our fellow’s actions. In other words, moral laws escape human
jurisdiction. Only God is conceivable as able to know the heart of people, and hence to
determine whether our actions were moral or not, and -as Kant adds- “as must be in every
community, give to each according to the worth of his action” (REL 6:99). We must
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assume here that what God is supposed to distribute is happiness, the second element of
the highest good, according to what we have seen in his earlier works, although he does
not mention the word explicitly.
In this way Kant concludes that all moral duties must be seen at the same time as
divine commands. As he explains, an “(…) ethical community (ein ethisches gemeines
Wesen) is conceivable only as a people under divine commands, i.e. as a people of God,
and indeed in accordance with the laws of virtue” (REL 6:99).
Kant closes his remarks in relation to the ethical community by insisting that its
realization does not fully depend on human effort, but that God is required for that.
Nevertheless, he insists that we must act as if everything depended on us (not only as a
collectivity, but even as individuals), since only in this case can we hope for its ultimately
divine completion; therefore, “the wish of all well-disposed human beings is (…) ‘that
the kingdom of God come, that His will be done on earth” (REL 6:100).
The Highest Good in the Religion (in a Nutshell)
The way the highest good is presented in the preamble of the Religion could be
outlined as follows:
1. Morality is self-sufficient; it does not need any end as its grounding, nor religion,
in order to determine what our duties are.
2. Nevertheless, morality has a necessary reference to an end, “not as the ground of
its maxims, but as a necessary consequence accepted in conformity with them”
(REL 6:4).

49
3. There is an end that proceeds from morality, since reason cannot be indifferent to
the question of the consequences of moral actions.
4. This end is the highest good, a moral world in which virtue will be rewarded with
happiness, ultimately through God.
5. The idea of the highest good is seen by Kant as the final end of all things.
6. The highest good for Kant does not add new moral virtues, “but rather provides
them with a special point of reference for the unification of all ends” (REL 6:5).
7. That the idea of a moral world is the ideal world is something to which any
impartial and well-oriented person will agree.
8. Morality, in this way, leads to religion, and through religion it reaches the idea of
God as the guarantor of the highest good.
The way the highest good is presented in part three of the Religion could, in turn,
be outlined as follows:
1. Two principles fight against each other in our moral life: the good and the evil
principle.
2. The most that we can attain if we follow the good is to be free, although the fight
never ends.
3. The evil principle does not arise in isolation, but in community.
4. Nevertheless (and at the same time because of that), the evil principle can only be
superseded in community, through the establishment of a social goal: the
emergence of an ethical community, i.e. a community under the laws of virtue,
united under the good principle.
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5. This ethical community is identified by Kant as the highest good.
6. The duty to promote the ethical community is different in kind and in principle
from all other duties, since it is one which cannot be brought about by individual
effort. It must be set as a social goal, but even then it will escape human effort.
That is why the postulate of God is required as a guarantor of the highest good.
7. Also, in an ethical community we cannot be regarded as legislators (concept that
for Kant include that of a judge), since moral intentions are invisible and hence
cannot be the object of public laws. Hence, only a supreme lawgiver can be the
legislator of such a world, and the moral laws must be regarded as his commands.
This supreme lawgiver would also be able to know people’s intentions, in order to
proportion happiness in accordance to virtue.
8. The highest good, for Kant, is beyond our power, but we must act as if it were in
our power to realize. Only then can we have a reasonable hope that it will come
some day, insofar as only then we will deserve the justice that comes with it.
References to the Highest Good in Other Works
Together with those three referred works, we find Kant’s references to the highest
good in other publications (namely, the Critique of Judgment, Theory and Practice, and
the Lectures on Ethics). In what follows, I will present those sporadic references, in order
to have the whole mass of raw materials in our hands.
The Highest Good in the Critique of Judgment
The highest good in the Critique of Judgment appears in the “Methodology of the
Teleological Power of Judgment.” The first reference is found in §84 (“On the final end

51
of the existence of a world, i.e., of creation itself”), where Kant asserts that the human
being is “the only natural being in which we can (…) cognize, on the basis of its
constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the law of the causality together
with the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the highest good in the world
(das höchste Gut in der Welt))” (CJ 5:435). So once again the highest good appears as the
highest end for human beings, beings who are part of the natural world but nevertheless
partake of a world of freedom.
The concept also appears in §86 (“On ethicotheology”), where the highest good is
defined as “the existence of rational beings under moral laws” (CJ 5:444).
A third reference appears in §87 (“On the moral proof of the existence of God”),
where Kant reasserts that the moral law “determines for us, and indeed does so a priori, a
final end, to strive after which it makes obligatory for us, (…) the highest good in the
world (das höchste Gut in der welt) possible through freedom” (CJ 5:450). This
definition resembles that of §86, and is mediated immediately, when Kant repeats that the
postulate of God is necessary for its complete actualization (being consequent with what
he said in the First and Second Critiques, and in the Religion, as we have seen).
The final reference is found in §91 (“On the kind of affirmation produced by
means of a practical faith”), where Kant argues that there are “three kinds of cognizable
things: matters of opinion (opinabile), facts (scibile), and matters of faith (mere
credibile)” (CJ 5:467). It is in the matters of faith that the highest good reappears. Matters
of faith are for him those objects which are conceived a priori through pure practical
reason, without extending speculative cognition. The highest good is one of these objects,
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which is characterized this time as an object “to be achieved in the world through
freedom” (CJ 5:469). Now, since the sensible world does not promise the complete
achievement of such a moral goal, the postulates of God and immortality of the soul are
postulated, and hence are also considered as objects of faith. The highest good, then, is
not only regarded as object of the moral law, but also as an object of faith. In this way, he
makes more explicit what he has been suggesting in his former works, namely that
although we have a duty to promote the highest good, this will come to complete
existence under the intervention of God in a future life, and hence must be regarded as an
object of (reasonable) faith.
The Highest Good in Theory and Practice
As it is known, in section I of Theory and Practice, Kant replies to Professor
Garve’s criticisms of his moral theory, in respect to the relation of theory and practice. In
this context, he starts his response by explaining his moral theory in a nutshell. He
basically reminds us that, according to him, morals is the science that teaches how to
become worthy of happiness. Nonetheless, as he clarifies, this does not imply that we
have to renounce happiness overall, but only when our inclinations collide with the moral
law. He even asserts that it is impossible for finite beings like us to renounce happiness.
What we ought to do is to distinguish our inclinations from the moral law and put the
latter in the first place. In that sense, it is not true that for him, as Garve argued, virtue is
the sole final end for human beings, and hence the creator’s sole end. Instead, as he
clarifies, “neither human morality by itself nor human happiness by itself is the creator’s
sole end, but rather the highest good possible in the world (das höchste in der Welt
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mögliche Gut), which consists of the union and harmony of the two” (TAP 8:279). So the
highest good is once again presented as the final end both for God and for humanity,
composed by happiness in proportion to virtue.
To this Kant adds that the moral law is not grounded on the highest good, but that
the former introduces the latter as an end that is also a duty. In this way, we are obliged
“to work to the best of one’s ability toward the highest good possible in the world
(universal happiness combined with and in conformity with the purest morality
throughout the world)” (TAP 8:279). Nevertheless, as has been repeated again and again,
it is not in our power to actualize the whole highest good, but only part of it. As he says
in this respect, “it is within our control from one quarter but not from both taken
together” (TAP 8:279). That is why both God and a future life reappear on the scene as
necessary postulates.
He finishes his references to the highest good with the radical assertion that “in
the question of the principle of morals the doctrine of the highest good (höchsten Gut), as
the final end of a will determined by this doctrine and conformed with its laws, can be
completely passed over and set aside (as episodic)” (TAP 8:280).
The Highest Good in the Lectures on Ethics
Other references to Kant’s idea of the highest good are found in his Lectures on
Ethics. These, as it is known, are not Kant’s direct writings, but his students’ notes. They
are, still, his own thoughts, as he explained them to an audience. Hence, it seems proper
to include them in our analysis.
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For instance, in the notes taken by G. L. Collins, corresponding to the course
given by Kant in the winter semester of 1784-5, in the section entitled “On the Ethical
Systems of Antiquity,” we find him saying: “What does the highest good (höchste Gut)
consist in? The most perfect world is the highest created good. But the most perfect world
involves the happiness of rational creatures and the worthiness of these creatures for such
happiness” (LE 27:247). He then invites us to imagine a world full of morally good
people that, nonetheless, do not enjoy happiness; or, on the contrary, a world of people
that actually enjoy happiness without deserving it. Neither world could match the idea of
the highest good, a world that requires happiness (physical good) in proportion to virtue
(moral good).
In the notes taken by C.C. Mrongovius, corresponding to the course given by
Kant in January, 1785, we find Kant explaining to his students that the good will (virtue)
cannot be considered the complete good. Virtue is certainly unconditionally good, but
does not constitute the whole of goodness. In his own words, “the highest good is
unconditionally good, and also comprises the whole of goodness” (LE 29:599). Virtue is
certainly the “greatest worth of the person” but not the “greatest state,” which is
happiness. Hence, only “virtue combined with happiness is the highest good” (LE
29:599).
Finally, other references are found in the notes taken by J. Vigilantius,
corresponding to the course that Kant gave in October 1793. There we find Kant
explaining how the Stoics and the Epicureans placed the highest good either in happiness
or in virtue alone, subordinating one principle to the other. Against this Kant argues that
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“none of the assumed principles is sufficient by itself; they have to be united, and this by
a supreme being, a sovereign ruler of the world, and hence by belief in a deity, and in His
power to accord man morality and happiness in due proportion” (LE 27:484). He also
asserts that if the highest good were impossible, then the endeavors of the virtuous one
“would be pointless, and virtue an empty delusion” (LE 27:483).
Later in the same notes we find Kant saying that
the highest good has two elements: morality and happiness. The possession of the
highest good under which we can participate in it (though in fact we can do so
partialiter only, and to an approximation), consists in the two necessary
requirements; to be conscious of being adequate to the moral law, or to be worthy
of happiness; and at the same time to be sure of having the prospect of being able
to participate in happiness (LE 27:646 – 647).
At 27:717 we find Kant defining the highest good as “morality coupled with
happiness to the maximum possible degree.” In this same section, he asserts that, since
morality does not empirically grant happiness, God is required as a postulate for this
connection to be possible. He literally says that man “does not have in his power to
become happy thereby in due proportion” (to virtue), which must be kept in mind.
Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good
As we can see, for Kant the highest good is something fundamental both for
ethics and for his philosophical system overall. The highest good appears in all his most
important works (with exception of the Groundwork). Now, the fact that the highest good
appears in more than one work does not imply that Kant held different versions of it. As
we have seen in these narrative accounts, and the corresponding outlines, for Kant the
highest good was conceived as a moral world that we must promote and may hope for in
a “future” life, in which happiness will be ultimately distributed as a reward for virtue
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through God. Of course, if we take some of the references separately, even within each
book, it could appear as if Kant held different versions of it, but an integrated, contextual
and articulated interpretation shows that this is how he envisioned the highest good.
In relation to the inner structure of each description (the engineering), the three
main accounts (and the other references) share the fundamental components of it
(although the Religion omits some of them, which does not necessarily mean that they
were rejected later by Kant, as I will try to explain). For instance, in the two First
Critiques and in the Religion, the idea of an impartial judge/reason is used in order to
show that the highest complete good cannot be virtue alone, but virtue and proportional
happiness (CPR 813/B841, CPrR 5:110, REL 6:5). Also, in the three accounts the
postulate of God appears as necessary for foreseeing the highest good as possible (CPR
A810/B838 – A814/B842, CPrR 5:515, 5:124 – 5:133, REL 6:5 – 6:6, 6:98 – 6:10). The
postulate of immortality appears in both the First and the Second Critiques (CPR
A811/B839 – A814/B842, CPrR 5:115, 5:122 – 5:123, 5:132), although not in the
Religion. Now, this does not necessarily imply that Kant abandoned this idea. In fact, the
description of the highest good in the Religion is not incompatible with the postulate of
immortality. In addition, both in the First and the Second Critiques, the argument
according to which the impossibility of the highest good would make the moral law
pointless, and would in turn affect the agent’s motivation for working towards such a
moral project, is included (CPR A811/B839 – A813/B841, CPrR 5:113–5:114, CPrR
5:143), although this is not mentioned in the Religion. Now, as in the case of the
postulate of immortality, the fact that these problems do not appear in the Religion does
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not necessarily imply that Kant changed his mind in that respect. Another argument
would be that Kant thought as unnecessary to discuss these issues again, insofar as it was
extensively discussed in his former works, which seems more plausible.
Now, what about the location of the highest good? In all cases it is something that
is supposed to happen in a future life. Now, does this imply that it will happen in an
afterlife or, on the contrary, is something to be expected for this world? In all cases, we
know, the postulate of God is necessary for its completion, which determines that the
highest good, for Kant, is always at the same time a religious concept (and not merely an
ethical one). Nonetheless, in many sections he speaks of the highest good “in the world,”
which could make us think of it as an ethical but still earthy goal reserved for a future
generation of humans. If this were the case, then the highest good would not be expected
for all humans (to start, not at all for all those who are already dead). As we will see in
the next chapter, there are many interpreters that try to defend a similar version of the
highest good. Now, is this really the case, or is the highest good for Kant something to be
expected for all humans, and not merely in a future life but in an afterlife? I sustain that
the latter interpretation is more plausible. We have, for instance, sections in which Kant
is explicit in this respect. Taking the Critique of Practical Reason as an example
(particularly in numeral II of Chapter II of the Dialectic), there we find Kant highlighting
as strange that “philosophers of both ancient and modern times could (…) have found
happiness in precise proportion to virtue already in this life (in the sensible world), or
persuaded themselves that they were conscious of it” (CPrR 5:115). But perhaps the more
convincing argument is related to the postulate of immortality. In fact, if we think that
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perfect virtue, which is the supreme component of the highest good, cannot be attained
unless an endless progress is guaranteed (which in turn requires an immortal soul), as
Kant states both in the First and Second Critiques, then how could be the case that the
highest good is something to happen in this life, in this world? We are mortals, and hence
it is impossible for us to attain holiness already in this life. Hence, unless our soul
continues its path towards perfect virtue after this life, and hence in another world, the
highest good will never be actualized.3
A critic of this defense of the highest good in an afterlife will repeat those
sections in which Kant speaks of the highest good “in this world,” which clearly
undermines, to some extent, our interpretation. In this case, a further defense is
demanded. In relation to this I would say that perhaps Kant was more Christian than we
think, and that when he talked of the highest good “in this world” he had in mind the
resurrection of the body, as this is promised in the Scriptures. If this were the case, then
we will still be talking of an afterlife, although it would be a life to happen in this world.
The best evidence for this interpretation is that it harmonizes the seemingly incompatible
references to the highest good “in this world” and in a “future life,” which we find in
Kant’s works, even within a same text. Also, it is known that Kant was a devoted
Lutheran, member of the Pietism movement, so it would not be surprising that he
believed in the reincarnation of the body.
With this we have completed the four goals established for this chapter, which
were to present a narrative account of each description of the highest good, to outline the
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logic that lies behind them, to identify Kant’s idea of the highest good, and to find out if
the inner structure (the engineering) of each description differs so broadly as to make
every account different from each other (which we have denied).
Now, this variety of references still could explain, to some extent, the big
controversy generated in the secondary literature in the English-speaking world. On one
hand, we find a group of critics, who have made an influential case against Kant’s
inclusion of the highest good in his ethical system. On the other hand, there are the
defenders, who differ in their way of shielding the highest good against those attacks.
The next chapter will be devoted to analyzing the existing discussion in the
secondary literature, in the English-speaking world. The goal will be threefold: to place
ourselves in the discussion, to identify the criticisms in an ordered and complete way
(something that is lacking), and to see how successful the defenders have been in their
attempt to save Kant’s theory of the highest good. This will in turn show us if a
complementary defense is still required.

CHAPTER II
CRITICS AND DEFENDERS OF KANT’S
IDEA OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
As it is known, Kant’s concept of the highest good has been an important matter
of dispute in the English-speaking world since the second half of the last century.
Particularly, the discussion started back in the 60’s with the so–called “Beck-Silber
controversy.” Briefly, in 1960 L.W. Beck published a book entitled A Commentary on
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, in which among other things he alleged the practical
unimportance of Kant’s idea of the highest good. In his opinion, the highest good does
not help us to answer the question of “What should I do?” Hence, it is unimportant for
Kant’s ethical system. This criticism motivated John Silber to write a response, which is
contained in his article “The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant’s Ethics.” Since
then, many scholars have jumped into the discussion, some defending the highest good,
and others joining Beck in his criticisms.
Following Matthew Caswell’s reading of this discussion, as presented in his
article “Kant’s conception of the highest good, the Gesinnung, and the Theory of Radical
Evil,” we can divide the interpreters of Kant’s concept of the highest good in four groups:
the “critics,” the “revisionists,” the “secularizers,” and the “maximalists.” According to
the “critics,” the highest good is practically unimportant or even harmful to Kant’s moral
system. Against them, the “revisionists” consider that the highest good is morally
60
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important since it corrects some problems found in the rest of Kant’s ethics, (for instance,
in the Groundwork, the Analytic of the Second Critique, etc.). The “secularizers” also try
to save the highest good as part of Kant’s ethics, but argue that it only makes sense in a
secular version, i.e. without the religious elements that Kant attaches to the concept.
Finally, the “maximalists” defend the highest good in its theological version, but try to
avoid the mistakes committed by the “revisionists” (problems that will be explained in
this chapter). In this sense, the “maximalists” do not believe in the secularization of the
highest good.1
In this chapter I will develop both a historical and a critical review of the
aforementioned discussion. I will start with the referred “Beck-Silber controversy,” not
only as a historical exercise, but also in order to root our own contemporary revision of
the matter. I will also present the problems pointed to by the “critics” in a systematized
way (something that is lacking in the secondary literature, and that obscures any attempt
to overcome the criticisms they raise). Together with these problems, I will present the
attempts made by the “revisionists,” the “secularizers,” and the “maximalists” to
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In relation to the “maximalists,” Caswell refers us to Bernhard Milz, particularly to his book entitled Der
Gesuchte Widerstreit, 310–311, where in Caswell’s opinion Milz establishes the conditions for a
“maximalist” interpretation. Among other things, there Milz mentions how the ethical importance of Kant’s
idea of the highest good has been put into question since at least 1795, through J. Ch. Greilings. In Milz’
words, “Kant, and even more, his interpreters, have tried to give to the highest good an essential ethicophilosophical function (…): the highest good belongs, according to the thesis, to the moral law like the
matter to the form, or like the completion of ends in the world towards their principle.” Now, in Milz’
opinion, “the highest good is not an intrinsic element of Kant’s moral philosophy, neither its foundation via
formal principles, nor its material part.” It is precisely this problem, in his opinion, that explains the
manifold of criticisms (and defenses) found in the English–speaking world against Kant’s assertion that the
highest good is important for ethics, as Milz tells to his German–speaking audience, discussion that is
patent for him “in articles with titles such as ‘The Importance of the Highest Good,’ ‘The Unimportance of
Kant’s Highest Good,’ und again ‘The Importance and Function of Kant’s Highest Good’” (personal
translation).

62
overcome these criticisms. A critical reading will show us how the “revisionists” and the
“secularizers” have not been able to supersede all of them. It will also show us how a
stronger “maximalist” defense can still be developed.
Back to the Roots: The Beck-Silber Controversy
As it is known, although Silber is the one that started the discussion by arguing
that Kant held an immanent and a transcendent conception of the highest good, and that
both have a justified place in his philosophy (as explained in his article “Kant's
conception of the highest good as immanent and transcendent”), it was Beck who started
the controversy. In his earlier referred to book, Beck approaches the topic under
discussion with three questions, two of which are relevant in this respect: is the highest
good the determining ground of the moral will? Is there a moral necessity (duty) to seek
and to promote it? He answers both questions negatively.
With regard to the first question, he argues that the categorical imperative is the
only determining ground of the moral will. In his words, “it is only the law as a necessary
component of the highest good that is the determining ground (of the will). (…) the
highest good is not an independent determining ground of the will in addition to or in
place of one of its components.”2 Now, he even goes further and suggests that to put the
highest good as a determining ground of the will would be to undermine the principle of
autonomy, which as we know constitutes the heart of Kant’s moral theory. In the best
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case, Beck asserts, the hope for the highest good “may be psychologically necessary to a
semblance of morality,”3 but nothing more. Never a determining ground of the will.
In relation to the second question, he denies that there is a duty to seek and to
promote the highest good, with the following arguments. First, none of the forms of the
categorical imperative have the highest good as its content. Second, the highest good is
not included among those ends that are also duties in the Metaphysics of Morals. Finally,
the highest good does not exist independently from the moral law: “For suppose I do all
in my power (…) to promote the highest good, what am I to do? Simply act out of respect
for the law, which I already knew.”4 For Beck, I cannot do anything with regard to
happiness (to distribute happiness in accordance to virtue), since that exceeds my powers,
being a task that only God can perform.
That is how he concludes that the highest good is unimportant for practical
effects. It serves, though, for architectonic concerns. The recognition of the architectonic
importance must be highlighted, since in it Beck still recognizes that the highest good
serves some purpose in Kant’s philosophical system. As he explains in this regard, “it
(the highest good) is important for the architectonic purpose of reason in uniting under
one idea the two legislations of reason, the theoretical and practical, in a practicaldogmatic metaphysics wholly distinct from the metaphysics of morals.”5

3

Ibid., 244.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid., 245.

64
In sum, Beck argues that the highest good is not the determining ground of the
will; that if it were so, it would undermine the principle of autonomy. Also, there is no
duty to seek and promote the highest good. Moreover, it would be even impossible to
attempt to promote it, since we cannot provide happiness in proportion to virtue. Hence,
it is unimportant for practical purposes.
These commentaries, as is well known, motivated Silber to write a response.
Briefly, Silber disapproves of Beck’s criticisms of Kant’s idea of the highest good, and
asserts its importance, both for practical effects and for the understanding of the Second
Critique.
Silber starts by arguing that, for him, it is obvious that, in our daily lives, we
promote the highest good. Examples such as raising children, serving on juries, and
grading papers are for him ordinary cases in which we, as human beings, are able to
proportion happiness in accordance with virtue. His central thesis is that the highest good
“while following from the moral law, adds content to the abstract form of the categorical
imperative and gives direction to moral volition.”6 The justification of this claim is
developed in four movements.
The four-folded argumentation is opened by the claim that the “good” is the
unifying concept of the Second Critique, i.e. is the concept that gives unity to the various
parts of this book. This is something that Beck did not take into account, and perhaps the
source of his so called “erroneous” interpretation (at least, according to Silber) of Kant’s
idea of the highest good. In this respect, as Silber suggests, for Kant the concept of the
6
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good –as a material object of the will– was necessary to give concrete direction to moral
volition. In this way, Kant related himself “to the classic tradition in ethics.”7
Nevertheless, he changed the tradition by arguing that the good must be determined by
the categorical imperative, the formal moral law (instead of deriving the duties from any
idea of the good, which for him always results in heteronomy); otherwise, the good could
not be posited as an obligatory object of the will. That is how, in Silber’s opinion, “he
(Kant) sought to provide, by means of the application of the moral law to the condition of
man, material content for the good as this necessary object.”8 This constitutes the first
step of Silber’s argument. The second and third go as follows. According to the author, in
Kant’s attempt to provide material content for the good, virtue appeared as an end which
is also a duty that, although identified as the supreme good, does not give the referred
material content. In Silber’s words, “that bonum supremum (virtue) cannot function as a
sufficiently determinate object of moral volition or provide material content to it.”9 Kant
then argued that, like virtue, the happiness of others is also both an end and a duty (in
fact, only when we consider the happiness of others as an end, does our own happiness,
which is a natural good, gain legitimacy). In this way, Kant happened to identify two
ends that follow from the moral law. In a fourth and final movement, Silber argues that
the next task for Kant was to reach the unity of these two ends, a task that, in his opinion,
Kant solved with the concept of the highest good, a material object “determined formally
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by the moral law as applied to the material of human desire.”10 That is how the highest
good appeared as the material object derived from the moral law which is necessary to
give concrete direction to moral volition.
In simple terms, as we can see, the most significant claim made by Silber is that,
for him, the highest good adds content to the abstract formalism of the categorical
imperative.
The Critics
Preamble
As previously stated, after the “Beck-Silber controversy” started, many have
jumped into the discussion. It is necessary, in any case, to start with the problems pointed
out by the critics, since the work of the “revisionists,” “secularizers,” and “maximalists”
has been devoted to overcome those criticisms. In relation to this, as a preamble, it is
important to highlight that the criticisms have not been properly systematized. In other
words, there is no clear list or summary of the main criticisms pointed against Kant’s
concept of the highest good, and this weakens any chance of victory on the side of the
defenders. For instance, for many of those aiming to defend Kant, the only problem that
needs to be solved is that of the supposed ethical irrelevance of the highest good (Silber,
for instance). Well, as we will see, the problem of irrelevance is one among a list; so
while the highest good has been the victim of a massive attack, the defenders have not
been able to identify in a proper way every one of the enemy’s weapons. It is urgent,
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then, in order to counterattack, to have a clear knowledge of the real power of the enemy,
i.e. to know his weapons. Otherwise, the probabilities of victory are minimal.
The group of the “critics” is led by Beck and those who, following him, believe
that the highest good is unimportant or even harmful to Kant’s ethical system. Caswell
includes in this group L.W. Beck, Jeffrie Murphy, Thomas Auxter, Yirmiyahu Yovel,
Lance Simmons, John Rawls and Eckart Forster. In relation to this list, I would like to
make some preliminary comments.
First, I would not include Lance Simmons for the following reason. In his article
entitled “Kant’s Highest Good: Albatross, Keystone, Achilles Heel,” Simmons
distinguishes between three groups of interpreters of the highest good: those for whom it
contributes little to the final success of Kant’s ethics, those for whom it is a crucial piece
of his system, and those for whom it is Kant’s Achilles heel. Now, as he expressly
mentions, “no attempt to adjudicate between them will be made; we will simply consider,
in bare outline, three pure positions concerning the role of the highest good in Kantian
ethics. Distinguishing between these three approaches is the main work of this paper.”11
Therefore, it seems improper to include him among the “critics,” assuming, as Caswell
does, that Simmons places himself among those for whom the highest good constitutes
Kant’s Achilles heel.12
The case of Yovel is, in turn, particular and hence deserves separate attention.
Caswell presents Yovel as a critic of Kant’s theory of the highest good otherwise
11
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unsympathetic to his ethical system. The fact that Yovel is in fact a critic of Kant’s moral
philosophy overall places him in a special situation for the purposes of this work. Let me
try to explain why. In his book Kant and the Philosophy of History, among other things,
he presents a criticism of Kant’s theory of the highest good. Briefly, he argues that the
highest good suffers from a problem of deduction. In his own words, “there is no
continuous passage from the formal to the material imperative”13 (i.e. from the formal
moral law to the highest good as a duty). For Yovel, this problem is rooted in a deeper
one: Kant’s supposed dualism of human nature (dualism of nature and reason). This is, in
his opinion, what impeded Kant from constructing a coherent and complete theory of the
highest good. In other words, for Yovel the issue is that the idea of the highest good
cannot follow from the moral law given Kant’s dualism. As he explains, “had reason
been conceived as intrinsic to the empirical world, had each been grasped as mediating
the other within a single process, these difficulties would not have arisen; but then we
would be discussing Hegel, not Kant.”14 Yovel is, therefore, a “critic,” but his criticism
points at Kant’s whole philosophical (or at least ethical) system. Therefore, any attempt
to respond to Yovel would imply making a defense of Kant’s ethical system as a whole,
which exceeds the scope of this work.
The case of Auxter is problematic for the following reason. He is traditionally
considered a mere “critic.” Nonetheless, as will be explained later, he could also be
considered a “secularizer,” since he tries to extract a secular version of the highest good
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out of Kant’s works, and gives value to it. His criticisms are directed against the
theological version, but not to what later has been known as the secular version of the
highest good. Nonetheless, since my reading could be contested (the whole tradition
considers him a mere “critic”), and since his criticisms to the theological version of the
highest good are relevant, he will be kept under the group of “critics.”
Finally, some preliminary words in relation to John Rawls. He also believes that
there are two versions of the highest good in Kant’s works, and expressly criticizes them.
In his own words, “both conceptions of the highest good –the full highest good and the
highest good of a particular world- are, I think, inconsistent with Kant’s account of the
moral law.”15 Nonetheless, at the same time Rawls seems to coincide with the
“secularizers,” as will be explained later. Nevertheless, since he expressly denies the
importance of both (alleged) versions of the highest good, I am keeping him as a member
of this group. I will also keep him in this group since he raises a new criticism, as we will
see.
Next I will try to sketch the position of all the mentioned authors, with the
exception of Simmons and Yovel, for the given reasons. This will allow us to list and
name the criticisms, an urgent and so far undone task.
Jeffrie Murphy
In 1965 Jeffrie Murphy joined the “critics” through his article entitled “The
Highest Good as Content for Kant’s Ethical Formalism (Beck vs. Silber),” concretely by
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criticizing Silber’s response to Beck, and Silber’s position overall with regard to the
highest good. Basically, he raises four criticisms against Silber.
The first resembles one of the criticisms that Beck pointed to against Kant: if the
highest good is the determining ground of the will, then heteronomy follows.
The second objection highlights the impossibility of promoting the highest good,
in similar terms to those presented by Beck, who saw the impossibility in our inability to
give happiness as a reward for virtue, since it was the “task of God.” Murphy highlights
an additional reason for this alleged impossibility. As is known, for Kant “we can never,
even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of
our actions. For when moral value is being considered, the concern is not with the
actions, which are seen, but rather with their inner principles, which are not seen” (GMM,
4:407). Murphy makes this point in order to argue that, if we cannot know whether a
person is virtuous, it is futile to be required to promote the highest good. The most we
can do, in his opinion, is to judge the legality of actions and to proportion happiness in
accordance to that, but only God is able to know human intentions. Therefore, it is wrong
to claim that there is a duty to promote the highest good.
The third criticism is directed towards Silber’s assertion that “to promote the
highest good accords with common moral experience.”16 The examples that Silber gives,
as we know, are those of rearing children, serving on juries and grading papers. For him,
these are cases in which we are actually promoting the highest good (proportioning
happiness as a reward for virtue). Nevertheless, Murphy is much more skeptical; for him
16
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in these cases we are, at best, rewarding or punishing the legality of actions “in the hope
of encouraging (or discouraging) their recurrence.”17 In no way are we rewarding or
punishing the morality of dispositions. That is how Murphy claims that if there is any
duty to promote the highest good, it is not a moral duty. Hence, the highest good only
serves to answer the question of “What may I hope?” and not of “What should I do?”
(serving the former, as Murphy says, for “extra-moral theological purposes,”18 and hence
being irrelevant for ethics).
Now, after presenting these three criticisms, Murphy makes a broader attack
against Silber. In his words, “the whole posture of Silber’s concern is uncalled for.”19 As
has been mentioned, Silber thought that it was necessary to find some content for Kant’s
formalism, and he found it in the highest good. Nevertheless, in Murphy’s opinion, “the
context of common moral experience gives all the content necessary (…) to fill out and
give direction to Kant’s formalism.”20
It is important to notice, though, that like Beck, Murphy gives some value to the
idea of the highest good. In his case, he considers that it serves to answer the question of
“What may I hope?” which is not an ethical one, in his opinion.21
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Thomas Auxter
Another classic “critic” of Kant’s theory of the highest good is Thomas Auxter
who, in 1979, published an article entitled “The Unimportance of Kant’s Highest Good.”
Through his article he joined Beck and Murphy in his criticism of Silber (and Kant by
extension). As he mentions in his introduction, like Beck and Murphy, he wants to begin
with the Kantian assumption according to which “impossibility implies no obligation,”
and from there will offer reasons why Kant must renounce his claim that there is a special
duty to promote the highest good. His most concrete and original strategy is explained by
him in the following way: “(…) I will argue that the case against using the highest good
as a moral standard becomes even more convincing when we examine Kant’s account of
the process by which practical reasoning takes place.”22 The highest good could serve, he
admits like Murphy, for religious purposes (and hence to answer the question of “What
may I hope?’”), but it is useless for practical judgment.
Basically, he presents two criticisms. By the first Auxter adds a new argument to
the charge of impossibility, which was previously stated by Beck and Murphy (the former
alleging that the crowning of virtue with happiness is the task of God and the latter
remarking that for Kant virtuous intentions are obscure, which makes impossible for
humans to judge who deserves happiness). In Auxter’s own words, “since the highest
good does not discriminate between actions appropriate to a human being and those
appropriate to God, it does not tell us what we ought to do and hence is not suitable as a
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guide for conduct.”23 On the other hand, the highest good cannot have any beneficial
effect on moral motivation, since, for Kant, no object can improve the moral quality of
personal motivation. Otherwise, we would have to give prevalence to heteronomy over
autonomy. For Kant, instead, as Auxter reminds us, the only valid moral motive is the
respect for the moral law. For instance, in the Groundwork we find Kant saying that “an
action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it,
but in the maxim according to which the action is determined” (GMM 4:399).
Now, although it is true that Auxter discards the highest good with the theological
elements that Kant regards as necessarily attached to it (as we have seen in Chapter II),
he nevertheless seems to give some value to another version of the highest good, what he
identifies as the “ectypal world” and what we nowadays call the secular version of the
highest good, that which in Auxter’s opinion is found in the Analytic of the Second
Critique. As will be mentioned later, according to this version, the highest good is a
social goal that can be attained in this world, only through collective human effort,
instead of a moral world in which happiness will be received as a reward for virtue
through God, in a future life. This version, in his opinion, does not suffer from the
difficulties found in the theological version of the highest good. I make this point since it
is usually overlooked. In fact, commentators usually regard Auxter as someone who
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completely discards the practical function of the highest good, without noticing that he
gives value to the secular version of it.24
John Rawls
John Rawls also has placed himself among the “critics” of the highest good, as his
book Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy shows. Rawls believes with Kant in a
secular ideal of a realm of ends, in which virtue would be somehow connected with
happiness, since it is foreseen as a world of self-rewarding morality. This follows, in his
opinion, from our duties to pursue our own virtue, our natural perfection, and the
happiness of others. Nevertheless, he disagrees with Kant that in such a realm of ends
“people are to act so as to make happiness strictly proportional to virtue.”25
Rawls claims to have identified two versions of the highest good in Kant’s works:
the “full highest good” and the “highest good for a social world.” In both versions
proportionality is included by Kant, in Rawls’s interpretation. Now, both versions of the
highest good are, for him, inconsistent with Kant’s account of the moral law. He accuses
Kant of not even showing how they follow from the moral law and how they can be the a
priori object of the pure will. The element of proportionality in Kant’s highest good is
based, according to Rawls, in the idea of impartial reason, which is for him “foreign to
Kant’s constructivism. Further, the highest good is incompatible with the idea of the
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realm of ends as the constructed object of the moral law: it cannot be that constructed
object, for there is nothing in the CI-procedure that can generate precepts requiring us to
proportion happiness to virtue.”26 He finally makes reference to the obscurity of inner
motives and alleges that any attempt to bring happiness in proportion to virtue would be
arbitrary, and so contrary to the categorical imperative. In this way, complementing
Murphy’s claim that it is impossible for human beings to proportion happiness in
accordance to virtue because of the referred obscurity, he alleges that any such attempt
would be even arbitrary, and hence, unjust.
Now, as we will see with the “secularizers,” it seems that Rawls could have been
in agreement with them, since they usually propose a secular version of the highest good
as a social goal attainable through human effort, and where proportionality is excluded.
In other words, this seems to be identical with the secular idea of a realm of ends where
happiness is favored, although not necessarily granted for the just in a proportionate way.
Eckart Forster
The last “critic” in the Anglo-Saxon discussion around Kant’s theory of the
highest good seems to be Eckart Forster who, in his book entitled Kant’s Final Synthesis,
argues that Kant finally thought of the highest good as an unimportant element in his
theory, since he did not make any substantial reference to it in his unfinished work: the
Opus Postumum. In his own words, “(…) the concept of the highest good, so central to
Kant’s earlier writings on ethics and religion, is now mentioned only in passing.”27 Even

26

Ibid., 316.

27

Forster, Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum, 144.

76
the idea of God as distributor of happiness in proportion to virtue was dismissed by Kant
at the end, in Foster’s opinion. Under this view, it would be unnecessary to continue any
discussion with regard to Kant’s theory of the highest good, since he dismissed it at the
very end.
What Foster is suggesting, in other words, is that Kant himself at last became a
“critic” of his own idea of the highest good, by regarding it as irrelevant, which
motivated him to (almost) abandon it. Therefore, the work of the defenders is worthless:
they should not be defending Kant’s idea of the highest good, since Kant himself took it
out from his philosophical system as a pivotal element.
Criticisms in a Nutshell28
In my personal reading of these criticisms, I maintain that there are six types of
apparent problems related to Kant’s theory of the highest good, problems that now I list
and name: the problems of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance
and abandonment.
The problem of heteronomy is explained by Beck when he asserts that to present
the highest good as the determining ground of the moral will would be to posit
heteronomy as the core principle of ethics, since the highest good includes happiness as
one of its components. It is also explained by Auxter when he says that the highest good
does not have beneficial effects on moral motivations, since only the conformity with the
moral law serves as proper moral motive.

28
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The problem of unsuitability is also pointed out by Beck when he argues that
there is no duty to promote the highest good, since it is not contained in any of the
formulations of the categorical imperative, and it is not included among those ends that
are also duties in the Metaphysics of Morals. In other words, what Beck is saying is that
the idea of the highest good does not fit in Kant’s ethical system, being instead an
arbitrary later addition that must be removed. Rawls joins this criticism by arguing that
the duty to proportion happiness in accordance to virtue does not follow from the moral
law and it is even incompatible with it and with the “realm of ends” that we ought to
pursue. Kant justifies this duty with reference to an impartial reason, but this is a foreign
element in his theory, in Rawls’s opinion.
The criticism of impossibility was also first pointed out by Beck when he
mentioned that there is nothing a person can do in order to distribute happiness in
proportion to virtue, and that such distribution is something that corresponds, in any case,
to God. This criticism was later reinforced by Murphy, with the argument that, for Kant,
we cannot know whether a person is virtuous; because of that, we cannot promote the
highest good which requires distributing happiness in proportion to virtue. Auxter has
also contributed to this criticism, by saying that the highest good does not tell what we
ought to do, since it does not discriminate between actions that correspond to God and
those appropriate to human beings. To this charge of impossibility I will add the one
pointed out by R.Z. Friedman, who is not a “critic,” but believes with Beck that there is
no duty to promote the highest good. As he reminds us, happiness for Kant is a relative
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concept. Therefore, it would be impossible to proportion happiness in accordance to
virtue, since we can never determine what makes somebody happy.
The charge of injustice was pointed out by Rawls. As we have seen, in his
opinion, since we cannot know whether a person is virtuous, any attempt to proportion
happiness in accordance to virtue would imply an arbitrary/irrational action.
The accusation of irrelevance was pointed out by Beck by saying that since the
highest good does not add new duties, and cannot be the determining ground of the will,
it is unimportant for ethical purposes.
Finally, the charge of abandonment was presented by Forster, according to whom
Kant finally abandoned his theory of the highest good, since he did not mention it in a
substantial form in his final unfinished work: the Opus Postumum.
As we can see, Kant’s theory of the highest good is not merely problematic
because of its apparent irrelevance. There are many other problems that are also at stake
here. The work of the “revisionists,” “secularizers,” and “maximalists” has been precisely
oriented to the solution of (some of) these problems.
The Revisionists
The “revisionists,” as has been briefly explained, consider that the highest good is
morally important since it corrects some supposed problems found in the rest of Kant’s
ethics (for instance, in the Groundwork, the Analytic of the Second Critique, etc.). Here
Caswell mentions three authors: John Silber, Mark Packer and R.Z. Friedman. Since
Silber’s position has already been presented, in what follows I will only present Packer’s
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and Friedman’s arguments. I will close this section with some criticisms to this way of
interpretation.
Mark Packer and the Problem of Motivation
As we know, Silber’s response to Beck constitutes the first effort in the Englishspeaking tradition to defend the importance of Kant’s theory of the highest good after the
attack of the “critics” started. He is considered a “revisionist,” since for him the highest
good solves the problem of formalism (and hence “corrects” a supposed problem found
in the rest of Kant’s ethics). The second “revisionist” that appeared on the scene was
Mark Packer, who argued that the highest good solves a problem of motivation, since the
mere form of the moral law is not capable of motivating enough the human will. Briefly,
his argument goes as follows.
Distancing himself from Auxter, Packer argues that the highest good is a
regulative idea, not a constitutive concept of moral action. To this he adds that Kant’s
theory of obligation does not exhaust his moral theory, as Auxter also thought. In
Packer’s opinion, Kant’s concept of duty needed to be complemented by a moral
psychology, considering that the moral law is applied as a command to finite beings. It is
precisely the highest good that is the element that conjoins the psychological account of
the human will with the concept of moral obligation. Therefore, its function is crucial to
the practical effectiveness of the moral law and for the completion of his moral theory.
The problem faced here is established in the question of “how a formal principle
of obligation legislated by noumenal reason can activate the sensuous will, which is part
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of humanity’s sensuous nature.”29 In order to solve this problem, according to Packer,
together with the deontological approach of ethics developed in the Groundwork and in
the Analytic of the Second Critique, a psychology of the will was also required.
Otherwise, “the formal conditions of morality (…) can have no motivating influence in
the human will.”30 In other words, just as happiness for its own sake is not moral (since it
leads to heteronomy), the mere form of the categorical imperative is not motivationally
enough for human beings. The problem, in Packer’s opinion, is solved by Kant with the
introduction of the idea of the highest good, one that
unites into a single moral concept the deontological thesis of Kant’s foundation
theory and its psychological application to the human will. (…) Ethics cannot
possibly work as a directive for human conduct, Kant suggests, if it is either a
rational deduction of duties or a purely eudaemonist doctrine.31
The highest good, from this perspective, is seen as a regulative idea that grants the
incentives to moral conduct. We are obliged to follow the moral law, but as finite beings
we cannot do so without happiness. Since the highest good contains both elements under
a proper hierarchy (virtue being its supreme component), it works as a proper moral
incentive.
Now, the highest good in its full expression for Kant was unattainable unless we
posit the postulates of immortality and God. Immortality would allow us to approach
perfect virtue, whereas God appears as the grantor of the deserved reward: happiness in
proportion to virtue. Hence, the highest good, together with the postulates related to it
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(the postulates of God and immortality) and religious faith constitute for Kant, in
Packer’s opinion, “indispensable factor(s) in human motivation,”32 elements that
complete his ethical theory.
R.Z. Friedman and the Problem of Subjectivism
As we have repeated, in Silber’s opinion the highest good solves the problem of
formalism. R.Z. Friedman is one of those for whom Silber was right in his attempt to
defend the importance of the highest good (and hence in responding Beck), although for
different reasons than his. Therefore, he disagrees with Silber in the opinion according to
which the highest good provides a material content to the formality of the moral law. He
gives two reasons for this.
First, he agrees with Murphy in that, if we follow Kant’s claim that we are not
capable of knowing the virtuousness of anybody, it seems to follow that there cannot be
any duty to proportion happiness in accordance to virtue. To this he adds that happiness
for Kant is a relative concept, and this also makes it impossible to promote the highest
good. In Friedman’s words, “the complete relative character of human happiness makes
the attempt to apportion it impossible.”33 To this, it is useful to remember Kant’s own
words with regard to happiness: “(…) the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate
one that even though everyone wishes to attain happiness, yet he can never say
definitively and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills” (GMM 4:418).
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In relation to Beck, Friedman agrees with him that the highest good does not posit
new duties. There is no duty to promote happiness in proportion to virtue. Our only duty
is to be virtuous.
Now, against Beck, Friedman considers that, although only the moral law
establishes our duties, this does not mean that the highest good is of no importance in
Kant’s moral system. It is not a practical concept, but it has practical consequences. To
say that the highest good is morally irrelevant would be similar to saying that the concept
of freedom has no practical consequences and hence is morally irrelevant, which is
absurd. It is absurd since, while the concept of freedom is irrelevant for the way in which
we make moral decisions, it is still relevant for the moral agent. To deny freedom would
imply denying the moral law. It is the same with the highest good. The impossibility of
the highest good would imply the falsity of the moral law.
Concretely, Friedman argues that the highest good is important because it is the
necessary condition for the objectivity of the moral law. How does he build his
argument? In his own words,
if the fate of the morally worthy and the morally unworthy does not reflect their
relative worthiness, the principle which enjoins moral worthiness cannot be
understood to be connected to the moral agent’s condition of existence. Lacking
this connection the moral law cannot be understood to be objective. Rather, the
law must be discarded as an empty projection of the agent’s mind. The objective
status of the moral law requires the causal connection between worthiness and the
agent’s condition of existence and it is precisely this connection which is provided
by the highest good.34
The claim, then, is that without the highest good, the moral law would not be
objective, a claim mainly (although in our opinion wrongly) based on Kant’s affirmation
34
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that “if (…) the highest good is impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the
moral law, which commands us to promote it, must be fantastic and directed to empty
imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false” (CPrR 5:114). Instead of claiming
that without it Kant’s ethical system would suffer from formalism, in this case the claim
is that it would suffer from subjectivism. This argument places him among the so called
“revisionists” under the classification that we are using.
Revisionists’ Burdens
As we have seen, for Silber the highest good solves the problem of formalism of
the moral law. The highest good, then, gives the necessary content to it, which otherwise
would be empty. For Packer, on the other hand, the highest good solves a problem of
motivation: the moral law does not have enough motivational force. Finally, Friedman
considers that the highest good is necessary since, without it, the moral law would be
subjective. So he points to the problem of subjectivism.
Now, as Caswell notes, these attempts to defend the importance of the highest
good fail for the following reasons. First, with regard to the alleged problems of
motivation and subjectivism, both Packer and Friedman “must either ignore or judge as
inadequate the solutions to the (referred) problems (…) offered in the Analytic of the
Second Critique.”35 Concretely, Packer must ignore or deny that the feeling of respect is
the only proper and sufficient incentive of the will, whereas Friedman must do the same
with Kant’s assertion that the moral law is a “fact of reason.” Silber’s alleged problem of
formalism constitutes a bigger departure from Kant’s theory, though, since the latter
35
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never thought of the formal nature of the moral law as a problem (for instance, as a
problem that leaves his moral theory as an empty one). Another reason for dismissing
Silber’s position, I would add, is given by Murphy, for whom “the context of common
moral experience gives all the content necessary.”36 As we can see, all these three
interpretations contradict Kant’s main claims, so they must be dismissed. None of them
have been able to overcome the criticisms posited by Beck and his followers.
In relation to this I would also say that, in most of the cases, the “revisionists”
seem to focus their defense of the highest good in the replies they offer to the charge of
irrelevance. Hence, their defense does not include a response to the other criticisms,
namely those of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, and abandonment,
which are also in need of a response (although, to be fair, the problems of injustice and
abandonment appeared later). In sum, the defense developed by the “revisionists” is not
only inadequate but also incomplete: none of them have been able to overcome the
criticisms offered by Beck and his followers.
The Secularizers
As Caswell explains with this respect,
a leading trend in the interpretation of the highest good, especially in the Englishspeaking literature, attempts to extract a ‘secularized’ version of the highest good
from Kant’s account. The secularizers hope to save the highest good by divesting
it of its difficult religious features, including Kant’s idea that in the highest good,
happiness will exist in proportion to virtue.37
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In simple terms, the “secularizers” see the highest good as a moral world possible
through human effort in which happiness will be favored, but not necessarily granted. As
secularizers, they do not consider the postulates of God and immortality as necessary, and
proportionality is sacrificed in most of the cases.
Among the “secularizers,” Caswell includes Gerald Barnes, Mary-Barbara Zeldin,
Steven G. Smith, Andrews Reath, Harry van der Linden, Onora O’Neill (together with
Korsgaard, who follows her interpretation), and Paul Guyer. In relation to this list, I
would add Philip J. Rossi and Pauline Kleingeld. Also with this respect, I am not so
convinced that Zeldin belongs to this group, insofar as she defends the inclusion of the
postulate of God as a condition for the possibility of the highest good. In her own words,
“if (a) we are to do our duty and thus promote the summum bonum (…) we must
postulate that God exists.”38 Now, if she includes God in her scheme, it is hard to see how
she could be considered a mere “secularizer,” when Caswell himself has described this
group as one that divests the highest good from its religious features (a definition that I
support).
In what follows I will present two of the best cases of “secularist” interpretations
of the highest good: the ones presented by Reath and by Kleingeld. This will help us in
two senses. First, it will give us a sense of how the “secularizers” have partially
succeeded in their attempt to solve the problems related to Kant’s theory of the highest
good, as I have listed and named them. In fact, I will try to show how they actually solve
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those problems. Second, it will allow us to build up our criticisms against this current of
interpretation.39
Andrews Reath and Two Versions of the Highest Good
In his article “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Reath argues that
it is possible to find two versions of the highest good in Kant’s works: a secular and a
theological. From here he develops a defense of the secular version. As he explains, he
wants to argue that “the highest good need not be viewed as a theological version, and
that the proportionality of virtue and happiness is not essential to the doctrine.”40 He
favors the secular version insofar as it is not subject to the criticisms raised among
commentators (especially if the element of proportionality is left aside). He also defends
that Kant moved from a theological version to a secular one during his lifetime.
According to Reath, Kant does not combine with success the two (supposed)
versions of the highest good. Two aspects distinguish them, related to the capability of
deriving the highest good from the moral law (problem of unsuitability), and with their
attainability (problem of impossibility). In relation to the first problem (unsuitability), the
secular version can be constructed out of the moral law without problems. On the
contrary, the basis for the theological version is less clear, in his opinion. In relation to
the second problem (impossibility), the theological version presents the highest good as a
state of affairs to be attained in a future life through God. The secular version, by
39
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contrast, can be described in naturalistic terms, achievable in this world through human
activity. Concretely, the secular version will happen if “all human beings were to act
from the moral law, and their conduct were co-ordinated in appropriate ways.”41 Reath
recognizes that, for Kant, even the secular version would depend on God, but he rejects
this necessity. Therefore, while in the theological version the highest good could not
result from human agency, under the secular interpretation it is possible to say what the
highest good would be like, and how it could be achieved through human action.
In Reath’s opinion, it is not the element of proportionality which leads to a
theological version, but its location in another world. He thinks it is possible to imagine a
state of affairs in this world in which happiness is given as a reward for virtue in a
proportional way. The necessity to locate the highest good in another world happens
when we envision the highest good as a state of affairs that all humans will enjoy.
Perhaps the desire for this absolute inclusion is the motive for the theological version, in
his opinion. In contrast, “on the secular conception, the individuals of a particular
historical era would experience the highest good, even though it might only result from
the efforts of many earlier generations.”42 This could seem unfair, but it does not
contradict other Kantian postulates, in Reath’s opinion.
According to Reath, the secular version is mainly found in the Critique of
Judgment and the Religion (!). Here the highest good is seen by Reath as attainable in
history through human efforts (for instance, with well designed institutions). It is
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presented as a social goal in which, furthermore, the element of proportionality is not
essential:
it implies no necessary connection between virtue and happiness, but instead
describes the highest good as a union of two distinct ends, one of which is
subordinate to the other. The first would be the moral perfection of all individuals,
and the second the satisfaction of their permissible ends.43
The ethical community that Kant mentions in the Religion is the clearest example,
for Reath, of the highest good in its secular version, where in his opinion it takes an
institutional/political form. Its rationale, then, seems to be much clearer than that of the
theological version. That the theological version has an unclear rationale is explained in
part by the ungrounded inclusion of proportionality in the picture, in Reath’s opinion.
Reath also presents a developmental reading of the highest good in Kant’s oeuvre.
He highlights that the theological version is predominant in the First and Second
Critiques, whereas the secular version is predominant in the Third Critique and later
works, surprisingly including the Religion, as it has been referred. From here he proposes
that, “historically, Kant’s thought about the highest good develops in the direction of the
secular conception, even though the theological version is never completely dropped.”44
Now, the referred distinction of the two versions of the highest good is the base
for his subsequent criticism of the theological version. According to the first criticism,
the theological version leaves limited role to human agency; therefore, “it is no longer a
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state of affairs that we can adopt as an end for our conduct.”45 We can become virtuous,
but not bring happiness in proportion to virtue (problem of impossibility). The second
criticism is related to the possibility of deriving the highest good from the moral law as
an end that is also a duty (problem of unsuitability). Concretely, the element of
proportionality is not grounded in any base, in his opinion. The idea of proportionality
seems to follows from a principle of moral desert, “but no reasons were ever given for
thinking that the moral law generates such a principle.”46 It is less sustainable that this
principle is independent of the moral law, since this is the keystone of the whole system
of morals, according to Kant.
The advantage of the secular version, as Reath presents it, is that it does not suffer
these criticisms (unsuitability and impossibility). Moreover, it could be argued that it
contributes to Kant’s moral theory. The highest good here appears as an ideal of social
cooperation. If everyone acted from the moral law, individuals would be able to achieve
their personal ends, since others would not harm them or interfere in their goals. In
addition, people will be more interested in others’ happiness, in the common good. In
sum, “when the implications of the secular conception are fully developed, the highest
good becomes an important social ideal that makes a substantive contribution to Kant’s
moral theory.”47 In this way, Reath also responds to the criticism of irrelevance.
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As we can see, for Reath the secular version, in contrast to the theological
version, is not subject to the criticisms of unsuitability, impossibility and irrelevance. The
problem of heteronomy is not responded to, as well as that of injustice (although, it is fair
to say, this problem appeared later). Nonetheless, the problem of injustice is indirectly
solved with the exclusion of the element of proportionality. Now, it is interesting to note
that Reath leaves aside the element of proportionality not because of its relation to the
problem of impossibility (according to which we are not able to give happiness in
proportion to virtue), but because of a problem of unsuitability: it is a principle that
(presumably) is not grounded in the heart of Kant’s ethical system.
Pauline Kleingeld and the “Connecting Problem”
As Kleingeld explains at the beginning of her article entitled “What Do the
Virtuous Hope For? Re-reading Kant’s Doctrine of the Highest Good,” her aim is to
develop a deduction of the duty to promote the highest good, and to make sense of
happiness as part of it, without contradicting the basic postulates of Kant’s ethics. Also,
she attempts to unfold the cause of the seemingly different versions of the highest good
found in Kant’s works.
In her words, “according to Kant, knowledge of one’s duty leads to a need to
relate one’s moral action to a final end,”48 which happens to be the highest good as a
moral world. The inclusion of an end in his system does not lead to heteronomy since it
follows the moral determination of the will and since it is not motivationally decisive.
That is how she answers the charge of heteronomy. Now, in the First Critique Kant
48
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presents this end for the first time, a sort of secular version of the highest good, in
Kleingeld’s opinion. The idea is to bring the sensible world into conformity with the
moral world. How? Through respect for the moral law. Now, in that world happiness will
be necessarily connected with virtue (the latter producing the former), considering that
people will live in harmony and will even promote the general happiness. The problem of
impossibility, hence, is also responded to. Now, in this way the horizon of a moral agent
shifts: “instead of only knowing how one ought to act, and instead of only looking at
single maxims in isolation, one thus obtains an all-encompassing end and sees one’s
individual moral efforts as contributions to that final end.”49 In this resides –to some
extent- the practical importance of the highest good as a moral world. As we can see, in
this initial conception of the highest good, the problems of heteronomy, impossibility and
irrelevance are contested.
What Kleingeld tries to do next is to derive the duty to promote the highest good.
In her opinion, nowhere does Kant formally derive this duty. She reminds us of Beck’s
criticisms, according to which the highest good is not contained in the moral law and,
even if it were contained, it does not add new duties. Kleingeld tries to reconstruct the
derivation of such a duty while avoiding such criticism. Her argument goes as follows:
1. It is a duty to act in accordance with the categorical imperative.
2. Acting in accordance to the categorical imperative, and only acting in
accordance to the categorical imperative, promotes the highest good (understood
as a moral world).
3. Therefore: Promoting the highest good is a duty.50
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That is how she answers the problem of unsuitability. To this, the author adds
some clarifications, most of which are recalled here. First, the duty is to promote, not to
realize the highest good, since individual moral agency cannot lead to the full attainment
of it. The only way to attain it is if everyone acts morally. That is how the criticism of
impossibility is weakened even more. Second, “the duty to promote the highest good
‘broadens’ and ‘extends’ the perspective of duty, and this extension is brought about not
by the introduction of a new moral principle, but by the rational construction of the idea
of a moral world.”51 This second point, as can be noticed, reinforces the defense of the
highest good against the criticism of irrelevance. Third, if the highest good is understood
not as a moral world, but as happiness in proportion to virtue, a problem arises, since we
cannot know inner intentions. As a consequence, the claim that there is a duty to promote
such a world would be subject again to the charge of impossibility. Now, for Kleingeld
there is not a need to hold this view, as we will see. Fourth, the validity of the second
premise depends on whether the highest good is possible or not. If it is impossible, as
Kant asserts, the moral law would be false. “This is why the question of the possibility of
the highest good becomes essential to Kant.”52 This is the problem that the author
attempts to solve next, through a revision of the development of the concept of the
highest good in Kant’s works.
When the highest good is seen as a moral world, as in the First Critique, it appears
to be possible through the morally well oriented actions of all human beings, according to
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Kleingeld. In fact, if all acted morally, as it has been mentioned, happiness will be
favored (since nobody will harm each other, for instance). In her opinion, the question
that Kant needed to address at that point –if he wanted to set once and for all the
possibility of the highest good– was “the question of whether a moralization of
humankind is possible.”53 Nonetheless, regrettably according to Kleingeld, Kant did not
approach this question here, but instead turned attention to what she calls the “connection
problem,” “i.e. the problem of the connection between virtue and happiness in an
imperfect world. Kant argues that a noncontingent connection of virtue and happiness can
be assumed only if one assumes the existence of God and of a ‘future world’.”54
As Kleingeld argues, the problem of the connection between virtue and happiness
in a moral world (and hence of the possibility of the highest good) is specially explained
in Kant’s later works, such as the Third Critique, the Religion and Perpetual Peace,
where Kant “works out the problem of the possibility of promoting a moral world.”55
Regrettably for Kleingeld, in the Second Critique Kant focused even more on the socalled “connecting problem,” i.e., on the question of how the connection between virtue
and happiness would be possible for an individual. It is here that the element of
proportionality enters on the stage as a core issue, to the extent that the highest good
happens to be re-defined as happiness in proportion to virtue, which for Kleingeld is a
mistake. The problem of happiness for an individual (proportionality included) is not so
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important. It highlights the question of “What may I hope?” and not the most important
one: how could we bring the real world closer to the moral one? She does not deny the
importance of the question of hope, but regrets that Kant paid too much attention to it.
As we can notice, Kleingeld responds to the criticisms of unsuitability and
impossibility by presenting the highest good as a moral world attainable through human
effort, in which happiness will be promoted, although not necessarily in a proportionate
way. The criticism of injustice is also indirectly solved –as in the case of Reath– by the
exclusion of the element of proportionality. Nonetheless, in distinction with Reath, the
element of proportionality is left aside –among other reasons, as we have seen– because
of its relation to the problem of impossibility (and not merely because of a problem of
unsuitability). The problems of heteronomy and irrelevance are also responded to, so we
can say that Kleingeld’s defense is almost complete (insofar as no response to the
problem of abandonment is given, although, as in other cases, this criticism appeared
later).
Secularizers’ Achilles heel
As we can see in these two examples, the “secularizers” seem to succeed in the
solution of the problems of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice and
irrelevance. This seems to be enough to be satisfied and close the discussion (although a
response to the problem of abandonment would still be necessary). But this is not the
case. There are several problems related with this way of interpreting Kant’s theory of the
highest good.
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The first problem is pointed out by Caswell: secular interpretations are always at
risk of being so compatible with Kant’s ethical system that the problem of irrelevance
remains always as a shadow. This assertion, as weird as it sounds (since precisely the
secularizers leave out essential components of Kant’s account of the highest good, such
as the element of proportionality, and the religious postulates), can be understood in the
following way. In their attempt to save the highest good through its secularization, this
group of interpreters tries to show that the highest good is just a harmonized compilation
of the duties described in other works by Kant, mainly in the Groundwork and in the
Metaphysics of Morals (namely the duties of pursuing one’s own virtue and the happiness
of others). In this way, if the highest good is just a repetition of what Kant has said
before, then it is irrelevant for ethical purposes, since nothing new is added: we already
know what we should do without the need of bringing the highest good onto the stage. At
least, this is what seems to be argued. In my opinion this is true: any secularist
interpretation is always at that risk. But to be at risk does not mean that the risk cannot be
avoided. For instance, the argument that Kleingeld gives for the importance of the highest
good as an ideal of a moral world seems to be strong: “the duty to promote the highest
good ‘broadens’ and ‘extends’ the perspective of duty, and this extension is brought
about not by the introduction of a new moral principle, but by the rational construction of
the idea of a moral world.”56 I believe, then, that a secular interpretation can succeed in
solving the problem of irrelevance.
The second problem pointed out by Caswell is stronger:
56
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when we deny the theological nature of the highest good, we deny Kant almost all
the significance he clearly believed the highest good had, as the link between
morality and rational religion. Of course, we are greater friends of the truth, but
the rejection of so much of Kant’s thought should be undertaken as a last resort.57
And this is related to another problem, namely that no matter how much these
interpreters try to find a secular version of the highest good in Kant’s works, there is not
such a thing. In other words, there are not two versions of the highest good (a secular and
a theological), as has been shown in Chapter I of this work. In fact, Kant held one idea of
the highest good, from the First Critique, to the Religion and the Third Critique: that of a
moral world in which virtue is rewarded with happiness, a world that is both a duty and
an object of hope for humans, and that ultimately can only be conceived as possible in its
total completion through God in a future life. So instead of directly facing the problems
of unsuitability, impossibility, and injustice, the secularizers look for an easy way out by
taking out a pivotal element of the concept, namely proportionality (the element that
inspires those criticisms), and by forcing Kant’s texts in order to argue that Kant moved
from a theological version of the highest good to a secular one, which is not accurate at
all.
Another point that can be made against an exclusively secular version of the
highest good is related with the problem of impossibility. In a few words, it seems too
naïve or arrogant to think that something like an ideal moral world would ever happen on
Earth only by human effort. That is how the postulate of God comes back, as the only
possible grantor of the highest good. And, if the postulate of God is back, then the highest
good turns out to be theological again, even if it is seen as a moral world that must be
57
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realized on Earth (and not in an afterlife). With regard to this point, it is important to
remember that, for Kant, the highest good that we are discussing is always a “derived”
one, never the original. The original highest good is precisely God, the grantor of the
derived version. In this way, even if we want to argue that Kant held an earthly version of
the highest good, this is also subjected, according to him, to theological elements. This is
pretty clear in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims, as we have seen before,
that “(…) only in the ideal of the highest original good can pure reason find the ground of
the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derived good,
namely of an intelligible, i.e., moral world” (CPR A810/B838 – A811/B839). This is also
mentioned in the Second Critique, where Kant says that “the postulate of the possibility
of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a
highest original good, namely of the existence of God” (CPrR 5:125).
In relation to the charge of arrogance or naiveté on the side of the “secularizers,”
John Hare has made a good case. In his article “Kant and the Rational Instability of
Atheism,” he argues that this secular view is not consistent in itself. In his own words,
the “human effort alone” part has been more or less unique in human history to
the last century and a half. This has been at once the most educated and the most
brutal period of human history. I am not arguing for the causal claim that atheism
produces brutality, but for a Kantian modesty about what humans, given the
propensity of evil, can accomplish on their own. Has Marxism or laissez-faire
capitalism or any other human system produced the world of our dreams?58
Finally, let’s pay some attention to the literal meaning of the concept of the
highest good. The highest good recalls a perfect state of being. Now, if the highest good
is seen as a state of affairs in the world in which happiness will only be favored, but not
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granted for the just ones, how could we keep calling this the highest good? The highest
good as understood by the “secularizers” is for sure a better state of affairs than that in
which we actually live, and hence it could be seen as a social goal. But I do not see how
we could keep calling it the highest good, i.e., a perfect world, as Kant understood it. The
adjective “highest” included in the concept determines that there is nothing superior to
that, and the secular version does not fit this characterization. In relation to this, it is
important to notice that Kant was not talking about a highest “possible for humans by
humans” good, as if it were a mere social goal. His vision of the highest good was much
more grandiose: he envisioned the highest good as nothing less than the ultimate end of
all things. That is why we have to take the adjective “highest” seriously, if we want to
remain Kantians.
The secularzers’ attempts, therefore, as beautiful as they could sound for some
(insofar as they foresee an ideal attainable through human effort), finally fail. The
challenge, therefore, is to develop a defense of the theological version of the highest
good; i.e. we have to find out if the theological version of the highest good (Kant’s idea
of the highest good!) is necessarily prey to the problems pointed out by the “critics,”
especially those of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice and irrelevance, or
if those criticisms are, after a careful analysis, ungrounded.
The Call for a “Maximalist” Interpretation
As we have seen, Kant’s concept of the highest good has been the subject of
several objections. The problems of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice,
irrelevance and abandonment seem to undermine the idea. That is how the “critics” argue
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that the highest good does not serve to answer the question of “What should I do?” It
could serve, they admit, for architectonic purposes or for answering the question of hope,
but is not useful for “practical” purposes. It is not, in sum, an ethical concept, but at most,
a religious one.
In their attempt to solve these problems, the “revisionists” failed by denying (or
ignoring) some of the main postulates of the Groundwork and the Analytic of the Second
Critique. Also, they failed by not answering all of the criticisms, but in most of the cases
only that of irrelevance. The case of the “secularizers” is interesting since they seem to
succeed in the solution of most of the remaining problems, but they are in turn subject to
several objections.
That is how it seems that the only possibility left, if we want to defend Kant’s
concept of the highest good as part of his ethics, is to succeed in a “maximalist”
interpretation; in other words, to defend the highest good against the criticisms in its
theological version, without secularizing it. The challenge is to find out if the problems of
heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, injustice and abandonment can be solved with a
“maximalist” interpretation. There have been several attempts to defend the highest good
in this way. Some of the “maximalists” mentioned by Caswell are Allen Wood, Terry
Godlove, Stephen Engstrom, and Sharon Anderson-Gold. Caswell himself identifies his
essay as a maximalist defense. Now, to this list I will add the defense given by Victoria
Wike. In what follows, I will give a quick review of some of these attempts, and see how
successful their interpretations are.
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In Chapter 3 of his book Kant’s Moral Religion, Wood responds to Beck’s
criticism of irrelevance by saying that “the demand of reason that we make the highest
good our end, is in effect a demand that we find for ourselves a single purpose for our
lives, a final purpose which our reason entitles us to regard as the ultimate meaning and
goal of the entire world,”59 an argument that I find convincing. Wood also responds to the
problem of unsuitability, in the following terms. Briefly, in Wood’s view the highest
good as a duty is just a harmonized compilation of the duties to promote the moral good,
which he sees as a duty to promote both one’s own and other’s virtue (and not merely
one’s virtue, as it is established in the Metaphysics of Morals), and the natural good,
which he sees as a duty to promote happiness in proportion to virtue “for myself and for
others.”60 This view inspires him to elaborate the “Cambridge University Example,”
which he builds in order to respond to Beck’s claim that there is no such duty to promote
the highest good, since it is not contained as a duty in the Metaphysics of Morals. In his
words, “Beck’s error here is quite like that of the man who denied that Cambridge
University was a real educative institution because he failed to find it housed in any of
the buildings on the campus.”61 My response to the problem of unsuitability parallels
Wood’s, but is unfolded in a different way, as we will see in the following Chapter.
Wood’s defense, in any case, is insufficient insofar as he does not answer the problems of
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heteronomy, impossibility, injustice, and abandonment (although he cannot be blamed for
a lack of response in the two latter cases, since they emerged later).
Godlove, in turn, has also built a “maximalist” defense of the highest good. In his
article entitled “Moral Actions, Moral Lives: Kant on Intending the Highest Good,”
Godlove attempts to overcome the classic discussion around the idea of the highest good
by focusing on an interpretation based on the Religion and the Third Critique. He
considers that Kant developed –that is, changed– the justification of the importance of the
highest good (and hence his theory of moral theism) in three periods: the first period
corresponding to the highest good as presented in the Lectures on Ethics and the First
Critique; the second period corresponding to the highest good as found in the Second
Critique; and the third period corresponding to highest good as developed in the Religion
and the Third Critique. The last account is the one that allows overcoming the classic
discussion, according to the author. In other words, it is in this period that Kant
successfully explains the ethical relevance of the highest good and of the religious
elements that are attached to it.
Concretely in the Religion, in Godlove’s reading, Kant makes a fruitful distinction
between two actions: the immediate and the mediate action. The immediate is related to
the concrete action that I perform in this moment; for instance, to tell the truth. The
mediate action is related to the final end of all actions: the highest good. “Thus, in acting,
I intend to tell the truth, and I intend to further the highest good.”62 Both have the same
motivational ground (the moral law), but different ends. Now, in Godlove’s opinion, it is
62
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only when we take the highest good as the final goal of our life, i.e. when we foresee the
second effect of every moral action (the highest good); it is only then that we adopt a
moral life (understood as “more than a brute concatenation of otherwise independent
moral actions”63). So the highest good is important insofar as it enriches our life,
transforming it into a really moral one, one oriented towards a final overarching goal.
In relation to this, also, theism is not necessary if we engage ourselves only in
immediate actions. On the contrary, theism is crucial when we engage ourselves in a
moral life, i.e., in a moral life oriented toward the highest good, since the latter is only
possible through the intervention of God. Otherwise, we would be intending something
that we know or believe to be impossible. In sum, for Godlove God is irrelevant to the
exercise of practical reason, but is crucial for a moral life, i.e., for a life oriented towards
the highest good.
From this reading the charge of irrelevance is, as in the case of Wood,
superseded. Nonetheless, he denies that there is a duty to crown virtue with happiness,64
which is not loyal to Kant’s idea of the highest good. To this extent, and to the extent that
he does not answer the other problems at stake, his defense is both inappropriate and
incomplete (although, as in the case of Wood, he cannot be blamed for not responding to
the problems of injustice and abandonment, since these appeared later).
Turning to Engstrom’s defense, he asserts that the highest good becomes
important “when to our concern regarding how we should act we add the further concern
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(…) regarding whither our actions will lead,”65 following what Kant says in the Religion.
In this way, he gives a strong argument to overcome the problem of irrelevance. He also
responds to the problem of impossibility, according to which we cannot distribute
happiness in accordance to virtue, mainly because of the obscurity of moral intentions.
Nonetheless, his solution happens to be wrong. The way he tries to supersede that
problem is by equating the duty of beneficence with the duty to proportion happiness in
accordance to virtue, which seems inaccurate, to say the least. In his own words: “no
problem arises if it is possible for us to aim at happiness proportioned to virtue without
making any assessments of person’s moral dispositions. This is possible if the duty to
proportion happiness to virtue and the duty of beneficence coincide.”66 To this extent and
to the extent that he does not respond to the other problems at stake (although, as in the
former cases, he cannot be blamed for not responding to the problems of injustice and
abandonment) his defense fails.
In relation to Wike’s defense, she gives successful responses to the problems of
heteronomy (by explaining how in Kant’s idea of the highest good there is only
“apparent” heteronomy, but not real67), unsuitability (by arguing that the highest good
commands “no more than the moral law although it surely commands in a different way
than the moral law,”68 insofar as it is a collective duty), impossibility (by asserting that
the duty is to promote and not to attain the highest good, and that for Kant “questions
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about physical abilities and powers are not relevant to considerations of categorical
commands”69), and irrelevance (by saying that the highest good “is of practical
importance in defining the final goal of the will, of morality, and of helping human
beings to recognize the communal nature of that goal”70). As in the cases of Wood,
Godlove, and Engstrom, she was not compelled to give an answer to the problems of
injustice and abandonment, insofar as these criticisms appeared after her book was
published, but she does answer all the other problems, for which her defense could be
called a complete one, at least at the moment in which it was launched. The reader will
note to which extent the defense developed in the next Chapter differs from hers,
although there are more positive connections than disagreements.
The defense of Anderson-Gold, in turn, is also interesting but not loyal to Kant
(although she argues the contrary). It is powerful insofar as she gives a good argument in
defense of the practical importance of the highest good: it is necessary, she asserts, for
the overcoming of evil, insofar as this emerges as a consequence of living among others,
as Kant says at the beginning of book 3 of the Religion. Nonetheless, in some sections
she seems to be too close to the “secularizers,” concretely by her understanding of the
highest good as a social goal in which the element of proportionality is left aside. The
way in which she distinguishes herself from the “secularizers,” and remains a
“maximalist,” is by recognizing that God has a valuable place in the overall picture. In
her words, “the God of the Religion functions (…) as the Moral Bondsman of a universal
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and enduring community.”71 Where I think she is wrong is when she maintains that Kant
changed his view on the highest good in this later work. In that way, instead of defining it
as a moral world in which happiness will be distributed as a reward for virtue, the highest
good, according to her, was now presented by Kant just as a moral world in which the
element of proportional happiness was not included anymore. As she says in this respect,
in book 3 of the Religion, the highest moral good is defined as a social good, a
unification of dispositions into a community under principles of virtue. With
respect to the social good, references to a physical happiness exactly proportioned
to virtue (with the retributivist connotations rejected by Auxter) are absent.72
This is not accurate at all. Kant clearly maintains his vision of the highest good as
a moral world in which happiness will be granted for the virtuous in the Religion, book 3
included. This is clear from the very beginning of the book, namely the preface to the
first edition, in which Kant speaks of the highest good as
an object that unites within itself the formal condition of all such ends as we
ought to have (duty) with everything which is conditional upon ends we have and
which conforms to duty (happiness proportioned to its observance), that is, the
idea of a highest good in the world, for whose possibility we must assume a
higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent being who alone can unite the two
elements of this good (REL 6:5).
Also, in book 3 of the Religion Kant speaks about the necessity, in the ethical
community (the highest good), of a divine legislator who will, “as must be in every
community, give to each according to the worth of his actions” (REL 6:99). So it is very
misleading to say that the highest good of the Religion is a different one from that of the
First and Second Critiques.
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In sum, I do not disagree with her claim that the highest good is ethically
important insofar as it is required for the overcoming of evil. Nonetheless, I do not share
the view that Kant abandoned his conception of the highest good as a moral world in
which proportional happiness has a place. So even though her defense solves the problem
of irrelevance, she fails by giving an erroneous interpretation of Kant’s idea of the
highest good, and by not responding to the other problems at stake.
Transition Towards a New “Maximalist” Defense
In Caswell’s opinion, “these defenses differ widely in the substance of their
interpretation, but all suffer from an inability to account for the necessity of the highest
good for practical reasons.”73 This is what justifies, in his opinion, his new “maximalist”
defense of the highest good. What is required from the “maximalists,” according to him,
is to show what difference it makes for a moral life to strive for the highest good, and to
believe in the postulates attached to it. From here he develops his own “maximalist”
interpretation. Concretely, he argues, as Anderson-Gold does, albeit through different
roads, that the highest good is ethically important for the “revolution of the heart,” a
revolution that is in turn required for the eradication of evil (as this is argued in the
Religion). The problem in his case is that he does not approach the other problems, but
only that of irrelevance, an error that, as we can see now clearly, is very common among
the defenders, starting with Silber.
Now, I do not want to take Caswell’s general attitude in relation to the
“maximalists.” In other words, I do not want to say that all of them –Caswell included73
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have failed in their attempts to overcome the problems attached to Kant’s concept of the
highest good by the “critics.” On the contrary, I found that each of the “maximalists”
have something interesting to say in defense of the highest good, with their particular
limitations. Within these lines, I think that any further defense, such as the one that I want
to develop in the next chapter, does not have to deny the others in order to find a place in
the discussion. There is no reason to think, for instance, that there must be only one
argument that proves the practical importance of a theological version of the highest
good. Now, this does not mean that I agree with all the arguments and readings presented
by the “maximalists.” For instance, I am not persuaded by Godlove’s thesis that Kant
changed his view on the real importance of the highest good at least three times.
Nonetheless, I do find his theory of the double-effect action very interesting. And the
same happens with the other interpreters. So instead of denying all their arguments, I am
calling for the consolidation of the “maximalists” as a platoon. The enemy’s weapons
have been identified. In addition, we already know the only road that could lead us to
victory. It would be irresponsible if, for the sake of our personal glory, we deny the value
of our fellow combatants and disintegrate our philosophical militia. On the contrary, the
more reasons we can collect for defending the highest good against the criticisms (as long
as these are truly justified), the stronger we will be. That said, the moment has arrived for
me to jump to the first line of combat, since the others have already done their part. If
everything goes as expected, both their position (that of the other “maximalists”) and
mine will be enlightened by each other, and the criticisms will be finally superseded.

CHAPTER III
AN OVERARCHING DEFENSE OF
KANT’S IDEA OF THE HIGHEST GOOD
A genetic study (i.e., a study of the origins) of the discussion around Kant’s idea
of the highest good in the Anglo-Saxon world has shown us that most of the criticisms
against Kant’s inclusion of it in his moral philosophy were initially postulated by Beck.
In fact, except for the criticisms of abandonment and injustice (which is, nonetheless,
related to that of impossibility), and despite the fact that most of the other criticisms were
complemented and reinforced by later commentators, Beck was the one who first pointed
out the criticisms of heteronomy, unsuitability, impossibility, and irrelevance. Beck’s
interpretation, hence, constitutes the seed from which the body of this controversy has
emerged. That is why I propose, in order to supersede this controversy, to return to that
seed, that origin, and to see if the discussion was not misled since the beginning. In other
words, perhaps by throwing light onto Beck’s interpretation, it will become clear that the
discussion over the last fifty years has been, to some extent, a misunderstanding
generated by an original erroneous interpretation of Kant’s idea of the highest good.
As it is known, through those criticisms Beck denied two things. First, he denied
that the highest good can be considered the determining ground of the will, insofar as it
would bring heteronomy back to the stage, given that the highest good is defined by Kant
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as an object that has happiness as one of its components. Second, he denied that there can
be a duty to promote the highest good, which for him is reducible to a duty to crown
virtue with happiness,1 because of the problems of unsuitability and impossibility, i.e.,
because the idea of the highest good does not fit in Kant’s ethics, insofar as it is neither
contained in any of the formulations of the categorical imperative nor in those ends that
are also duties in the Metaphysics of Morals, being instead a later arbitrary addition to his
system (problem of unsuitability), and because there is nothing we can do in order to
distribute happiness in accordance to virtue, that being a task reserved for a Supreme
Being (problem of impossibility). Now, insofar as the concept of the highest good does
not add new duties, and since in his opinion it cannot be considered the determining
ground of the will, Beck concluded that the highest good is unimportant for moral
purposes (problem of irrelevance).
Now, in his critical analysis Beck committed, in my opinion, at least four
interpretative mistakes. First, he did not understand the consistency of the argument that
Kant gives in order to justify how we could think, without bringing heteronomy back to
the system, that the highest good is a proper determining ground of the will. Second, he
did not see how a duty to crown virtue with happiness follows from the moral law and
how, thanks to this, the idea of the highest good is constructed out of the latter, having
not only a place, but a privileged one in his moral philosophy. In other words, Beck did
not see how the highest good is “latently” present in the various formulations of the
categorical imperative, insofar as the latter is the highest good in its embryonic stage, as
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it will be explained later. Instead, Beck seems to have thought of the highest good as an
ungrounded idea that Kant arbitrarily added to his moral system from outside, from
which an unjustified duty to crown virtue was then deduced, when it is the other way
around. Third, Beck assumed that, for Kant, the duty to crown virtue with happiness is an
infallible one, one of similar status as, for instance, the duty of not lying. Fourth, it is
clear that, for Beck, the moral question is reducible to a question of duties. Therefore, if a
concept, such as that of the highest good, does not help to answer the question of “What
should I do?” by adding new duties, then it is morally irrelevant. In this way he denied,
for instance, Kant’s clarifications in the Religion, where he asserts that, although the
highest good does not add new duties, it is still important for ethics insofar as it answers
the “whither” question. Beck’s reductionism of the moral question is patent in his claim
that “the concept of the highest good is not a practical concept at all.”2
It is this erroneous reading of Kant that has misled, in turn, many of the
commentators that came later. The “critics” that came after Beck have given more
reasons to deny that the highest good can be considered the determining ground of the
will insofar as it will undermine the principle of autonomy (first interpretative mistake),
without paying careful attention to how Kant himself anticipated and responded to this
potential criticism. Also, the “critics” have empowered the claim that the highest good
does not fit in Kant’s ethics (second interpretative mistake), and have gone even further
by saying that the idea of the highest good is incompatible with “the idea of the realm of
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ends as the constructed object of the moral law.”3 In addition to this, the “critics” have
followed Beck in the belief that Kant thought of the rewarding of virtue with happiness as
an infallible duty (third interpretative mistake), something that they criticize because of
the problem of impossibility. Moreover, the later interpretation has affected even some of
the defenders, Silber being the most emblematic because of his assertion that the
crowning of virtue with happiness is something that we do frequently in our ordinary
lives (for instance, when rearing children, serving on juries, and grading papers), as if it
were something unproblematic. But when we realize that Kant never thought of the duty
to reward virtue as an infallible one, but instead softened such a duty and finally
transposed the referred crowning to the “realm of hope,” then the criticism of
impossibility disappears, insofar as it is grounded on that assumption, i.e., the criticism
can only subsist under the presupposition that the duty to promote the highest good
implies an infallible duty of distributing happiness in accordance to virtue, instead of a
fallible one. Finally, the “critics” that came later also denied, as Beck did, the ethical
importance of the highest good under the conviction that the moral question is only a
question of duties (fourth interpretative mistake). For instance, the latter was stated by
Murphy when he developed his defense of Beck against Silber. In his words, “(…) Kant’s
introduction of this notion (the notion of the highest good into his ethical corpus) was
unnecessary and ill-advised, serving as it does extra-moral theological purposes (…).”4
And this is why they were not able to solve the criticism of irrelevance, but instead
adhered to it and reinforced it. Beck was right, we must admit, in suggesting that if the
3
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highest good does not add new duties, then it is necessary to explain how it is still
important for ethics.5 The problem in this case was that, for him, there was not any moral
importance left, ignoring those sections in which Kant makes clear how the highest good
is important for morality although not precisely because it adds new duties.
In addition to this, Beck’s sowing of suspicion into Kant’s idea of the highest
good has also opened the door for new criticisms, specifically those of abandonment and
injustice, which also demand an answer. So he is also, albeit indirectly, responsible for
these criticisms.
The challenge of the defenders, then, is six-fold. First, we have to show how Kant
was consistent with his ethical system overall while asserting that the highest good can be
considered the determining ground of the will. In this way we will supersede the problem
of heteronomy. Second, we have to demonstrate that the duty to crown virtue with
happiness follows from the moral law and that, thanks to this, the idea of the highest good
is constructed out of the latter; in other words, we have to demonstrate that the moral law
is the highest good in its embryonic stage, and hence that the latter has a privileged place
in his ethical system. In this way, we will overcome the problem of unsuitability. Third,
we have to show that the crowning of virtue with happiness does not remain as an
infallible duty for humans in Kant’s moral system, but as a fallible one, till the point in
which it also becomes a matter of hope. If we can do this, then it will be easy to show
how the criticism of impossibility disappears, since it is grounded on that assumption.

5
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Fourth, we have to show how the criticism of injustice posited by Rawls is both
ungrounded –mainly through the reminder that Kant’s ethics is an ethics of intentions, not
of consequences– and overestimated. Fifth, we have to demonstrate how it is true that the
highest good is still important for ethics even though it does not add new duties, and
hence overcome the problem that has attracted most of the attention in the secondary
literature: namely that of irrelevance. Sixth and finally, we have to say something in
relation to the problem of abandonment, the weakest of the criticisms, which nonetheless
demands a response if we want to qualify our defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good
as a complete one.
The Highest Good as Determining Ground of the Will
As we have said, at the end of Chapter I of the Dialectic of the Second Critique
Kant speaks about the highest good as the determining ground of the will, something that,
as we know, Beck regards as a mistake. The problem here is how Kant dares to speak of
the highest good, which is defined by him as the “whole object of a pure practical reason”
(CPrR 5:109), as the determining ground of the will, when in the Analytic of the same
book he systematically insisted that no object, but only the formal moral law could be
considered a proper determining ground of the will. This is precisely what makes Beck
uncomfortable. In his opinion, to consider the highest good, which is an object that,
moreover, has happiness as its subordinated component, as the determining ground of the
will is to “surrender autonomy,”6 since only the moral law has that role in Kant’s ethics.
In this consists, in a nutshell, the criticism of heteronomy.
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In relation to this, as we have seen in Chapter II, this criticism was later
reinforced by Auxter, who maintained that “the highest good cannot have a beneficial
effect on the motives of a subject, because no object can improve the specifically moral
quality of a motive.”7
The ironic side of this criticism –ironic for us, the defenders– is that Kant himself
anticipated this criticism, and responded to it.8 That is precisely what he does when he
clarifies, in the same section of the Dialectic, how the highest good could be regarded as
the determining ground of the will, without contradicting the fundamentals of the
Analytic i.e., without bringing heteronomy back to the system. There he insists that “the
moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will” (CPrR 5:109), and that it is not
because the highest good constitutes the whole object of pure practical reason that it must
be regarded as the determining ground of the will. He even is very explicit in warning his
readers of any misunderstanding when it is about moral principles, since in relation to
them “the slightest misinterpretation corrupts dispositions” (CPrR 5:109), and he reminds
us that no object can determine the will prior to the moral law without producing
heteronomy instead of autonomy.
But there is a sense, he adds, in which we could say that the highest good is the
determining ground of the will. In his own words:
if the moral law is already included as supreme condition in the concept of the
highest good, the highest good is then not merely object: the concept of it and the
representation of its existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same
time the determining ground of the pure will because in that case the moral law,
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already included and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact
determines the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy (CPrR 5:109).
In simple terms, it is not because the highest good is foreseen as an object that it is
presented as the determining ground of the will, but because the moral law is included as
its supreme component. In other words, if there is an object that has the moral law as one
of its components, and moreover, as its supreme component, as in the case of the highest
good, then there is a sense in which it could be said, without undermining the principle of
autonomy, that such an object is a proper determining ground of the will. It is not,
therefore, that the highest good (merely/primarily) as an object is the determining ground
of the will, a case in which we would have better reasons to discuss if such a concept
undermines the principle of autonomy. But this is not the case.
But Beck did not see the consistency of Kant’s argument. On the contrary, in his
opinion this way of putting things opens the door for the misunderstanding that Kant is
trying to avoid. But insofar as Kant himself clarifies this point, and hence leaves no place
for such a misunderstanding, I do not see why we should disregard his proposition,
namely that the highest good could be thought as the determining ground of the will
insofar as the moral law is the unconditional part of it.
In sum, Kant is clearly not bringing heteronomy back to his system. He expressly
mentions that; hence, any criticism that insists on this issue (such as that of Auxter) is
pointless, to say the least. There is no heteronomy if the idea of the highest good as the
determining ground of the will is properly understood. As Wike says in relation to this,
“there is only ‘apparent’ heteronomy here.”9
9
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The problem of heteronomy, therefore, is superseded in this way. Kant himself
faced it with success. Nevertheless, in addition to this, and as a complementary defense,
if we can show how the idea of the highest good can be plainly constructed out of the
moral law or, using another image, if we can prove that the moral law is the highest good
in its embryonic stage, as I will try to do in the next sub-section, then we will have
another reason to dismiss the criticism of heteronomy. Why? Because the highest good
would be understood as the constructed object of the moral law, or as the moral law in its
completion, concretely as a world in which the categorical imperative and all the concrete
duties that follow from it (including, for sure, a duty to crown virtue with happiness) are
actualized by humans. In that case, the highest good would be distinguished from other
objects in a fundamental way: it will not be a mere object but, as Wike says, “the moral
law objectified, understood as a completed object.”10 Therefore, to pursue and even to
desire such an object would never mean to subordinate our reason to our ordinary
inclinations, but to pursue and desire the “good” as rationally dictated.
From this point of view, hence, to pursue the highest good would imply exactly
the same as to honor the categorical imperative. So let’s see if the idea of the highest
good can be constructed out of the moral law. Now, if we can do this, then we will not
only reinforce our response to the criticism of heteronomy, but at the same time we will
overcome the problem of unsuitability.
The Moral Law is the Highest Good in its Embryonic Stage
At this point we encounter the problem of unsuitability. As we know, according to
Beck the idea of the highest good does not fit in Kant’s ethics, insofar as the highest good
10
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is neither contained in any of the formulations of the categorical imperative nor in those
ends that are also duties in the Metaphysics of Morals, being instead a later arbitrary
addition to the system. In this way, Beck did not see how the highest good was “latently”
present in the various formulations of the categorical imperative, insofar as the latter is
nothing less than the highest good in its embryonic stage, having not only a place, but a
privileged one in his ethical system.
This criticism, we have seen, was later reinforced by Rawls, who argued that the
idea of the highest good is incompatible with that of the “kingdom of ends,” which as we
know is included in one of the formulations of the categorical imperative (GMM 4:433).
Moreover, in Rawls’ opinion the idea of an “impartial reason/judge,” from which Kant
highlights that the highest good understood as the complete good must include happiness,
and not only virtue, is something foreign to Kant’s core ethical system, a theological
import that he (Rawls) regrets.
In relation to this criticism, as it has been briefly mentioned, it seems that Beck
thought of the highest good as an ungrounded moral idea (i.e., one independent from the
moral law) that Kant arbitrarily added in a later stage to his ethical system, from which an
unjustified duty to crown virtue was then deduced. In such a presupposition, the idea of
the highest good seems to appear as a sort of additional “fact of reason,”11 one floating
around in the noumenal world, independent from the moral law. In this view, the moral
law would, on one side, command us to become virtuous, whereas the idea of the highest
good would command, as an independent source of duties, the rewarding of such virtue.
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The supposed lack of ground of the idea of the highest good would be precisely the
ground of his criticism: only the moral law can be a source of duties. But is this reading
appropriate? No. The idea of the highest good, as explained by Kant as early as in the
First Critique, is an idea constructed out of the categorical imperative; moreover, it is the
categorical imperative in its total completion, objectified or, in other words, its
constructed object. The highest good is nothing less than the world as it would be if all
the duties that follow from the moral law were honored by all humans, including a duty
to reward virtue with happiness. Let’s remind ourselves how this is stated in the First
Critique. There the moral world, which is a duty for us to promote, is defined by Kant as
“the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all moral laws” (CPR
A808/B836). Later he says that in the moral world a
system of happiness proportionately combined with morality can also be thought
as necessary, since freedom, partly moved and partly restricted by moral laws,
would itself be the cause of the general happiness, and rational beings, under the
guidance of such principles, would themselves be the authors of their own
enduring welfare and at the same time that of others (CPR A809/B837).
As it can be noticed, here Kant is saying that, among the duties that follow from
the categorical imperative, there is one of rewarding virtue. He does not show how this is
the case, but he certainly believes it.12 That is why a moral world would be a world in
which people are good and also rewarded for their goodness (insofar as the rewarding of
goodness is also a way of becoming good, i.e. part of virtue, and not merely because we
desire happiness). Finally, after having defined the moral world in these terms, Kant
identifies it with the highest (derived) good (CPR A810/B838). Now, from this it is clear
that Kant constructs the idea of the highest good out of the categorical imperative: the
12
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highest good is the moral world, a world where the categorical imperative is fully
actualized by all humans. The highest good, therefore, is not an independent idea that has
no connection with the moral law, or that is even incompatible with it, as Rawls believes.
It is, on the contrary, the moral law in its total completion.
As we can see, contrary to Beck’s presupposition, we do not have to determine if
the idea of the highest good was expressly included in any of the formulations of the
categorical imperative, in order to determine if there is a duty to promote it, a duty that he
narrows to one of rewarding virtue. It is the other way around: we have to see first how a
duty to crown virtue with happiness follows from the moral law in order to see that the
idea of the highest good is the constructed object of the moral law, and hence that the
highest good not only fits in Kant’s moral philosophy, but has a privileged place in it. In
this way, we would overcome the problem of unsuitability. The demonstration that such a
duty of rewarding virtue follows from the moral law, in fact, constitutes the “Rosetta
stone” for such a construction. Why? Because if the crowning of virtue were not a duty,
then we would be able to construct, out of the categorical imperative, the idea of a moral
world in which people are good, but not deservedly happy, insofar as nobody would be
required to reward virtue. The duty to promote the moral world, i.e. highest good,
integrates in one idea (includes) all the particular duties that follow from the categorical
imperative, and not only a duty to crown virtue with happiness, as Beck believes. In that
sense, we promote the highest good by guiding our lives with the light of the categorical
imperative.13 But if we cannot see how a duty to reward virtue with happiness is included
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among the duties that follow from the categorical imperative, then the idea of the highest
good as a moral world in which virtue is rewarded would not follow from it. This is,
therefore, our next and fundamental task: to show that a duty to crown virtue with
happiness follows from the moral law.
To this purpose, let’s refer to the categorical imperative itself, using the so-called
“formula of universal law,” which is presented in the Groundwork in the following terms:
“act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law” (GMM 4:421); a formula that is rephrased almost immediately
as follows: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal
law of nature” (GMM 4:421); and let’s apply these formulas within the context of an
educative institution, and particularly with the case of the grading systems that are not
only applicable to subject matters such as mathematics or history (cases in which what is
rewarded is not virtue, as Silber thinks, but knowledge), but also to the behavior of the
students, something common at the high school level in Latin America. Professors there
are supposed to grade the conduct of their students. From here we can imagine the case of
a professor who has a negative disposition towards a particular student for reasons that he
cannot explain, and who, because of that, does not want to give him an “A” as a reward,
although the student deserves it because of his outstanding conduct during the academic
year. Now, paraphrasing the argument that Kant uses in the example of beneficence to
others (although here we are working with an example of “rewarding virtue”), we can say
that, if such a way of thinking were to become a universal law, grading systems would

the fact that she is a “secularizer,” is that she did not see that a duty to crown virtue with happiness also
follows from the categorical imperative, as I will try to show immediately.
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probably still subsist (in fact, we cannot deny that in some cases the justice required in
such grading systems is not actualized, but they have not disappeared). But, as Kant says,
even though
it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in accordance with that
maxim, still it is impossible to will that such a principle should hold everywhere
as a law of nature (GMM 4:423).
This is the case –and we are here, it is important to remember, paralleling the way
in which Kant literally justifies the duty of beneficence to others– because a will resolved
in this way would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one
would want to be rewarded for one’s own virtue and in which one would deprive himself,
by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the deserved reward
he wants for himself.
This seems to be the case: a maxim according to which virtue will not be
rewarded with happiness can become a universal law of nature without contradiction
(moreover, the world seems to be governed by such a law, as we frequently witness in
cases where good people suffer the tragedies that come with earthquakes, sicknesses,
etc.); nonetheless, there is no possibility of willing that such maxim “should be raised to
the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would contradict itself” (GMM
4:424). In the case of our imaginary professor, he would never will that such a maxim
becomes a universal law, because he is in turn subject to the evaluation of the students
and of his superiors. He would like, in such cases, to be graded fairly and rewarded if his
performance is good; so if he applies his wicked maxim, he will think of it merely as an
exception for his own benefit.
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This way of identifying a duty of beneficence, whose method I use to derive a
duty of rewarding virtue, is clearly developed by Kant in these terms. Nonetheless, some
could object that this is a consequentialist defense, and hence that Kant is not being
consistent to his own ethical system in this particular case. If this were the case
(something in relation to which I am not completely convinced), then a further
justification is required. Why, then, can one not will without contradiction that a maxim
of not rewarding virtue in a particular case should become a universal law, without taking
into account our natural desire for receiving happiness as a reward for virtue? For this we
can complement what is established in the “formula of the universal law” with the
“formula of the end in itself,” which is presented by Kant in the following terms: “Act in
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (GMM 4:429).
With both formulas at hand, we could argue that the agent would contradict himself
inasmuch as cases might often arise in which he will deserve to be rewarded for his own
virtue, and will be in the moral necessity of demanding such reward, not because he
desires the latter, but fundamentally because he, as a rational being, cannot deny to
himself that such justice be actualized in his favor; otherwise, he would be treating
himself as a mere mean, and not as an end. Therefore, it would be logically (and not
merely naturally) impossible for him to will that such a principle should hold as a law of
nature, depriving himself of the distributive justice that he will eventually deserve.
Reformulating what we said first, in the case of our imaginary professor, he would never
rightly will that such a maxim becomes a universal law, because he is in turn subject to
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the evaluation of the students and of his superiors. He would demand, in such cases, to be
graded fairly and rewarded if his performance is good, and not merely because he desires
happiness, but because he is also obliged to demand justice for himself, as a way of
treating himself as an end, and not merely as a mean.
Now, from this we can conclude that it is a duty “not to grade conduct unfairly,”
insofar as the maxim according to which I will grade conduct unfairly does not pass the
categorical imperative test. Now, this duty of “not grading conduct unfairly” can be
rephrased in positive terms, namely by saying that it is a duty “to grade conduct fairly,”
which is an example of rewarding virtue. Hence, grading conduct fairly, i.e. rewarding
virtue could be included among those duties that Kant calls “imperfect duties,” if we are
with Kant in this, his way of identifying concrete duties out of the categorical imperative.
It is an imperfect duty and not a perfect one insofar as the contradiction lies in the will of
the agent, and not in the maxim itself.
Let’s now see if the same duty can be specified from another formulation of the
categorical imperative, particularly the “formula of the end in itself,” which has been
recently quoted. The professor that denies the proper reward to his student because of his
antipathy for him is clearly using him “merely as a means to an end which the latter does
not likewise hold” (GMM 4:429). In this case, the end that the professor is pursuing is the
wicked satisfaction of making his student unfairly miserable, an end that the student will
never hold, insofar as he “cannot possibly concur with my (the professor’s, in this case)
way of acting toward him and hence cannot himself hold the end of this action” (GMM
4:429); and in fact, would the student hold such a wicked end? Definitively, no. Now, if
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grading unfairly is a particular case of treating a human being (in this case, the student) as
a mere object, and hence such a maxim does not pass the “categorical imperative test,”
we can say that it is a duty “not to grade conduct unfairly,” a duty that, rephrased in
positive terms, equates to a duty “to grade conduct fairly,” or to reward virtue.
That the crowning of virtue with happiness is for Kant an act of justice (and more
particularly, an act of distributive justice broadly understood), and hence an act that
harmonizes with the moral law, is confirmed when we remember that, for him, such
reward is something that we can rationally hope for through God, and that is even
presented by Kant as God’s final end in creation (CPrR 5:130). And this (that the
rewarding of virtue is an act of justice that follows from the categorical imperative) is the
reason that lies behind the example of the “impartial reason/judge,” the one that Kant
uses for the sake of making evident that the highest good must include happiness as its
subordinate component, and not only virtue. In fact, as he says in all his major works, an
impartial reason/judge with suitable power would find it wrong not to crown virtue with
happiness. And why would this be the case? We can say without doubts that because not
doing it would be unjust according to the moral law. It is senseless, then, to say that a
duty to crown virtue with happiness is incompatible with the moral law, or that the
example of the “impartial reason/judge” does not have anything to do with Kant’s core
ethical system, as Rawls asserts.
Let’s now insist on the consequence that follows from this demonstration: if it is
true that a duty to reward virtue can be specified from the moral law (as other duties are),
as I claim to have shown, then the idea of the highest good as understood by Kant can be
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constructed out of the moral law (idea that, we must remember, pure practical reason
seeks, as the “unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason” (CPrR 5:108).
In fact, if it were possible for us to judge the morality of actions and to harmonize the
moral laws with the natural ones, and moreover, if we in fact did that, then we would be
actualizing the highest good as defined by Kant: as a moral world in which people are not
only good, but also rewarded for their goodness. The idea of the highest good, therefore,
can be plainly constructed out of the moral law once we see that the duty to crown virtue
can be specified from the moral law, without saying, it is important to reassert, that we
promote the highest good only by rewarding virtue, but more broadly by honoring the
categorical imperative. The highest good, hence, is “latently” present in the categorical
imperative, insofar as the moral law is the highest good in its embryonic stage. In other
words, whereas the categorical imperative contains as a seed all the particular duties that
we must obey, the highest good represents all these same particular duties in their
completion. Therefore, it is wrong to say, as Beck does, that “none of the formulations of
the categorical imperative have had this content.”14
From this two things that were promised before follow: first, the reinforcement of
our response to the criticism of heteronomy, insofar as the idea of the highest good can be
thought of not as a mere object, but as the constructed object of the moral law, or as the
moral law in its completion; and second, the certainty that the criticism of unsuitability
was also wrongly posited by the “critics.” There are still, nonetheless, four problems
ahead of us, namely those of impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment. Let’s
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take them one by one in the same order, and see if we can overcome them, as we have
already done with those of abandonment, heteronomy, and unsuitability.
The Duty to Crown Virtue is a Fallible One
We just have seen how the duty to crown virtue with happiness follows from the
moral law. Next we have Beck’s claim that the rewarding of virtue is impossible for
humans. Against the problem of impossibility, I want to argue two things. First, that Kant
did not think of the duty of rewarding virtue as an infallible one. Second, that, in any
case, the burden of the proof in this specific issue is on the side of the “critics;” i.e., that
since the latter are the ones accusing Kant of having contradicted himself (by asserting
both that virtuous intentions are obscure but that, nonetheless, we have an infallible duty
to crown virtue with happiness), they are the ones responsible for proving their
accusation, and not the defenders, as I will show.
The Fallible Duty to Crown Virtue
According to Beck the rewarding of virtue is impossible for humans, although he
does not unfold this idea. He just says that there is nothing we can do for distributing
happiness in accordance to virtue, something that, instead, only a Supreme Being could
grant. In his words, “I can do absolutely nothing else toward apportioning happiness in
accordance with desert–that is the task of a moral governor of the universe, not of a
laborer in the vineyard.”15 This problem, nonetheless, was later reinforced by further
commentators, as we have seen. Now, among the reasons that the “critics” have posited
in order to prove the impossibility of such a thing, there is one that seems
insurmountable, namely Kant’s own conviction that virtuous intentions are obscure
15
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(GMM 4:407), which was first highlighted by Murphy. And in fact, if we cannot know
other people’s intentions, and not even ours, how would be possible for us to judge the
morality of actions, in order to reward them? For this an omniscient moral ruler of the
world is required.
This idea (that the obscurity of virtuous intentions makes it impossible for us to
distribute happiness in accordance to virtue), it is important to remark, has not only been
sustained by the “critics” but even by some defenders, including “maximalists” such as
Anderson-Gold. As she asserts in relation to this,
our epistemological limitations render us incapable of making the type of moral
assessment of worthiness necessary to be “just distributors.” Our obligation to
‘promote’ this type of world cannot mean that individuals should attempt to
become the distributing agents.16
Now, Kant could be blamed for falling prey to the problem of impossibility and,
moreover, of having contradicted himself, had he thought of the duty of crowning virtue
as an infallible one. By an infallible duty I understand one that we are in power to
perfectly actualize or, in other words, one for whose improper accomplishment we could
be blamed. Many duties are of this nature; for instance, the duty of telling the truth (or of
not lying). This duty is an infallible one insofar as it can be clearly seen by me, in every
particular situation in which I am required to tell the truth, if I am lying or not, since I am
the one that holds the piece of truth that is either revealed or concealed. In other words, in
relation to the duty of telling the truth, I can perfectly accomplish what is required from
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me: I can’t fail.17 A fallible duty, on the contrary, is one whose perfect accomplishment is
not in my control. The duty to crown virtue is one of these, mainly because of the
obscurity of moral intentions.18 We can, certainly, fail in our attempts to crown virtue
with happiness, but can we be blamed for such a mistake? Would it not be enough that
we try as best as we can? Is not Kant’s ethics mainly an ethics of intentions?
It is true that Kant did not develop this distinction, i.e. that of fallible and
infallible duties. Nonetheless, we can build such a distinction by ourselves insofar as it
does not violate the fundamentals of Kant’s ethics, and since, moreover, it helps us to
defend his moral system, this time concretely in relation to the problem of impossibility.
We can also do that insofar as there are hints that lead to this interpretation in Kant’s
oeuvre, as we will see.
I am of the opinion that Kant softened the duty to crown virtue, not in the sense
that we are not so required to crown virtue with happiness when reality puts us in such
situations, but in the sense that he was very well aware of our limitations, especially of
17
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I cannot be blamed, insofar as the failure resides not in my intention. The perfect accomplishment of this
duty is not under my complete control.
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our impossibility of knowing people’s moral intentions (he himself is the one that states
that virtuous intentions are obscure!). Therefore, for him we are required to try as best as
we can to crown virtue with happiness when life puts us in such situations; nonetheless,
this duty is a fallible one, insofar as our limited judgment can fail to meet reality, without
being our fault. That is why we would never be condemned for making an inexact
judgment on this one: a well intended attempt of rewarding will be enough. After all,
once again, Kant’s ethics is an ethics of intentions. So despite the obscurity of moral
intentions, for Kant we are still required to try to reward virtue as far as it is possible for
us, always in the hope that our action will match reality, and that a Supreme Being will
rectify our mistakes at the very end, when completing his ultimate plan in creating the
world which, as we have seen, in Kant’s view is the crowning of virtue with happiness
(CPrR 5:131).
The Religion makes a good case for this claim, namely the claim that for Kant the
crowning of virtue was still a duty, although a fallible one, because of our
epistemological limitations (concretely in Book III, sections 3 and 4 of the First
Division). There we find Kant reminding us that humans cannot be legislators (and
judges by extension) of an ethical community, precisely because of the obscurity of moral
intentions. For that the postulate of God is required. “The morality of actions,” Kant says,
are “something internal, and hence cannot be subject of public human laws” (REL 6:98).
Nonetheless, despite our epistemological limitations, Kant did not renounce this duty
completely, and kept it as a fallible one. In fact, a few paragraphs later we find him
saying that, in promoting the highest good, “each must (…) so conduct himself as if
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everything depended on him. Only on this condition may he hope that a higher wisdom
will provide the fulfillment of his well-intentioned effort” (REL 6:101). Now, in this
assertion it is implied that we must act as if the crowning of virtue depended on us,
although without ignoring our limitations in this respect, in the hope that God will
complete our efforts in an unknown future.19 This is a clear hint that for Kant there are
fallible duties, such as that of rewarding virtue.
As we can see, we are under a fallible duty, but a moral duty at last. And it is
reasonable that it remains as a duty, even under such limitation, because the crowning of
virtue represents nothing less than the accomplishment of ultimate (distributive) justice in
the world,20 and because life frequently puts us in front of situations in which we are
called to reward virtue (for instance, in our example of the Latin American high school
professor). So what else could we do instead of trying to reward virtue as best as we can,
when we are required to? Not even trying? I do not think that this would be a wise, much
less realistic solution. We must try as best as we can, always in the referred hope.
Now, the fallible nature of this duty, caused by our inability to perfectly judge the
morality of actions, together with our other inability, namely that of thoroughly
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The importance of what Bielefeldt calls the “as-if mode of thinking” or “as-if structure” in Kant’s
philosophical project is developed in his book entitled Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical
Philosophy. In his own words, “the use of the as-if structure in addressing ideas of reason is of fundamental
significance for understanding Kant’s critical philosophizing in general. (…) That is, whenever it comes to
represent ideas of reason, all claims of objectifying knowledge must be transformed into the mode of a
conscious ‘as-if.’ For only by becoming aware of this as-if structure can the human mind avoid the
complementary traps of dogmatism and skepticism. This as-if structure occurs both in Kant’s theoretical
and practical philosophy. In the realm of practical philosophy, however it is particularly important since in
moral practice the idea of the unconditioned has a constitutive (rather than a mere regulative) function,” 36.
He then highlights how the “as-if” structure is present in the various formulations of the categorical
imperative.

20

“Justice” in the broad sense of the word, and not in the merely legal sense that Kant sometimes attributes
to it.
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harmonizing the moral laws with the natural laws (CPrR 5:124), makes Kant transpose
the referred crowning from the “realm of virtue” to the “realm of hope.” And that the
crowning of virtue is not only a duty but an object of hope is another hint that, for Kant,
such a duty is a fallible one. In fact, if it were completely in our hands to actualize the
crowning of virtue, then Kant would have not seen the necessity of transposing such
crowning to the “realm of hope.” By doing this, Kant is admitting that this duty has a
different status than most duties, as for instance the previously referred to duty to tell the
truth. It would be absurd to say that the “telling of truth” (as in the case of the “crowning
of virtue”) is not only a duty but a matter of hope, something to be expected in a future
life through God. And why is this the case? We can say, for instance, that because to tell
the truth is something that is, under normal conditions, completely in our hands.
In the Second Critique, we know, Kant qualifies the highest good as “God’s final
end in creating the world” (CPrR 5:130). There he says that
nothing glorifies God more than what is most estimable in the world, respect for
his command, observance of the holy duty that his law lays upon us, when there is
added to this his magnificent plan of crowning such a beautiful order with
corresponding happiness (CPrR 5:131).
This quote is not only beautiful, but also important in our task of arguing that for
Kant the duty to crown virtue is a fallible one, one that was softened by Kant, till the
point in which he talked of the crowning as an object of hope, as nothing less than the
ultimate goal of creation.
But this is something that the “critics” seem to ignore. For them, Kant thought of
the duty of rewarding virtue as any other duty, i.e. not as a fallible one. And that is why
they accuse Kant not only of falling prey to the problem of impossibility but, even worse,
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of having contradicted himself by saying both that virtuous intentions are obscure but that
nonetheless we are obliged by the moral law to reward virtue without qualifications. But
is this true?
I have tried to prove that this is not the case. But can we do better? In other words,
can we undoubtedly prove that for Kant the duty of rewarding duty was a fallible one?
This is a hard, if not impossible, task; moreover, it is something that the “critics” are
called to prove, if they want to keep the criticism of impossibility. Let me try to explain
why, for which we have to appeal to what the ancients called onus probandi, and what is
nowadays known in the legal and scientific sphere as the “burden of proof.”
The Probatio Diabolica
The juridical and scientific doctrine of onus probandi (which, as it is known, is
traced back to the Romans, and was very influential in medieval disputations21) helps us
to determine who is responsible to prove the validity of an assertion or an imputation, i.e.,
to assign the burden of proof. As Crocker22 explains in relation to this, in Common Law
this tradition embraces, among other principles, those known as the principles of
“tractability of proof” and of “prior improbability.”
According to the principle of “prior improbability,” the burden of proof may be
located upon the party who argues that the more unusual event has occurred. An example
will help us to understand this principle. We can say that the majority of people in the
world do not kill other humans. Therefore, it is assumed that people normally are not
prone to kill; the abnormal case is the assassination of a human by another. Therefore, he
21

Hahn and Oaksford, “The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation,” 40.

22

Crocker, “Ethics and the Law’s Burdens of Proof,” 276-280.

133
who accuses somebody of committing an assassination is the one responsible of proving
his imputation, according to the principle of “prior improbability.”
The principle of “tractability of proof,” on the other hand, establishes that the
burden of proof may be placed on the one who holds a positive assertion, instead of on
the one who holds a negative one. For instance, in the assertion “X killed Y,” the one
who accuses is the one called to prove, instead of leaving the responsibility of proving to
X, who in such a case would be taken to the absurdity of proving that he did not do
something. In fact, negative proofs lead to what the ancients called probatio diabolica
(the “Devil’s proof”). A probatio diabolica is an impossible proof; for instance (in
metaphysics), the demand of proving that something does not exist or, as in our legal
example, the imposition to the accused of proving his own innocence. This is related to
that ancient axiom according to which affirmanti incumbit probatio, which could be
translated as “the one that affirms must prove,” rule which mirrors that other that says
that semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, which can in turn be translated as
“the necessity of proof always lies with the person who accuses.”
Now, how is all this related to our defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good? We
are, we must remember, in a crucial state of our defense. The “critics” are accusing Kant
of having contradicted himself by having asserted both that virtuous intentions are
obscure but that, nonetheless, we have an infallible duty to crown virtue with happiness.
On the other side of the discussion, we have built our defense of Kant by saying that he
never meant, when he said that there was a duty to promote the highest good, that there
was an infallible duty to crown virtue with happiness (and, by extension, that he never
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committed the contradiction of saying that we are blind with regard to moral intentions
but that, nonetheless, we are obliged to perfectly reward virtue). Now, taking in
consideration the principles of “prior improbability,” and of “tractability of proof,” we
can ask: are we, the defenders, responsible for proving that Kant never stated that such a
duty was an infallible one and that, therefore, he did not contradict himself? Are not
instead the “critics” the ones on whom such burden should be placed? Moreover, would
not the contrary equate the imposition on the defenders (and Kant’s) side of a probatio
diabolica? Let’s analyze if this is the case.
According to the principle of “prior improbability,” we have to analyze if the
“critics” are asserting something that could be qualified as unusual. In this case, the
“critics” are accusing Kant of having contradicted himself by saying both that moral
intentions are obscure and that we have an infallible duty to crown virtue with happiness.
But what sounds more normal, or expected? To think that Kant (who is probably the
greatest philosopher of the last five hundred years, and who asserted that the main
responsibility of a philosopher is to be consistent) contradicted himself in such a gross
way or that he did not contradict himself, but rather never thought of the duty to crown
virtue with happiness as an infallible one? It is clear that the former is less plausible, so
according to the “prior improbability” principle,” the “critics” are the ones responsible
for proving their assertion that for Kant such duty was an infallible one.
Now let’s analyze if the same conclusion follows from the principle of
“tractability of proof.” According to this principle, we remember, the burden of the proof
must go to the one that is making a positive assertion. In our case, as we know, the
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“critics” are the ones accusing Kant of having contradicted himself by stating the
obscurity of moral intentions and next establishing an infallible duty to crown virtue with
happiness. Therefore, they are the ones who are called to prove it. The contrary would be
to impose on the side of the defenders the so-called probatio diabolica.
Now we ask: have the “critics” so far proved that Kant contradicted himself by
stating an infallible duty to crown virtue with happiness? Clearly not. Now, in their
defense someone could say that this was not something required from them, insofar as the
distinction between fallible and infallible duties is not expressly found in Kant’s works.
Nonetheless, if they want to keep their accusation after this distinction has been unfolded,
it is necessary that they present the corresponding proofs. Meanwhile, we can say that
Kant did not do that, and that, therefore, he was not prey either to the problem of
impossibility, or to the referred contradiction.
In sum, even though we have presented good arguments in Kant’s defense against
this particular accusation, the defenders are not responsible for demonstrating that Kant
did not contradict himself on this one. On the contrary, the “critics” are the ones who are
called to prove their accusation, particularly by proving that for Kant the duty to crown
virtue with happiness was an infallible one. Otherwise, the defenders would have to deal
with an impossible proof (the probatio diabolica), something unacceptable in any trial
(or, in this case, philosophical discussion) that claims to be fair.
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Further Clarification
If Kant never thought of the duty to crown virtue with happiness as an infallible
one, then the criticism of impossibility disappears, insofar as it is grounded on the
assumption that, for Kant, such a duty is an infallible one.
Now, before going to the next step, I would like to make some amendment to an
opinion frequently found in the secondary literature, particularly the claim that the
fallible (as it has been qualified in this work) duty to crown virtue with happiness equates
with the indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the direct duty to promote
other’s happiness taken together, as these duties are defined by Kant.23 Let’s hence
analyze if that is, in fact, the case (something that I will deny).
The Indirect Duty to Promote One’s Happiness
References to the indirect duty to promote one’s own happiness are found mainly
in the Groundwork, the Second Critique, and the Metaphysics of Morals. In the
Groundwork Kant says that “to assure one’s own happiness is a duty (at least indirectly);
for, want of satisfaction with one’s condition, under pressure from many anxieties and
amid unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty”
(GMM 4:399). This is restated in the Second Critique, where Kant says –after claiming
that pure practical reason does not require that one renounce happiness overall, but only
to put limits over it if duty is at stake or, in other words, to shape our desire for happiness
through the light of reason– that
it can even in certain respects be a duty to attend to one’s happiness, partly
because happiness (to which belong skill, health, and wealth) contains means for
23

For instance, Wood, as it has been mentioned in Chapter III.
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the fulfillment of one’s duty and partly because lack of it (e.g., poverty) contains
temptations to transgress one’s duty (CPrR 5:93).
In both cases, it is important to clarify, Kant is not contradicting what he has
established with great insight, namely that the moral law must shape our strivings for
happiness and that, in consequence, the former prevails over the latter (i.e., in relation to
what is unconditionally good, the moral law has the last word). It is not the case, hence,
that Kant is here contradicting his main lines of thought by calling for an open and
unlimited search for happiness, as if the principle of heteronomy will, in the long term,
generate that of autonomy. No. What Kant is doing here is simply asserting that
happiness is not evil in itself, and that, in a very limited way, it could even contribute to
virtue, on one side because well being puts us in a better situation to accomplish our
duties (for instance, if I am healthy I am in a better position to help the sick ones) and, on
the other side, because the least we suffer of the poundings of life, the fewer reasons we
will have to treat others and ourselves merely as means and not as ends (following Kant’s
own example, if we are not poor, then we will be less inclined to steal).
Now, this duty does not equate with that of rewarding virtue. In fact, in the case
of the indirect duty to promote our own happiness, happiness serves virtue (it is a duty
since it could favor virtuous dispositions, albeit only under the very limited
circumstances and conditions described), whereas in the highest good happiness is seen
as the reward for virtue, i.e. virtue justifies happiness. This is explained in detail by Kant
in the Metaphysics of Morals. There we find Kant saying that, in the case of the indirect
duty to promote one’s own happiness, “it is not my happiness but the preservation of my
moral integrity that is my end and also my duty”, and that here “the end is not the
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subject’s happiness but his morality, and happiness is merely a means for removing
obstacles to his morality” (MM 6:388). So in this indirect duty we are not talking of
happiness as a reward for virtue at all, but of happiness as a means to virtue, which is
something completely different. The indirect duty says “take care of your happiness
insofar (and only insofar) as it favors virtue,” and not “do justice to yourself by rewarding
your virtue with happiness;” these are two different things.
The Direct Duty to Promote Others’ Happiness
References to the duty to promote others’ happiness are found, also, mainly in the
Groundwork, the Second Critique, and the Metaphysics of Morals. In the first mentioned,
the duty appears right after the categorical imperative in the “formula of universal law”
and in the “formula of the law of nature” is presented, particularly when Kant offers the
four examples of concrete duties that follow from the formal moral law, occupying, the
duty under discussion, the fourth position (GMM 4:423). As we have already indirectly
referred when deriving the duty of crowning virtue, Kant argues that it is not possible for
humans to will that a maxim of indifference towards the well-being of others
should hold elsewhere as a law of nature. For a will which resolved in this way
would contradict itself, inasmuch as cases might often arise in which one would
have need of the love and sympathy of others and in which he would deprive
himself, by such a law of nature springing from his own will, of all hope of the
aid he wants for himself (GMM 4:423).
This is reasserted later, although in different terms, when using the same example
but under the light of the categorical imperative in the “formula of the end in itself”
(GMM 4:430). Here the justification goes as follows: humanity might survive if we do
not contribute to each other’s happiness, but this
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would harmonize only negatively and not positively with humanity as an end in
itself (…). For the ends of any subject who is an end in himself must as far as
possible be my end also, if that conception of an end in itself is to have its full
effect in me (GMM 4:430).
Now, as we can see, in both cases Kant is making no reference to a duty to
proportion happiness in accordance to virtue. The duty is generally established: to
promote others’ happiness, without qualification. Kant is not, hence, presenting a duty of
crowning virtue with happiness, but a duty of promoting happiness, for the reasons given.
In the Second Critique the duty to promote others’ happiness is also approached,
particularly at 5:34. There Kant asserts that only by including the happiness of others in
our personal moral considerations can we individually claim that our personal strivings
for happiness are legitimate, and this by way of the moral law which commands that we
universalize our maxims. In his own words,
the law to promote the happiness of others arises not from the presupposition that
this is an object of everyone’s choice but merely from this: that the form of
universality, which reason requires as the condition of giving to a maxim of selflove the objective validity of a law, becomes the determining ground of the will
(CPrR 5:34).
Now, as in the case of the Groundwork, here we are not talking of a duty to
proportion happiness in accordance to virtue, but of a duty to promote the happiness of
others in general. Also as in the former case, the justification is not the deservedness, but
in this case the conditions under which we can legitimately promote our own happiness.
So we are under duties that are different and that, because of that, should not be equated.
Finally, in the Metaphysics of Morals, as in the former cases, the justification of
the duty to promote others’ happiness makes it different from the vision of happiness as a
reward for virtue that is presented in the highest good. The duty to promote others’
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happiness in a detached way (i.e., without expecting a retribution) is named
“beneficence” in this book. Now, when Kant unfolds this duty, he makes clear that the
duty is one of helping the needed people according to one’s means. This is, as can be
clearly recognized, something completely different from a supposed duty to proportion
happiness as a reward for virtue. In fact, this duty arises because the other is in need, not
because the other deserves happiness as a reward for being a good person. In his own
words,
the maxim of (…) beneficence towards those in need, is a universal duty of
human beings, just because they are to be considered fellow human beings, that is,
rational beings with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place so that they can
help one another (MM 6:453).
Moreover, we could add that, even if it were argued that we are also supposed to
verify that the person in need is morally good, the motivation that justifies the duty is the
same: the need, and not the virtuous disposition. The latter will only be a requirement, a
condition, not the motive for helping. So again we are talking of two different things.
Now, the fact that there is a duty to promote other’s happiness without
qualifications reconfirms that there must be a duty to crown virtue with happiness. Why?
Because if I am first of all obliged to take care of other’s well being, with more reason I
would be obliged to do it when the other not only needs it, but in addition deserves it. So
there is another reason to deny that a duty to reward virtue cannot follow from the moral
law, as the “critics” argue.
Kant’s Ethics is an Ethics of Intentions
As we have seen, the problem of impossibility is superseded when we realize that
the duty to crown virtue with happiness is a fallible one, and that Kant was very aware of
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that (unless somebody proves the contrary). Now, the obscurity of moral intentions is
something that creates another problem, namely that of injustice, as described by Rawls.
As we remember, for Rawls there cannot be a duty to crown virtue insofar as any
attempt to reward virtue would imply an arbitrary/irrational action. In other words, any
virtue rewarding system will always be a “blind” one; so we will always be at risk of
rewarding the wrong people, or in other words, of distributing happiness in the wrong
way. So Rawls seems to be worried about the consequences that such a rewarding system
would generate.
It is true. A system devoted to the rewarding of virtue would be, for humans, a
fallible one. There would be, without doubts, cases of people receiving prizes without
deserving them. So how could we respond to this criticism? First and most important, by
reminding ourselves that Kant’s ethics is, above all, an ethics of intentions, and never a
“consequentialist” theory, something that everybody, including Rawls, will immediately
admit. In fact, as Kant states as early as in the Groundwork, the categorical imperative is
concerned “with the form of the action and the principle from which it follows; what is
essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be
what they may” (GMM 4:416). Therefore, our focus must be primarily the moral agent
and his intention in performing the act, and not the consequences of his actions.
In the case of the fallible duty to crown virtue with happiness, what matters is if
the moral agent, specifically the one called to crown virtue in a particular situation, is
doing his duty of rewarding virtue for the proper motive (i.e., because rewarding virtue is
the right thing to do according to the moral law), and as best as he can (despite his
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inability of knowing with total certainty people’s moral intentions). If he does as best as
he can, and does it for the proper motive, then there is nothing else to say. The moral
action would have been a good one. So if against his intention he fails in his judgment of
the deservedness of the reward, this will not harm the rightness of his action.
It is strange, taking in consideration this basic and radical aspect of Kant’s ethics,
that Rawls criticizes the duty to crown virtue because of the consequences that such an
action could generate. Now, if we add to this that there will be many instances in which
the right people will receive their deserved reward, and that, in addition, there will be no
cases of people receiving rewards for actions that go against the moral law (for instance,
there will be no cases of killers being rewarded for their crime), but only of people that at
least “legally” (and hopefully also morally) have followed the moral law, then Rawls’
fear becomes even powerless. Finally, we could ask what other choice we have. Not
rewarding people’s actions? As it has been said before, this sounds unrealistic, insofar as
life sometimes puts us in such situations; in other words, the rewarding of virtue, as
fallible as it is, is something that belongs to human relationships, so it would be absurd to
establish that we simply must stop doing it.
So the problem of injustice is, as the others, a misled one. It is, first of all, a
criticism that does not pay careful attention to the deontological nature of Kant’s ethics;
and second, it is overestimated for the three mentioned reasons: first, insofar as the
concrete attempts to crown virtue will in many cases match reality; second, insofar as
those attempts will never consider the rewarding of crimes or actions that legally go
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against the moral law; and third, because the option of not doing anything in rewarding
situations seems absurd.
The Ethical Importance of Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good
So far we claim to have superseded the problems of heteronomy, unsuitability,
impossibility, and injustice. Now we turn to the problem that has called most of the
attention in the secondary literature: that of irrelevance, whose solution we pursue now.
As this problem was defined by Beck, if the highest good does not add new
duties, and if it cannot be considered the determining ground of the will, hence it must be
regarded as irrelevant for moral purposes. But is this conclusion accurate? Kant himself
asserts, in the Religion, that the highest good does not add new duties,24 and he clarifies
in the Second Critique that the highest good can be thought as the determining ground of
the will only insofar as it has the moral law as its supreme component. We have already
seen this. But from this does it follow that the highest good is irrelevant for ethics, as
Beck asserts? I do not think that this is the case.
In what follows I will present four reasons to defend the practical importance of
the highest good. Briefly, the reasons are the following. First, as Kant says, if the highest
good were impossible, the moral law would be pointless, insofar as the highest good is
nothing less than the moral law in its total completion; second, the highest good serves as
a proper incentive for the moral agent (without bringing heteronomy back to the stage);
third, the highest good is necessary for the overcoming of evil; and fourth, the highest
good is the answer to the “whither” question, which is without doubts a moral one, as
Kant states.
24

Once again, the fallible duty to crown virtue follows from the moral law.
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Now, I am not saying that these are all the reasons that prove the ethical
importance of the highest good. There could be, without doubt, more reasons; but these
are the ones that I am focusing on; if they are well grounded, they suffice (even
individually) to supersede the problem of irrelevance. That said, let me proceed to the
final step of this work: that of demonstrating the ethical importance of the highest good.
Without the Highest Good the Moral Law would be Pointless
The first argument that Kant gives for the ethical importance of the highest good
in his major works is found in the First Critique. There we find him saying that unless we
assume the existence of God and of a future life in the intelligible world (which are
necessary for thinking the highest good as possible), the “moral laws” would have to be
regarded as “empty figments of the brain, since without that presupposition their
necessary success, which the same reason connects with them, would have to disappear”
(CPR A811/B839). This is reasserted in the Second Critique, concretely where Kant
presents the antinomy of practical reason, a section in which he says that the
impossibility of the highest good must also prove the falsity of the moral law. In his own
words, “if (…) the highest good is impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the
moral law, which commands us to promote it, must be fantastic and directed to empty
imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false” (CPrR 5:113). Finally, in the
Lectures on Ethics we find Kant saying that if the highest good were impossible, then the
endeavors of the virtuous “would be pointless, and virtue an empty delusion” (LE
27:483).
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Now, what does Kant mean by this? To make sense of these assertions is one of
the most compelling challenges that Kant’s ethical system presents to us, but we cannot
avoid it, since it is the first reason that Kant gives in order to justify the ethical
importance of the highest good. Is he denying, for instance, what he said in the Analytic
of the Second Critique, namely that the moral law is a “fact of reason” (CPrR 5:31)? This
is clearly not the case: the moral law remains for Kant a fact of reason. What he is adding
now is that, if the highest good were impossible, it would follow that the moral law which
we do find in our reason would be commanding something that will never happen. In
other words, the moral law would be presenting and demanding from us to work for a
project condemned to failure since the very beginning. To say that the highest good is
impossible is equivalent to saying that the moral law is, when foreseen in its total
completion, pointless, meaningless. The moral law would be, in this case, a “wounded
law,” victim of a fatal fate, one that would condemn it to a premature death, or to an unsplendorous growth.
In order to understand this point, we have to remind ourselves how it is true that
the idea of the highest good is constructed out of the moral law, something that we have
discussed earlier in this Chapter. In relation to this, as we have seen, as early as in the
First Critique, Kant explains how the highest good is equated with the moral world, a
world in which all the duties that follow from the categorical imperative are honored by
all humans, including a duty to reward virtue. The moral law, therefore, obliges us to
promote such a world. Now, from this it follows that, if the highest good were
impossible, the moral law would be a law condemned to failure, insofar as it would be
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commanding something impossible. This is what Kant suggests when he says that, if the
highest good is impossible, the “moral laws” would have to be regarded as “empty
figments of the brain” (CPR A811/B839), as quoted before. And this rationale is the same
found in the Dialectic of the Second Critique, a section in which Kant reasserts that the
duty to promote the highest good emerges from the moral law and that, if the highest
good were impossible, the categorical imperative would have to be regarded as “fantastic
and directed to empty imaginary ends” (CPrR 5:113).
So once we see how the highest good is nothing less than the moral law in its
completion, it is easy to understand how, if it were impossible, the moral law would be
pointless. The moral law will still be there as a fact of reason, and we will be still subject
to its commands. Nonetheless, it would be pointless, insofar as it would be a law
condemned to failure. In other words, the kind of world that would be created if all of its
particular commands (including the fallible duty to reward virtue) were universally and
absolutely accomplished would have to be denied since the very beginning. Therefore, as
has been said, the moral law would be presenting to us a project condemned to failure.
In sum, the highest good is nothing else than the moral law in its completeness.
By stating how the highest good can be thought as possible (something for which the
religious postulates are necessary), therefore, the moral law is saved from being qualified
as failed and, on the contrary, gains significance. Without the highest good, on the
contrary, the moral law becomes a futile law. This is one of the reasons that explains its
importance for ethics.
If the Highest Good were Impossible the Moral Agent will lose an Incentive
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The second argument that Kant gives for the importance of the highest good is
that, if we knew that the highest good is impossible, the moral agent will lose an
“incentive.” Kant points to this in the First Critique when he says the following:
thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the
majestic ideas of morality are, to be sure, objects of approbation and admiration
but not incentives for resolve and realization, because they would not fulfill the
whole end that is natural for every rational being and determined a priori and
necessarily through the very same pure reason (CPR A813/B841).
This idea resembles that found in the Second Critique, where Kant states that
the subjective effect of this law (the moral law), namely the disposition
conformed with it and also made necessary by it to promote the practically
possible highest good, (…) presupposes at least that the latter is possible; in the
contrary case it would be practically impossible to strive for the object of a
concept that would be, at bottom, empty and without an object (CPrR 5:143).
Both assertions are compelling, insofar as they could invite people to think that
the problem of heteronomy is back, but that is not the case. In fact, Kant is not saying
that, without the highest good, the moral agent will lose an incentive because he will not
be able to expect to be compensated for his good behavior. The moral agent will, instead,
lose an incentive insofar as he will know that by being good he will be engaged in a
project (a project which, once again, is depicted by the same pure moral law) that is
condemned to failure since the very beginning: the moral project of creating the best
possible world.
The moral law, it is necessary to insist, allows us to foresee the kind of world that
would be created if everybody would follow its commands. This ideal world (the highest
good) can, in turn, be seen as a moral project, the ultimate moral project, one to which we
will contribute by being good, i.e., by being virtuous (and we already know that, among
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the duties included in the general command of being good, there is one of ─fallibly─
apportioning happiness in accordance to virtue). Now, as in any project, if we knew from
the beginning that it will never be accomplished, it is clear that we will lose an incentive
to work towards it. But the incentive in this case is a proper one, i.e. it is not a material
incentive, much less a selfish one. It is just the incentive of knowing that our efforts
towards creating the best possible world are not pointless.
It is not, hence, because we need happiness that the highest good, when thought as
possible, works as an incentive (in this case the criticism of heteronomy would be
grounded), but because a moral world in which people are virtuous, and in which ultimate
justice is accomplished through the fair distribution of happiness, is the world that the
moral law establishes as the ideal world, as the world that we should promote; and it is
because of that that the possibility of the highest good is morally significant.
This is how we can think of the highest good as an incentive for the moral agent,
without bringing heteronomy back to the stage. And this is how the ethical importance of
the highest good is reasserted.
Here a clarification is required. As Kant establishes in Chapter III of the Analytic
of the Second Critique (entitled “On the incentives of pure practical reason”), “respect for
the moral law is (…) the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive” (CPrR 5:78) for
finite beings as humans, a moral feeling that is demanded and inspired by the same moral
law (CPrR 5:80). From here we could say that the moral law does not need the idea of the
highest good in order to demand and inspire such respect. It produces such feeling by
itself. Nonetheless, it can still be argued that the highest good is also, by extension, the
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source of such moral feeling, insofar as the highest good is, as we have repeated several
times, the moral law in its completion. Under this reading to say that the moral law
demands and inspires respect would be, to some extent, equivalent as to say that the
highest good demands and inspires respect, insofar as we are talking about the same
thing, just different perspectives. Now, when we say that without the highest good the
moral agent will lose an incentive, as Kant says in the First Critique and in the Dialectic
of the Second Critique (as has been quoted), he is pointing to something different. Here
he is not saying that the moral agent will lose an incentive insofar as the highest good
(the moral law in its completion) is the source of that moral incentive which is called
respect. Kant is saying that the moral agent will lose the motivation that comes with
knowing that his efforts of respecting the moral law (and note here that the moral feeling
of respect is already in action, which confirms that Kant is speaking of “incentive” at a
different level) are not pointless. The moral law (and the highest good as its constructed
object) would still be the source of that moral incentive which Kant calls respect;
nonetheless, if the highest good were impossible, the moral agent would lose another
incentive, namely the one that comes with knowing that his efforts of respecting the
moral law (and with it of building the highest good) are effective.
Now, a superficial reading could suggest that, in this way, I am becoming a
“revisionist” and renouncing the “maximalist” view by repeating the argument given by
Packer, whose position was briefly presented and criticized in Chapter III, but this is not
the case. It is not the case insofar as the way he sees how the highest good serves as an
incentive is completely different than the way this is explained here. Packer sees the
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highest good as an incentive because of his conviction that we cannot do without
happiness, and that the highest good includes such ingredient. In this way he falls prey to
the criticism of heteronomy. In his opinion, “just as the pursuit of happiness for its own
sake is not of itself moral, so, too, on Kant’s account, the mere form of the moral law is
not sufficient to encourage moral willing.”25 The highest good, in his view, solves that
problem by including both elements, namely the moral law and happiness, with the
mentioned negative consequence (that of heteronomy). On the other hand, Packer is
considered a “revisionist” insofar as he thinks that the highest good complements and
even rectifies supposed omissions and problems found in the other sections of Kant’s
ethical corpus (particularly the lack of a proper motivational force for willing the “good,”
insofar as, for Packer, the moral law is not motivationally enough), something that we
have judged as erroneous in the same Chapter, considering that for Kant the moral law is
motivationally enough. But here we are neither falling prey to the problem of
heteronomy, nor becoming “revisionists.” The argument given here for the highest good
as incentive is not subject to the problem of heteronomy, as I have tried to explain and,
furthermore, retains the conditions for being considered part of a “maximalist”
interpretation of the highest good, since it does not contradict any of Kant’s main lines of
thought.
The Highest Good as Necessary for the Overcoming of Evil
So far, it has been argued that the highest good is morally important since without
it the moral law becomes pointless, and since it serves as a proper incentive to the moral
agent. These reasons are found, as we know, in the First and Second Critiques. Now, if
25
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we look forward into what Kant says in the Religion, we can find more reasons that
explain the ethical importance of the highest good.
Particularly in Book III of the Religion, as has been explained in different terms
by Anderson-Gold and by Caswell, Kant argues that the highest good (which now is
named the “ethical community,” one that resembles that of the “moral world” found in
his previous works) is necessary for the overcoming of evil. In Anderson-Gold’s words,
“the ethical commonwealth is the ideal that individuals must propose to one another as
the means for overcoming the ethical state of nature,”26 where the evil principle is
constantly attacking the good one. For Caswell, in turn, “(…) only the adoption of the
highest good as a complete object, as the perfect synthesis of both perfect virtue and
complete happiness, is sufficient to overturn evil.”27 Now, here I do not want to enter into
the detail of how their approaches differ. Instead, I will go directly to Kant’s work and
explain briefly and in my own words how, for him, the highest good is necessary for the
overcoming of evil.
As we have seen in Chapter I, Kant starts Book III of the Religion by recalling the
daily battle, within each individual, between the good and the evil principles. In this
struggle, he adds, the most we can attain is freedom. Nonetheless, this battle is neverending, so we are called to be constantly ready for the battle. Now, in Kant’s search for
the causes of the evil principle, he finds that it arises in community, i.e., the evil principle
emerges when an individual finds other human beings, and not when humans are in
isolation. As he explains:
26
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he (the human being) is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that he is
anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and will despise him for
it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated
with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as he is among
human beings (REL 6:93).
Moral dispositions, hence, get corrupted when humans are among humans
according to Kant. But that the evil principle arises in community opens the door for its
solution at the same level, i.e., at the communitarian level, particularly through the
establishment of a society unified under the good principle or, in other words, under the
laws of virtue. Otherwise, the individual will never be able to completely supersede the
attacks of the evil principle. Kant is convinced, therefore, that unless a society united by
the laws of virtue is established –an ideal that constitutes a duty for humans– the evil
principle will never be superseded. In Kant’s words, “(…) only in this way can we hope
for a victory of the good principle over the evil one” (REL 6:94).
We have seen, in Chapter I, the distinction that, in this same section of the
Religion, Kant elaborates between the ethical state of nature and what he calls the ethicocivil state (namely a society united under the laws of virtue). According to Kant, it is in
the ethical state of nature that ethical dispositions get corrupted among humans. And this
is true, for Kant, “even with the good will of each individual” (REL 6:69). And why is
this the case? As he asserts, “because of a lack of principle which unites them,” which
cause them to deviate, “through their dissentions from the common goal of goodness”
(REL 6:69). Now, a community under the laws of virtue, thanks to which the evil
principle can be superseded, is also called by him the ethical community, and is equated
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with the highest good at 6:97.28 So what Kant is arguing now is that the highest good is
necessary for the overcoming of evil, another reason that proves its moral importance.
Whether it is true or not what Kant presupposes, namely that, in isolation, moral
dispositions remain pure, the thesis according to which in an ethical community, i.e. in a
community united under the laws of virtue, the attacks of the evil principle can be
superseded, is strong. As he explains, there are many evils that arise in community, such
as “envy, addiction to power, avarice” (REL 6:93). Now, we can individually try as much
as we can to not fall prey to these “passions” (as he also calls them); nonetheless, we will
always be in peril of relapsing; so unless we and our fellow humans get engaged in the
common project of constructing the highest good, i.e. of creating an ethical community,
one unified under the good principle, that risk will always be at hand. We are corruptible,
so insofar as there are other humans disrupting our originally good moral disposition,
instead of helping us in our strivings to become better, we will (individually) never be
able to emancipate ourselves from the attacks of the evil principle.
Here we have, therefore, a third reason that explains the ethical importance of the
highest good: it is necessary for nothing less than the overcoming of evil, insofar as,
unless an ethical community is established, the evil principle will never be superseded.
28
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The Highest Good is the Answer to the “Whither” Question
The final reason that I want to present for the task of demonstrating the ethical
importance of the highest good is also found in the Religion, concretely in the Preface to
the First Edition. In relation to this, as we have seen in Chapter I, in that section of the
Religion we find Kant saying how morality needs neither religion nor any end (i.e., no
material determining ground of the will) “either in order to recognize what duty is or to
impel its performance.” (REL 6:4). In this sense, he is being consistent with what he said,
for instance, in the Analytic of the Second Critique. Nonetheless, he adds, it may be the
case that morality has a necessary reference to an end, “not as the grounds of its maxims
but as a necessary consequence accepted in conformity with them” (REL 6:4). Now, why
would that reference be necessary? In Kant’s opinion, because without such an end the
moral agent would be instructed merely “as to how to operate but not as to the whither”
(REL 6:4); and, he adds, if that were the case, the moral agent, and moreover, reason
itself, would never obtain satisfaction. This end, we already know, is the highest good, so
we can say that this idea is also ethically important insofar as it is the answer to the
“whither,” i.e., the “where to” question, which is a fundamental moral question for
humans (something that, as we have seen in Chapter II, has been previously highlighted
by “maximalists” such as Wood, Godlove, Engstrom, and Wike).
What Kant is saying here is fundamental. He is establishing, in simple terms, that
ethics is not only about duties, as many commentators believe,29 but also about a horizon,
a destination. In Kant’s opinion, we cannot do without an answer to the “where to?”
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question. As Kant develops further this idea, morality does not need an end in order to
determine what the right conduct is; nonetheless,
an end proceeds from morality just the same; for it cannot be a matter of
indifference to reason how to answer the question, What is then the result of this
right conduct of ours? nor to what we are to direct our doings or nondoings, even
granted this is not fully in our control, at least as something with which they are to
harmonize (REL 6:5).
And this end, we already know, is the highest good, for whose possibility it is
necessary to postulate the existence of God and of a future life, for the reasons that we
have already analyzed.
In sum, as Kant says, “it cannot be a matter of indifference to morality (…)
whether it does or does not fashion for itself the concept of an ultimate end of all things”
(REL 6:5). The highest good is, for him, this final end, one that, moreover, as we have
seen before, rises out of morality, i.e., is an idea that can be constructed out of the moral
law.
Let me at this point return to what I briefly referred before, namely the tendency,
among Kant scholars, to reduce ethics to the dimension of duties. That is precisely the
reason why the “critics” disregard the highest good as an ethical concept. The highest
good could serve, they admit, for religious purposes, since it is a matter of hope, but not
for ethical ones. In relation to this I do not think that this is the case or that for Kant this
was the case. It is true that the principle of autonomy and the moral law together
constitute the keystones of his moral system, but the latter is not completed by them. As
Phillip Rossi says, “there are (…) good reasons for thinking that autonomy is not the
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whole story of moral personhood for Kant.”30 In fact, Kant’s ethical system is completed
with the inclusion of the highest good as our final destination. Otherwise, we could not
make complete sense of our life.
The Preface to the First Edition of the Religion shows how, for Kant, it is a fact
that morality is also concerned about the results of moral actions, and particularly
concerned about the highest good as the final end of all things. It is an illusion, he would
say, to think that we can live without asking ourselves about the results of our actions
and, more precisely, about our final destination. His genius consists in presenting an end
that proceeds from morality, and this allows him to avoid bringing heteronomy back to
his system. Now, since that final end which is a duty for us can only be thought as
possible through the postulate of God, it turns out to be also a matter of (reasonable)
hope. That explains how the question of hope is also practical, as he states in the First
Critique, and how morality leads to religion.
The highest good, then, as the final end of all things, allows us to answer the
unavoidable and dramatic question of our final destination. The highest good is nothing
less than the ultimate goal of our lives. It is hard, then, to figure how this idea would not
be fundamental for ethics. Thanks to the idea of the highest good we can complement
what we had first, namely a duty (established by the moral law), with a horizon, a
destination, an end, a final and overarching goal (which is grounded on the same moral
law, constructed out of it). The picture, the moral panorama, in this way, is complete, and
our moral life without doubt enriched.
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The ethical question, then, is not only a question of duties, but also a question of
destination (the “whither” question). The highest good in Kant’s ethical system appears
precisely as our individual and collective destination, something that we must promote
and, moreover, something that we can hope for. Hence, the highest good is also important
for practical purposes since it is foreseen as an end, as our individual and collective
destination. In sum, a good account of ethics must include not only duties, but also a
moral final end as one of its components. Kant clearly establishes this.
Kant Did Not Abandon his Idea of the Highest Good
There is one problem left: that of abandonment. This problem, as we know, was
introduced by Eckart Förster, who argues that Kant finally thought of the highest good as
an unimportant element in his theory, since he did not make any substantial reference to it
in his unfinished work: the Opus Postumum. As we have quoted before, in Förster’s
words “(…) the concept of the highest good, so central to Kant’s earlier writings on
ethics and religion, is now mentioned only in passing.”31 If this were true, it would imply
that Kant himself became, at the end of his life, a “critic” of his own idea of the highest
good, by regarding it as irrelevant.
In relation to this, Paul Guyer has made a solid response. In his article entitled
“Beauty, Systematicity, and the Highest Good: Eckart Forster’s Kant’s Final Synthesis,”
Guyer criticizes Forster’s interpretation of Kant’s Opus Postumum. Concretely in relation
to Forster’s claim that Kant finally omitted any substantial reference to the highest good
in his last work, since he thought of it as unimportant, Guyer has contested the following:
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we cannot infer Kant’s retraction of the idea of the highest good and the theory of
practical postulation from this absence of reference to it; an equally plausible
explanation of this absence would be simply that Kant believed he had made his
view adequately clear in the two works of 1793 and did not need to revisit it.32
As we can see, Förster interpretation happens to be a weak one. He definitively
goes too fast when he proposes that Kant finally thought of the highest good as not
essential to his philosophical system, becoming in this way (although he does not say
this, but it is implied) a “critic” of his own idea of it. The alternative interpretation that
Guyer gives seems much more sustainable, considering that the highest good is
mentioned in all of Kant’s major published works. The last of the problems, hence, must
also be dismissed.
Conclusions
As we have seen, according to this reading of the discussion in the secondary
literature, the “critics” have presented six criticisms against Kant’s idea of the highest
good, which in this dissertation have been labeled as the problems of heteronomy,
unsuitability, impossibility, injustice, irrelevance, and abandonment.
The identification and labeling of the criticisms alone constitutes an important
contribution to the discussion around Kant’s idea of the highest good, considering that
any future commentator will know what is required in order to make a complete defense
of this concept (unless, a future “critic” identifies a new potential objection). In fact, like
legal attorneys in front of a lawsuit through which their client is being accused, Kant’s
defenders are called to identify every single accusation posited against the consistency of
his philosophical system. Only after this is a complete defense feasible. Therefore, thanks
32
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to the systematization of the criticisms developed in this dissertation, we now know what
a complete defense of Kant’s idea of the highest good requires, so as Kant’s “attorneys,”
we are better prepared to represent him in front of the so-called “tribunal of reason.”
But this dissertation has targeted more. Once the systematization of the criticism
was complete, we were able both to judge the correctness and completeness of other
attempts to defend Kant’s idea of the highest good, and to elaborate a partially new, but at
last overarching defense of it, without contradicting Kant’s main premises (as the
“revisionists”), or taking out elements of his philosophical system (as the “secularizers”).
As a matter of fact, we have responded to every single accusation posited against Kant’s
idea of the highest good. Let me now repeat, in a sort of synthesis, each response, and
hence show how Kant’s magnificent idea of the highest good can be saved as part of his
ethical system.
In response to the problem of heteronomy, we have explained, in harmony with
previous defenses,33 how Kant himself anticipated this criticism by saying that the
highest good can be thought of as the determining ground of the will only insofar as it has
the moral law as its supreme component. This defense was complemented by showing
that the highest good is an object constructed out of the moral law or, in other words, the
moral law in its total completion. Therefore, it cannot be considered a mere object, i.e.,
one that would bring heteronomy back to the stage, but “the” object par excellence of the
will.
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With regard to the problem of unsuitability, we have seen how the highest good is
“latently” present in the different formulations of the categorical imperative, and
furthermore how it has not only a place, but a privileged one in Kant’s ethical system.
The problem of impossibility was solved by arguing how for Kant the duty to
crown virtue is a fallible one (but still a duty). I have also argued that the “critics” are the
ones responsible for showing that for Kant the duty to crown virtue was an infallible one,
falling prey of the problem of impossibility, and even contradicting himself by asserting
both that moral intentions are obscure but that, nonetheless, we have an infallible duty to
reward virtue.
The problem of injustice was in turn solved by reminding ourselves that Kant’s
ethics is fundamentally an ethics of intentions and not of consequences. We have also
seen how this problem is overestimated, insofar as our attempts to crown virtue will in
many cases match reality; also considering that no action that goes against the law will be
rewarded as a consequence of this duty; and because the option of stopping the rewarding
of virtue seems unrealistic, since the reward of good behavior is something common in
human relationships.
The problem of irrelevance was superseded by showing that the highest good is
important for at least four reasons. First, insofar as without the highest good the moral
law becomes a failed law; second, insofar as, if the highest good were impossible, moral
agents will lose a moral incentive, namely the incentive of knowing that they are engaged
in a project condemned to failure; third, insofar as the highest good is necessary for the
overcoming of evil, as explained by Kant in the Religion; and fourth, because the highest
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good answers the “whither” question, the “where to?” question, the question of our final
destination, which is, without any doubt, an ethical question, whose answer enriches our
moral life.
Finally, in relation to the problem of abandonment, we recalled Guyer’s response,
according to which we cannot infer from Kant’s omission of a substantial reference to the
highest good in his final/unpublished work (which is known as the Opus Postumum) that
Kant abandoned his idea of it, as Forster argues. This is a precipitated conclusion that can
be contested by the counter argument, which seems more plausible: that according to
which Kant did not develop his idea of the highest good in a detailed way in this final
work again, insofar as he thought that it was sufficiently developed in his former works.
Once all the criticisms have been responded to, Kant’s idea of the highest good
emerges again, by its own merit, in its entire splendor, like the sun in the horizon, as it
always happens with all those ideas that are both well inspired and wisely unfolded. Not
by chance the concept of the highest good has been “the” ethical topic of all the most
important heroes of thought before Kant, from Plato34 to Bonaventure.35 One of Kant’s
merits was to dare to retake it, with its religious features, nothing less than in the peak of
Modernity, a time in which this concept was almost completely abandoned,36 perhaps due
to the suspicious attitude towards religion and authorities in general, which was
34
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characteristic of the Enlightenment;37 and not only did he dare to retake the highest good
as a philosophical topic, but he did it in a very original way, in a way that was compatible
with his so called “deontological” approach to ethics.
Now the question is, will we dare to retake (and even reformulate, if necessary)
this idea again, in times where relativism is perceived by many as “politically correct,” in
the midst of this crisis of meaning and orientation that is called post-Modernity, in this
“desert of our cultural nihilism”38 which is characteristic of our times, our world? Perhaps
by doing it, always with the help of the heroes of spirit and their never-ending heritage,
we will be able to reconstruct a common destiny, to attain a new account of the highest
good towards which we will orient our lives, both as individuals and as a worldwide
community; in sum, to foresee something worthy of living and dying for, an idea that will
allow us to create a better world, always under the light that shines from the Good.

37
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